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A FRENCH VIEW OF ENGLISH CATHOLICITY,

FROM the "Anglo-Catholic" current our author turns to the Catholic Revival, properly so called. The chapter entitled "Les Progrès du Catholicisme" is devoted chiefly to Newman, confessedly the greatest of all the converts the Church had gained through the Oxford Movement. It is in some respects a sad history. There existed, among a certain section of English Catholics, a distrust of Newman's methods, and even a suspicion that he was tainted with that form of "Liberalism" which had attacked some continental Catholics, and which issued in the deplorable and now rapidly dying "Old Catholic" schism. Manning himself imagined that Newman's desire was to create a sort of Oxford flavored, Anglican Catholicism, while his own conviction was that what the Church and the Christian faith needed then was insistance on the authority and infallibility of the Church's central and sovereign power—the Supreme Pontiff. The fact was that Manning, above all things a man of action, failed to appreciate the peculiar width and subtlety of Newman's grasp of any question, which enabled him to see and weigh both sides of a problem in a way that few are able to do. This wonderful capacity was remarkably manifested in Newman's line with regard to the *Rambler,* a review published under the auspices of some Catholics of "liberal" tendencies, and with regard to which he was asked to intervene by the Bishops. The moderation of his action caused him to incur the vehement opposition of certain members of the so-called

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Ultramontane school, notably W. G. Ward, in the *Dublin Review.* The whole controversy can merely be alluded to here, but the lack of confidence in the great Oratorian on the part of a section of English Catholics hindered the work he might have done in various public undertakings and cast a shadow over the next twenty years of his life—a shadow only wholly removed when our Holy Father Leo XIII. raised him to the Sacred College in 1879. The intense sympathies of Newman's nature and his extraordinary sensitiveness of heart had a twofold result: they often caused him, simply because he tried to look at every question with sympathy for another's point of view, to be wholly misunderstood and his motives entirely misconstrued, and at the same time they brought to himself deep suffering of mind and heart which a shallower or less complex nature could not have experienced. But anything more opposite to the facts than the suspicion that Newman belonged to the liberalizing school, or was touched with the "Cis-alpine" heresy, could not be conceived. Never had Rome a more devoted son; never did the Vicar of Christ raise to the sacred purple a more faithful servant of the Church.

In view of this there is a pathetic note in a letter written by him to the Rev. Fr. Whitty on March 19, 1865, in which the following passages occur:

"I think, and with some comfort, that I have ever tried to act as others told me, and, if I have not done more, it has been because I have not been put to do more, or have been stopped when I attempted more.

"The Cardinal brought me from Littlemore to Oscott, he sent me to Rome, he stationed and left me in Birmingham. When the Holy Father wished me to begin the Dublin Catholic University, I did so at once. When the Synod of Oscott gave me to do the new translation of Scripture, I began it without a word. When the Cardinal asked me to interfere in the matter of the *Rambler,* I took on myself, to my sore disgust, a great trouble and trial. Lastly, when my Bishop, proprio motu, asked me to undertake the mission of Oxford, I at once committed myself to a very expensive purchase of land and began, as he wished me, to collect money for a church. In all these matters I think (in spite of many incidental mistakes) I should, on the whole, have done a work had I been allowed or aided to go on with them; but it has been our God's Blessed Will that I should have been stopped.

"If I could get out of my mind the notion that I could do something and am not doing it, nothing could be happier, more peaceful or more to my taste than the life I lead."

With regard to the action of our second great Cardinal-Arch-

bishop in his relations with Newman, we can scarcely do better than refer to the admirable remarks of M. Thureau-Dangin ("Seconde partie," pp. 331-333), who quotes, as applicable to these two Princes of the Church, Newman's own vivid sketch of the contrast between the characters of S. Gregory of Nazianzum and S. Basil, in his "Arians of the Fourth Century." The Catholic Church in England and the English people could have spared neither their Gregory nor their Basil.

Long before his elevation to the Cardinalate Newman had won the regard and reverence of all his countrymen, of whatever creed, whose regard was worth having, and who were capable of reverence for what was great, and noble, and saintly. The attack made on him, charging him and his brethren in the priesthood with possessing no love for truth, and, in fact, with placing dexterous lying among the virtues of a Christian character, by Mr. C. Kingsley, then a well-known clergyman of the "Broad Church" school, was the occasion of Newman's writing his immortal "Apologia." It was deplorable that a man, in many respects worthy of admiration, as Mr. Kingsley was, should have sunk to such controversial depths. The first edition of Newman's reply—now by no means easy to procure—contains his rejoinder to Kingsley's personal attacks and misstatements, taken *seriatim,* under the title of "Blot No. 1," "No. 2," and so on. It is delightful reading, sparkling with the writer's finest irony. He withdrew it, however, in later editions as possessing a temporary rather than a permanent interest, and as not affecting the main thesis of the book.

Mr. Kingsley's is to-day an almost unknown name among the majority of Anglicans; his calumnies have been relegated to the limbo of forgotten scandals, but the "Apologia" of Cardinal Newman will live and win from countless readers admiration and love for its saintly author so long as our English tongue shall last. From the day of its publication the English nation—all of it that was willing to be and capable of being enlightened, and this in spite of our proverbial prejudices, is surely the vast majority—recognized the honesty and the greatness of Newman, trusted and admired him and was proud to think that he was "English of the English." The result to the Church was necessarily of the happiest kind. "Quelque chose de son prestige, de sa popularité reconquise, rejaillissait sur tous les catholiques. De cette date, le nom de 'converti' a cessé d'être décrié" (p. 362).

Another event, shortly following, served to show the altered feeling of the country. Cardinal Wiseman, who had been for many years winning his way in the public life of England, died on February 15, 1865, after a life of magnificent service for God, the Church and

the English people he loved so deeply. His funeral wore all the signs of a national mourning. London had seen nothing like it, as the *Times* itself affirmed, since the funeral of the Duke of Wellington. It was difficult to think that this was the country that, with many honorable exceptions, had shrieked itself into hysterics fifteen years before at the restoration of the hierarchy.

The last chapter of M. Thureau-Dangin's second volume returns to the affairs of the Anglican Church. It deals first with the "Broad Church" section, with Stanley, now Dean of Westminster; Jowett, master of Balliol and regius professor of Greek at Oxford; with F. D. Maurice, Anthony Hort and Frederic Robertson. The author shows a fine and accurate judgment in his treatment of the teaching and influence of these various leaders. He recognizes that, from the point of a believer in the Christian Revelation, it would be rank injustice to associate the two first of these with the other three. The two groups represent a perfectly different "Broad Churchism." In fact, by Stanley's own avowals, and still more by Jowett's, we cannot class their opinions as belonging to "churchism" of any sort. Both believed conscientiously that they were justified in retaining their position in the Anglican communion, though dogmatic Christianity was a matter of indifference to both, and Jowett scarcely professed to retain any belief in it. They have their followers to-day, though of less celebrity than themselves, and the possibility of such phenomena throws an illuminating light on the life, the supposed witness to the faith and the discipline of Anglicanism. The "Essays and Reviews" controversy, in which writings synodically condemned by convocation were declared by the judicial committee of the Privy Council to be not repugnant to the doctrines of the Anglican Church, is a further illustration of them. So is the Colenso case, in which the Bishop of Natal, condemned and deprived by ecclesiastical authority, was supported by the same civil power in the temporalities of his see. Both these controversies were a terrible scandal to the best Anglican clergy and laity. M. Thureau-Dangin gives a fair and lucid account of them. And he has some wise words as to the undue haste with which, àpropos of these deplorable affairs, Biblical criticism *as a whole* was decried and condemned. Many statements, critical and historical, now accepted generally, have been at first treated as heresies against the faith. It is good to compare the lack of proportion and the hasty conclusions of certain individual theologians with the wise patience of our Mother the Catholic Church. The Biblical Commission, appointed by the Holy Father, is just now turning the eyes of Catholics to this subject, and they know that the conclusions reached at Rome, whatever they may be, will assign to theological, historical and natural science their rightful place.

M. Thureau-Dangin's third and concluding volume is, as he tells us in his short foreword, composed of two distinct parts. The necessity, in the preceding volume "de dédoubler, en quelque sort, mon sujet, pour suivre separément les deux courants issus du Mouvement d'Oxford, d'une part le courant proprement catholique, de l'autre le courant 'anglo-catholique,' qui tendait à catholiciser plus on moins l'anglicanisme," he finds still more imperative as he proceeds in his work. "Plus on s'éloigne du mouvement originaire, plus cette séparation devient manifeste, et, plus, par suite, elle s'impose à l'historien." The first five chapters, therefore, treat of the history of the Church in England from the death of Cardinal Wiseman to that of Cardinal Manning, and this history, as the author remarks, develops itself around the two great leading figures of Newman and the second Archbishop of Westminster.

The question of Cardinal Wiseman's successor in the metropolitical see of England raised much discussion and some contention. The Chapter of Westminster, meeting a month after the Cardinal's decease, sent to Rome a *terna,* the first name on which was that of Mgr. Errington, followed by those of Dr. Clifford, Bishop of Clifton, and Dr. Grant, Bishop of Southwark. Mgr. Errington had been Wiseman's coadjutor, *cum jure successionis,* but owing to the difficulties that arose between the Cardinal and himself (difficulties that had their source in temperament, upbringing and a difference of ideal as to the right course for the Church in England to pursue in order to win back her rightful place), the Holy Father had revoked the appointment. It was understood that, while the Cardinal represented the policy of the Vatican, Mgr. Errington stood for the representative of the old hereditary Catholics of England. However regrettable may have been the difficulties between them, no blame whatever can be attached to the Cardinal, while Mgr. Errington's line of action—his modesty and ready self-effacement—won for him the added respect and affection of those who knew his real piety and worth.

His nomination by the Westminster Chapter seemed, however, like a declaration against the splendid administration that had just closed; and we can scarcely wonder that Pius IX. characterized it as *un insulto al Papa.* The other two Bishops nominated were viewed with favor by Cardinal Barnabo, Prefect of Propaganda, Dr. Grant being known as a *persona grata* to the English sovereign and government, and Dr. Clifford as the same to the English Catholic aristocracy. If the matter had been left with Propaganda, one of these would in all likelihood have succeeded to the Archbishopric. But, following a rare precedent, Pius IX. took the matter into his own hands, and putting aside the three candidates of the chapter—

all Bishops and Catholics by birth—named Henry Edward Manning, a convert and a simple priest, Archbishop of Westminster and head of the Church in England.

Nothing could redound more to his honor than every step he took on this almost unparalleled elevation—his simplicity, his earnest devotion, his self-distrust, his universal kindliness and geniality. Nothing could redound more to the honor of the Chapter of Westminster than the whole-hearted welcome they gave to their new Archbishop.

Manning's administration carried on and developed that of his illustrious predecessor. M. Thureau-Dangin (pp. 9 et seqq.) gives an appreciation, at once admiring and discriminating, of the character and work of the Archbishop. He was a born ruler and held the reins of power inflexibly in his own hands. His capacity for work, his influence over men of all grades and all kinds, his intense love and pity for the poor, for all suffering and oppressed, his unfailing sympathy with his clergy—these were some of the outstanding notes of the twenty-seven years during which he ruled England's primatial see. His zeal for education was immense; the Westminster Diocesan Education Fund, which he founded in 1866, enabled him to double the number of children in the Catholic schools of the archdiocese, raising them from 11,245 to 22,580. There was scarcely a great social or philanthropic enterprise in London which did not seek the support of the Archbishop. A "Mansion House Fund Committee" would have seemed strange if his name had not appeared amongst its members. We remember, the Sunday after his death, hearing a celebrated Anglican clergyman declare that he had been, more than any other man, instrumental in restoring Catholics to their place in the respect and confidence of their fellow-countrymen. We should demur to the exclusiveness of this statement, but if we associate Wiseman and Newman with their brother Cardinal it is undoubtedly a simple statement of a fact that cannot be challenged.

There is one feature in Manning's character which, in view of the uncompromising nature of his line in religious and ecclesiastical matters, might easily be lost sight of—a feature which appears most emphatically in his later journals. We mean the tenderness he felt for those outside the Church, his sympathy with their difficulties, his wide toleration (in the true sense of the word) for those in error. It was another side of that sensitive generosity of heart that went out so unrestrainedly to all in suffering. In presenting the faith to his countrymen he never lost sight of their limitations, their prejudices, or those inherent instincts (so often overlaid by ignorance and distorted by inherited tradition) of fair play and justice which mark the Anglo-Saxon character.

M. Thureau-Dangin treats at length two interesting events which brought the Church into definite relations with Anglicanism and which, though in neither case could Catholic authority approve, yet were no doubt of service in developing, for many minds, the progress of "Anglo-Catholicism" towards the fullness of the faith. The first of these was the Association for the Promotion of the Unity of Christendom, founded on September 8, 1857, by Ambrose Phillips de Lisle, a convert since 1825, and George Frederick Lee, vicar of All Saints', Lambeth. De Lisle was known as one of the most admirable of Catholic laymen; he was, in a measure quite unshared by other English Catholics, enthusiastically hopeful of the return of the Anglican Church to Catholic communion, and in this sense he wrote at length, some months before the A. P. U. C. came into being, to the Cardinal Prefect of Propaganda. His motive was beyond praise, but his miscalculation of the extent of the movement towards reunion among Anglicans, and of the real temper of even most High Churchmen, was both pathetic and extraordinary. Among those looking towards reunion and submission to the Apostolic See he reckoned ten Bishops, and among these he included the violently anti-Roman Samuel Wilberforce! The association at first numbered many Catholics as well as Anglicans; the prayer "Domine Jesu Christe, Qui dixisti apostolis Tuis," which immediately follows the "Agnus Dei" in the Mass, was chosen for the daily recitation of the associates, and a periodical called the *Union Review* was established, in which articles from both Catholics and Anglicans were published, some—and those not entirely from the Anglican side—of a description that ecclesiastical authority could not allow to pass unnoticed. However admirable the intentions of the founders, we cannot wonder that, in April, 1864, the English episcopate addressed a memorandum to Rome against the participation of Catholics in the association, and that this was condemned in the following September by a rescript from the Holy Office. Since then the association has consisted of Anglicans only. From it, however, sprung, in 1877, the "Order of Corporate Reunion," which had in view the special object of clearing away the initial obstacles to reunion which lay in the (at least) insecurity of the sacraments—of the episcopate and priesthood—of the Anglican Church. In the following year three members of the O. C. R. were secretly baptized, confirmed, ordained priests and then consecrated Bishops by—it is currently believed—one or more of the schismatic Jansenist Bishops of Holland. To avoid questions of jurisdiction, the consecration is said to have taken place on the high seas. Dr. Lee, one of the originators of both the A. P. U. C. and the O. C. R., was one of these Bishops thus consecrated; Dr. Thomas Mossman, rector of Torrington, Lin-

colnshire, was another. It is matter of great thankfulness to know that both died in the bosom of the Church. Who the third was is a question still shrouded in mystery. A number of Anglican clergymen were conditionally reordained, it is said, by them. The number has been put as high as 800, but probably this is a gross exaggeration. We heard it computed by a convert in Rome two years ago as about 200, but the facts will perhaps never be really known. It is not believed that any successors were consecrated to the episcopate.

The other event to which we have alluded was the publication of Dr. Pusey's famous "Eirenicon," which took the form of a letter to Mr. Keble, and which saw the light in September, 1865. It was, in fact, a development of the thesis of Tract XC. Pusey saw nothing in the *authoritative* teaching of the Catholic Church with which the Anglican formularies could not be reconciled, but he laid stress on what he termed the *excrescences* of Catholic popular teaching and practice. The Council of Trent formed, in his eyes, no difficulty to reunion. In pursuance of this conviction he paid a visit, in the month following the appearance of the "Eirenicon," to several French Bishops, among them Mgr. Darboy, the Archbishop of Paris, afterwards martyred at the barricades in the Commune of 1871. He believed himself to have received so much encouragement that he returned to France during the following winter and, among other prelates, visited the celebrated Mgr. Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans. Unfortunately, the biographies both of Mgr. Darboy and of Mgr. Dupanloup are silent on the subject, and the possessors of the private papers of those illustrious prelates have not been able to furnish M. Thureau-Dangin with any information. In England, both among Catholics and Anglicans, there was a sharp divergence of estimate as to the line taken by the "Eirenicon." Probably it is never read nowadays; but it remains a witness to Pusey's good faith and pious hopes, and it was the means of producing in a letter to the author a magnificent defense of the homage paid by Catholics to the Mother of God on the part of Dr. Newman—a homage which, strangely enough, Dr. Pusey had vehemently attacked while delivering what he desired to be his earnest plea for peace and union.

Another remarkable publication of this period was a commentary on the Thirty-nine Articles by Bishop Alex. P. Forbes, Anglican Bishop of Brechin, a man of wide culture, real scholarship and deep piety. He had been some years previously censured by his fellow-Bishops in Scotland for the strongly Catholic character of his teaching on the Blessed Eucharist. The censure had, of course, been, like other Anglican sentences, wholly inoperative, and the Bishop's present publication emphasized more strongly than ever the ad-

vanced nature of his convictions. In great part this commentary on the Articles was a manual, so far as it went, of Catholic theology. Like Sancti Clara's book in the seventeenth century and Tract XC. in 1841, the Bishop demonstrated the ease with which the equivocal statements of the Articles could be interpreted with little violence to Catholic truth. We have heard an Anglican Bishop in Scotland describe the work as "special pleading." The charge may be true, but *every* interpretation of the extraordinary document so much prized by Protestant-minded Anglicans is no less special pleading. It is almost impossible to believe in the good faith of the original framers of the Articles, but they were certainly past masters in the art of concealing their real purpose and in saving themselves, by some dexterous *tour de force,* from a conclusion to which their previous statements seemed expressly designed to lead up. It has always been a puzzle to us why a section of Anglicans are so attached to the Articles, when at almost every point you may drive a coach-and-six through this supposed bulwark of Protestant orthodoxy.

A long chapter is, inevitably, devoted to the Œucumenical Council which was opened at the Vatican in December, 1869. M. Thureau-Dangin gives a clear and impartial account of the state of feeling, in England especially, on the subject of the definition of Papal infallibility which, it was clearly understood, would be brought before the Council. The attitude of both the Opportunists and Inopportunists is fairly described, though it is clear that the author's sympathies are with Newman rather than with Ward and others who represented what was regarded by some as an extreme of "Ultramontanism." Even to trace the outlines of the great Council and its work would be impossible here, but there are two points in connection with that work which are too often lost sight of and which we may briefly refer to. There is a widespread notion that the Council met simply for the definition of the infallibility, and that its other proceedings were unimportant. In reality, the Council dealt with a long list of subjects, all of capital importance to religion, the Church and human society; and but for the invasion of the city by Victor Emmanuel's troops in September, 1870, would no doubt on its reassembling have dealt with many more. The infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff, when speaking ex cathedra as supreme pastor and doctor he defines any point in faith or morals to be held by the whole Church, was only one of these subjects. Again, the definition is commonly looked upon as the victory of the extreme Ultramontanists in the Council. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Divine guidance of the Church was never more clearly manifested. The Council had but expressed, in terms

of guarded moderation, what the whole Church believed. M. Thureau-Dangin's thoughtful words deserve to be quoted. After speaking of the misunderstanding of the real scope of the definition on the part of Dr. Pusey and others, he continues:

"Plus tard, quand on a pu juger les choses avec plus de sang-froid et qu'on a mieux connu les délibérations du concile, on s'est rendu compte qu'en dépit de certaines apparences, loin d'avoir consacré la victoire d'un parti, la haute assemblée s'est élevée dans une région supérieure à celle des rivalités de personnes et des querelles d'écoles, qu'elle a écarté les idées excessives que certains prétendaient lui imposer, que, si elle a donné tort à la minorité sur l'opportunité de la définition, elle a tenu un large compte de ses observations, en écartant les formules trop absolves, d'abord proposées, en précisant et en limitant les cas très exceptionnels où s'exerce l'infaillibilité, si bien que le dogme ainsi défini diffère notablement des thèses sontenues par les plus véhéments des controversistes infaillibilistes d'avant le concile, et que cette définition est moins un succès pour eux qu'une garantie contre leurs exagérations. Ainsi, en dépit des passions des homces, s'est rélisée la divine promesse de l'assistance de l'Esprit Saint." (Pp. 144, 145.)

And if anything were wanted to show to the world the splendid unity of the Church, that want was supplied in the not merely submissive, but willing and joyful acceptance of the definition by Opportunists and Inopportunists alike. Not one Bishop in the whole Catholic Church hesitated for one moment as to his adhesion. The pitiful "Old Catholic" schism, now rapidly nearing its final extinction, scarcely availed to make, even for an hour, a false note in the harmony of the kingdom of Christ.

Among non-Catholics the failure to understand the drift of the definition of infallibility was extraordinary. Bismarck made the result of the Council the pretext for the "May Laws" and the Kulturkampf that followed his anti-Catholic legislation—proceedings that were made the subject of enthusiastic acclamation in a large meeting held in London of so-called Liberals, men who did not understand how liberty of conscience is the foundation of all true liberty in human society. Lord John Russell, who was to have presided at this meeting, but was hindered by ill health, published a letter, the tone of which recalled only too accurately that of his notorious "Durham Letter," more than twenty years before. This "Liberal" statesman secured by his action the thanks of the German Chancellor and of his imperial master—truly a strange political alliance!

What was far more astonishing, however, and far more deplorable was the line taken by Mr. Gladstone, who in November, 1874, published a pamphlet under the title "The Vatican Decrees in Their

Bearing on Civil Allegiance: A Political Expostulation." The burden of this publication was that the Church, in consequence of her recent action, had changed her character, with results that no civil government could view without suspicion and alarm. The renown of the author caused, within a few weeks, the sale of no less than 120,000 copies. The Protestant section of the community was, of course, overjoyed to find an ally so illustrious and so unexpected, and the extraordinary strength and even violence of the language of the pamphlet stirred up all that was most unworthy in English prejudice. Manning replied to the great statesman in a powerful letter to the *Times,* and a few weeks later in a more elaborate and extended refutation. But what brought back the mind of the country to sanity was the famous "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk," which, before Manning's second protest, appeared on December 27, 1874, from the pen of John Henry Newman. The venerable Oratorian showed how the Syllabus, published in 1864, which had shared Gladstone's vehement denunciations, was simply a list of errors condemned in recent Pontifical pronouncements; how the definition of infallibility had simply declared the possession by the Pope of an authority which had not only been constantly acknowledged, but continually put in practice. The allusion made to the unhappy schism of the "Old Catholics" was at once pathetic and uncompromising. The whole tone of the "Letter," its splendid English, its firmness, joined to its tender sympathy, produced a wonderful effect. As M. Thureau-Dangin writes:

"Les protestants de bonne foi sont ébrantés, touchés par cette argumentation sincère, forte, oraiment libérale, écrite en une langue qu'ils comprennent, qu'ils admirent, et où rien ne les blesse. Gladstone a recontré le contradicteur qui est le mieux en mesure de contenir et de désarmer les passions qu'il a sonlevées. Les catholiques, en général, sont fiers de leur champion et reconnaissants du secours qu'il leur apporte dans cette crise périlleuse" (p. 182). There were a few, indeed, who affected to see in this act of noble service to our holy religion the work of a "minimizer;" but Rome did not see the matter in their light. Newman had stood forth as the champion and defender of the rights of the Holy See. Pius IX. recognized the good the "Letter" had accomplished, and a few years later the saintly recluse of Oscott took his place—his merit and the grandeur of his work no longer doubted, or obscured, or mistrusted—among the Princes of the Church. Rome and Christendom rejoiced in the long-merited and long-deferred honor when our Holy Father Leo XIII. crowned that splendid career with the dignity of the sacred purple.

The chapter following that which treats of the Council has for its title "Les Deux Cardinaux," and relates the creation of both the

illustrious English ecclesiastics to the Sacred College. It was significant of how times were altered to note the universal satisfaction when the Archbishop of Westminster, in 1875, was thus promoted, and still more when, four years later, the great Oratorian received the same dignity. We say "universal," for all Protestants of good will were conscious that two of the foremost Englishmen of the day had received a recognition which reflected honor, not on the recipients alone, but on their country. The last years of both Cardinals were spent amidst the veneration and deep appreciation of their fellow-countrymen, and each passed away surrounded on every side by the grateful homage of the land they had loved and served so devotedly. Henceforward no sane person could imagine that good citizenship and devoted Catholicity were incompatible terms.

The later years of the Cardinal-Archbishop were full of manifold activities, not only spiritual and ecclesiastical, but scientific, social and philanthropic. His enthusiasm for the cause of temperance is well known and won him a profound influence among the London poor. Still more striking was his work in connection with the great strike of the "dockers" in 1889. It was to him far more than to any other man that the suffering and danger of that long period of trouble was finally brought to an end; and it was in simple recognition of this that the agreement at last effected was known by London and by the country generally as "The Cardinal's Peace." The Anglican Bishop of London, who had been associated in the efforts to bring the strike to an end, had retired in despair from a task, the difficulties of which he felt to be insurmountable; the aged Catholic prelate had been able to achieve a complete triumph for the social peace of East London. No wonder that, when he lay in state at the Archbishop's house, in January, 1892, among the many thousands who flocked to pay him a last homage were countless workmen, their wives and families, whom his efforts had rescued from dire distress. The very fact that he was a Prince of the Church seemed forgotten in the sense that between those tall burning candles lay the unwearied, invincible friend of London's poor and suffering millions.

Nothing could be a greater contrast to this life, full of outward activities, than the quiet obscurity of S. Philip's house at Oscott. Yet Newman was none the less in intimate touch with all that was best in the life and thought of his country. M. Thureau-Dangin's account of those last years—their calm and intense serenity after the storm and stress of the long life—is eloquently touching and worthy of his subject. The famous Archbishop he admires and venerates in fullest measure; but the illustrious son of S. Philip is to the last his hero, on whom he lavishes all the homage of a loving reverence. We cannot refrain from quoting a few sentences:

"Le temps, loin d'avoir effacé la gloire de Newman, l'a consacrée. Plus quejamais, l'Angleterre entière reconnâit en lui un de ses plus grands hommes, admirant son génie, honorant sa vertu et subissant encore, par-delà le tombeau, le charme singulier que, vivant, il exerçait sur ceux que l'approchaient. Ce qui vaut miex que la confirmation de cette gloire, c'est la persistance de l'action bienfaisante qu'il exerce sur les âmes. Aujourd'hui encore, nulle conversion d'anglicans au Catholicisme où l'on ne discerne son influence. Ses ouvrages, sans cesse réédités, sont lus avidement par chaque génération nouvelle. Il n'est pas de nom qui ait, aux yeux des catholiques anglais, un tel prestige et dont ils se parent avec autant d'orgueil" (p. 290).

The world has seen few writers so many-sided in their genius. The preacher who could give to the world the "Parochial and Plain Sermons" before and the "Sermons to Mixed Congregations" after his submission to the Church; the scholar and historian who could write the "Arians of the Fourth Century" and the "Historical Sketches;" the theologian who could produce the "Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine" and the various theological tracts; the Christian controversialist whose keenest shaft was winged with charity, who has given us the "Difficulties of Anglicanism" and the inimitable "Present Position of Catholics in England;" the poet who could leave behind him such a chef-d'œuvre as the "Dream of Gerontius," and, lastly, the writer who could pen such stories as "Callista" and "Loss and Gain," must indeed be reckoned as in the very front rank of the immortals. Of the "Apologia" we have already spoken at some length.

With the departure of the two great Cardinals the history of the Church in England necessarily entered on a new epoch. Two generations of heroic effort had lifted her from the obscurity and depression of the penal laws; she was once more an evident power in the land that once was all her own. The years that have passed since 1892 are too recent to be weighed as yet in the balance of history, but M. Thureau-Dangin's estimate of the present period of English Catholic life is no doubt a true one: "On dirait un instant de répit après un effort violent, une pose en terrain plat après une laborieuse et heureuse ascension. Personne toutefois n'a le sentiment que cette situation suit durable et définitive, et que l'èvolution commencée, il y a soixante ans, doive s'arrêter là. Si peu qu'il en paraisse maintenant au dehors, le ferment catholique qui a été déposé dans la conscience anglaise, n'est pas mort; il y continue, dans l'ombre et le silence, son mystérieux travail" (p. 309).

The last four chapters of this long and exhaustive study of the religious side of English history during the last century are occu-

pied with an interesting and sympathetic account of the Anglican Church, especially in her more Catholic aspect, in the period following the "Tractarian" epoch. The movement had taken, to a large extent, a new form. It was no longer essentially the work of learned university men, whose names as scholars and writers were well known to the public ear; it had become, primarily, the inspiration of a new ideal of parochial life, marked by intense activity and true devotion. Also, while the older school, while grasping with invincible firmness certain Catholic principles and doctrines, had shrunk from any remarkable outward manifestation of these, their later followers were persuaded that Catholic convictions must issue in Catholic worship ceremonially expressed; that men must be taught by the eye as well as by the ear. The "Ritualists," as this younger school of High Churchmen came to be called (it was a singular misnomer, as very few of them were authorities on the Roman or any other rite!), were far from receiving the entire sympathy of the older "Anglo-Catholics;" but they have succeeded in causing such a revolution in Anglican worship and the ornaments of Anglican churches as would have been deemed impossible even half a century ago. The triumphant "Moderate High Churchism" of to-day, in its ceremonial aspect, would have been in those days branded as unblushing Popery. The kind of function now beloved by Bishops and the fashionable Anglican world is immeasurably more "advanced" than what in many parishes caused riot and uproar in our fathers' days. It is another question whether this wide acceptance of ceremonial at all connotes acceptance of such Catholic doctrine and discipline as were the very life of the Oxford leaders of 1833 and afterwards—men whose outward expression of their earnest faith would be considered nowadays bold, inadequate and even grotesque.

In the earlier days of "Ritualism" this was not so. Men like Charles Lowder, Alexander Mackonochie and Arthur Henry Stanton cared nothing for vestments, lights and incense, *in themselves.* There was no æsthetic self-gratification in the worship at S. Peter's, London Docks, or S. Alban's, Holborn. But such men, like thousands of the best of Anglican clergymen and laymen to-day, were convinced that this ceremonial was part of their heritage as belonging to "a branch of the Catholic Church," and was, also, expressly ordained by the "Ornaments Rubric" in the Book of Common Prayer; moreover, they knew by their own experience the effect that it produced in impressing the truth they held and in drawing their people to a fuller faith and a devouter worship.

There were two great objects that the "Ritualists" of forty and fifty years ago and their successors to-day set before themselves—

to restore the homage due to our Divine Lord in the Holy Eucharist, and by means of the Sacrament of Penance to bring souls out of the bondage of sin to a new and loyal Christian life. And these were the men whom Bishops charged against and persecuted, and whom wretches like the paid spies of the "Church Association" were allowed to bear witness against in civil courts—these men whose whole lives were spent in the service of the poorest, and whose one aim was the restoration of the fallen and the guiding of the faithful. The story of the "Victorian Persecution," as it used to be called, is a story of true heroism displayed in the face of overwhelming odds; of quiet, unassuming sacrifice, and of suffering borne unflinchingly and uncomplainingly; and, on the other hand, of meanness, cruelty and persistent malice, that makes an Englishman blush that such things could be in a country that prated of tolerance and religious freedom.

Beginning with the troubles, more than half a century ago, at S. Barnabas', Pimlico, M. Thureau-Dangin traces the history of the "Anglo-Catholic" movement through the riots at St. George's-in-the-East, the futile Royal Commission, the prosecutions of Mr. Mackonochie, Mr. Bennett (who secured for his teaching on the Eucharist a favorable judgment from the judicial committee of the Privy Council) and Mr. Punhas, the controversy on the Athanasian Creed, the storm which attended the petition addressed to convocation of 483 clergymen desiring the proper instruction and due license of those who were to act as confessors in the Anglican Church, and the disgraceful and wholly abortive Public Worship Regulation Act of 1874. The implacable Protestant section of Anglicanism, after trying with very indifferent success to obtain anything more than words from the Bishops, turned to Parliament, and there the Primate, Dr. Tait, introduced a bill, which the government of the day supported, with the avowed design of "putting down Ritualism." Looking at the whole question from without, it was at any rate obvious that the Ritualists had, to say the least of it, as much standing ground within the wide limits of Anglicanism as their persecutors. The position is not logical, nor is it possible to a Church that really pretends to authority in teaching; but, given the conditions that prevail in that society, it is inevitable. From every point of view, therefore, the action of the Protestant section was intolerable. To a dweller in the United States, where religious freedom is really understood, such action must seem an impossible anachronism; yet it took place in England towards the end of the nineteenth century! The result at the moment was an immense majority in both Houses of Parliament in favor of the policy of persecution. Nineteen Bishops voted in favor of the bill, two abstained from voting, only

one (Dr. Moberley, of Salisbury—let his memory be had in honor for his solitary stand for justice and equity) against the measure. The eventual result, after several prosecutions and the imprisonment of a number of hard-working, devoted clergy, was absolute failure—"un coup manqué," as M. Thureau-Dangin terms the act.

The "Persecution Company, Limited," however, was hard to quell, and the fatuous bitterness of its relentless persecution of Mr. Mackonochie is a dark episode in English religious history. Utterly discredited as it was, it still had power to vex and harass and eventually to shatter, both in body and mind, one of the best, bravest and most self-sacrificing of the Anglican clergy. The well-known story of the exchange between him and Mr. Suckling, vicar of St. Peter's, London Docks, at the suggestion of the dying Archbishop Tait, of Mr. Mackonochie's continued persecution and deprivation, and of his pathetic death amid the snows of the Mamore Forst, in the Western Highlands, is told with much sympathy. After a short lull in the strife Mr. Bell Cox, of St. Margaret's, Liverpool, was added to the ranks of the clergy imprisoned for conscience sake. Then followed the St. Paul's "reredos case," in which the veto pronounced against the prosecution of the Dean and Chapter by Temple, Bishop of London, was sustained by the House of Lords. This was a severe blow to the persecutors, and the result of the trial of the venerated Bishop of Lincoln before the Archbishop of Canterbury (Dr. Benson), confirmed as it was by that very judicial committee which in times past had shown itself as intolerant of the introduction of "Ritualistic practices," was a still more crushing one. The later campaign of ruffianism and sacrilegious disturbance of church services carried on by John Kensit, a London bookseller in a small way, and his bands of "Wickliff preachers" are shortly mentioned. They were exhibitions that disgusted all religious-minded and fair-minded people of whatever creed, and the best cause in the world could scarcely have sustained the assistance of such defenders. No general recrudescence of persecution was to be feared from the grotesque and blasphemous performances of these latest champions of so-called Protestantism.

In fact, the Ritualists have, to a great extent, triumphed all along the line. But there is one underlying fact which hopelessly vitiates the comparatively favorable decisions of later years. Archbishop Benson would not even hold his court as metropolitan (or in virtue of the old rights which belonged to the successor of St. Augustine as *ex officio* Papal Legate, which, according to one opinion, he was attempting to exercise!) until he had secured the recognition of his jurisdiction from the Privy Council. And from his judgment an appeal lay to the judicial committee and was actually carried there,

as to the Supreme Court in ecclesiastical cases. These facts reduce the apparent victory to something very like an accident, for who can foretell what the next decision of the committee may be? Unless the Anglican Church succeeds in ridding herself of this temporal supremacy in spiritual matters, all other questions, however decided for the moment, must appear as mere side issues. And, in spite of the brave and noble stand against Erastianism made by such clergy as the leaders of the "Ritualists" and such laymen as Lord Halifax (*nomen semper laudabile!*), we cannot but ask, looking at the origin of the Anglican position, how is it to be expected but that the State will, so long as any bonds of establishment connect it with the Anglican body, suffer any supremacy but its own? The very *raison d'être* of the schism under Henry VIII. was the substitution of the royal supremacy for that of the Vicar of Christ, and the royal supremacy is now represented by the Ministers and Parliament of the day. No doubt the time will come when the State itself will sever the connection, with little regret on the part of many Anglican churchmen. And then the disintegrating forces that are now merely kept in check through the accidental pressure of establishment will have full play, with what eventual results it is easy to speculate, but impossible to foresee. Of one thing we may be tolerably confident—that Anglicanism, as it is at present, will be profoundly influenced in *some* direction by the severance of the Anglican Church from all secular control, but in what direction? This present generation will, it is not unlikely, read the answer to the query.

In the meantime the "advanced" section continues more and more to gather into itself all that is best, most devoted and most hopeful for the future in the Anglican body. There have been—there are to-day—the most extraordinary *bizarreries* of both teaching and practice in the ranks of this section; and it is obvious that by their entire lack of any *living* authority to which they acknowledge deference and obedience to be due, they are, in fact, resting on the very root-principle of the Protestantism which they so exuberantly (and honestly) denounce. But through their ranks there is another spirit at work, which has already brought thousands, and must bring thousands more, by the path of advanced Anglicanism to the gate of the Catholic Church. What for England, Scotland and the empire of "Greater Britain" is to be the final outcome of the revival of seventy years ago? Those who have embraced—illogically, no doubt, but with intense reality—so much of Catholic truth, can they indefinitely endure to be a merely tolerated section of a communion which admits as equally true (or equally indifferent) teaching in direct denial of what they know to be vital points of the Christian

faith? Our own experience coincides entirely with M. Thureau-Dangin's judgment as to the growing tendency towards separation of the conflicting elements: "L'extrême gravité des consequences peut faire hésiter les plus convaincus et let plus hardis. Toutefois, *il est évident que l'idée marche.*"* The recent report of the Royal Commission on the "Disorders in the Church" may have a far-reaching effect in this direction if its recommendations are attempted to be carried out with any consistency.

And if the break-up of Anglicanism comes, what then? Let the closing sentences of M. Thureau-Dangin's last volume answer the question:

"Le Rev. Walworth, prêtre américain, était un jour en visite, chez le Cardinal Newman, avec un prêtre étranger, à cause de ce dernier, la conversation avait lieu en latin; comme il était demandé si les anglicans, déjà portés si loin de leur point de départ par un courant mystérieux, ne le suivraient pas jusqu'au bout et ne finiraient pas par atteindre le plein catholicisme, Newman se borna à répondre ces deux mots: *'Spero fore.'* C'est aussi par ces mots que je veux conclure: *Spero fore.*"

J. Faber-Scholfield.

THE CATHOLIC POINT OF VIEW IN PHILOSOPHY.

POPULAR works on Catholic Apologetics have so familiarized us with the discussion of the attitude of the Church towards the social, political and scientific problems with which she has been confronted in the course of her historical career, that the educated Catholic of to-day is expected to be able to take up the defense of the Church and to explain how she stands towards the study of history, sociology or natural science. Philosophy, however, seems to interest only the technical student, and it is safe to say that few even among our best educated are prepared to give an intelligent account of the Church's attitude towards the study of philosophy. The little fellow who defined a philosopher as "a man who rides a philosopede" unconsciously voiced the sentiment of the majority of people, who are inclined to regard the philosopher as one who rides an especially objectionable hobby. And it is not difficult to account for this sentiment of indifference, not to say hostility. The problems with which philosophy busies itself most lie outside the boundary of our commoner interests. The science

* P. 531. The italics are mine.

of philosophy, too, is hampered by peculiar difficulties of expression. It has a language of its own, which is just technical enough to confuse the untrained student, yet not so technical as to command the respect which high-sounding Greek and Latin words exact from the uninitiated in physiology or paleontology. In philosophy the untrained reader understands just enough to enable him to misunderstand. Moreover, philosophy, in its effort to encompass all truth, has often wandered from the path of truth, and its aberrations do not always invite attention and interest. Yet there is a phase of philosophical inquiry which appeals to all who have at heart the highest interests of human life; philosophy in its relation to conduct, to literature, to education, to religion, appeals not merely to the student of psychology and metaphysics, but to every man who is desirous of rounding out his education.

A brief consideration of some of the technical definitions of philosophy will reveal this wider aspect of the science and lead to a discussion of the Catholic attitude towards the study of philosophical problems. The definition most commonly quoted in our text-books is that given by Cicero: Philosophy is the science of things human and divine—a definition sufficiently comprehensive of the various relations of the science to other forms of intellectual activity. Equally comprehensive is the definition given by the Pythagoreans: Philosophy is the love of wisdom; or that ascribed to Aristotle: Philosophy is the art of arts and the science of sciences. Next comes a group of definitions which, like Plto's, single out the ethical aspect of philosophy and define it as the medicine of the soul, the meditation on death; or Kant's, which defines philosophy as the attempt to answer the three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope for? The answers to the last two are, according to Kant, the constructive part of philosophy. In more recent times it has become the fashion to define philosophy in terms of its ultimateness as the search after ultimate causes, or the systematization of the concepts furnished by science, or, more simply, completely unified knowledge. Now, these various definitions are mentioned here merely in order to point out that, whether we consider the comprehensive claim of philosophy to be a science of all things human and divine, or consider it as a science that is concerned in a special manner with the problems of human conduct, or as a science which aims at carrying human knowledge to the highest point of unification and systematization, such a science must have essential and inevitable relation to the wider field of life—literature, education and religion; it must have its word to say about those things—conduct, destiny and the value of life—which are, and always will be, of deepest concern to thinking

men. In its effort to comprehend the nature and reason of all things, to discover the rational rule of life and unlock the secret of human destiny, it falls within the sphere of interest of each and every one of us. We may still be unable to sympathize with the labors of the technical metaphysician, we may endorse the verdict of him who pronounced metaphysics to be "looking in a dark room for a black hat that isn't there;" but we must acknowledge, at the same time, that there is a non-technical aspect of philosophy; for, as some one else has said, "metaphysics is merely an unusually obstinate effort to think accurately." In this sense we are all philosophers; for we must all, at one time or another, look around among our mental impressions and convictions and try to set them in order, arranging them under metaphysical concepts of some sort. We have no choice in this matter, or, at most, we have a choice merely between good philosophy and bad philosophy; for, as Aristotle said, "if you are a philosopher you must philosophize, and if you are not a philosopher you must still philosophize," if only to show reason why you are not a philosopher.

The science of philosophy is, then, peculiar in this—that its relations to life and the manifold interests of life are deeper and more abiding than those of any other science. This truth was recognized long ages ago by the first speculative thinkers in Hindustan. For them philosophy was never a matter of knowledge merely; it was something to be lived as well as known, a way of life, or, more specifically, a means of deliverance from the bondage of the flesh. For the Chinese it was preëminently a way. Even in Greece, where the theoretical mind learned to value knowledge for its own sake, there took place, about the middle of the sixth century B. C., a deep stirring of the religious sense—marked by the beginning of the mysteries, the foundation of the brotherhood of the Pythagoreans—which led in literature to the substitution of problems of conduct in tragedy and comedy for the old-time buoyant optimism of the Homeric poems. Henceforth for Socrates, Plato and especially for the Stoics, philosophy becomes a matter of living as well as of thinking.

And, as philosophy remained in closer touch with life in general, it naturally maintained its relation to literature. Indeed, without going very deep into the subject of the nature of literature, we may take for granted that, since literature is a presentation of life—not every presentation, but a certain kind of presentation—and since philosophy is concerned with life in its highest interests, the relation between philosophy and literature is essential and vital. The ancients were altogether right when they refused to draw a line of demarcation between the two, when they placed, as Plato did, the

most finished literary art at the service of philosophy, or when they sought, as Dante did, the inspiration of a great poem in a living system of philosophy. If others have refused to follow where they have led, both literature and philosophy have been the losers.

On the relation between philosophy and education it is needless to dwell at length. The history of education furnishes ample proof of the mutual dependence of these two. We are told by psychologists that every mental state tends to find expression in action, and we need but glance at the succession of educational systems to realize that a change in philosophical theory leads sooner or later to a change in pedagogical practice. And, of course, education reacts on philosophy. We have here a typical instance of the reciprocity of which Hegel speaks when he says that cause becomes effect and effect, in turn, becomes cause.

If philosophy stands in close relation to life and literature and education, it stands to religion in relations still closer, still more vital and, therefore, more abiding. Philosophy, said Aristotle, begins in wonder, and Plato is reported to have said it ends in astonishment. A modern writer says, somewhat paradoxically, the chief attraction of philosophy is that it is an inexact science. It leaves so many questions unsolved. When Plato, who more than any other philosopher devoted himself to the task of solving the problem of man's destiny, has brought forward his strongest argument for the immortality of the soul, he represents the Socratic group as yielding their ready assent and protesting that they now have no doubt, "except such as arises from the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of the human mind." A remarkable admission. In these words of Plato we have the supreme lesson of philosophy—the necessity of reverential awe in the presence of the problems which, even in the face of the most rigorous proof, continue to trouble the mind on account of the magnitude of the interests at stake. And from this reverential awe to religion there is but a step. Thus does philosophy lead up to religion. There is, however, another and a more important relation between religion and philosophy. Philosophy, by its natural birthright, claims to solve certain problems, which it is entirely competent to solve, but which are so vital to religion that the latter cannot afford to be indifferent to the treatment of them in philosophy. Should philosophy, for example, deny the existence of God, the freedom of the will or the immortality of the soul, it is evident at once that the rational foundation of religion is assailed.

All this is obviously true of any and every religion that undertakes seriously the functions of religion. It was true in Greece whenever the Greeks took sufficient interest in religion to care about

the matter at all. It is still more obviously true of Christianity, which claims to be a religion divinely instituted to lead men to God, not merely by the performance of ceremonies and the practice of piety and devotion, but also by faith, that is, by assent to supernatural truth. Like philosophy itself, the Christian religion, by virtue of the revelation of which it is the guardian, is all-comprehensive in its interests; with the highest concerns of humanity it deals in a manner peremptory, that is, with a decisiveness to which no merely human system can lay claim.

There is, then, a Christian philosophy, and, more specifically, a Catholic philosophy. This combination of words has often been criticized as unwarrantable. Why, we are asked, should we speak of a Catholic philosophy at all? We never hear of Methodist mathematics, or Presbyterian physics, or Calvinistic chemistry. It is true, we do not speak of Calvinistic chemistry; neither do we speak of German chemistry, or French chemistry, or Italian chemistry. But we do speak of German, French and Italian philosophy, just as we speak of German, French and Italian poetry, because philosophy, like literature, is closely related to the language and life of a nation. Similarly, we are warranted in speaking of Catholic philosophy because of the intimate association of philosophic doctrines with the dogmatic system of the Church. It is not because philosophy is a science that we so speak of it, but because it is a science *sui generis,* a science, and yet more than a science, because it is a matter of life and destiny and conduct and happiness.

What, then, is Catholic philosophy? What is the distinctive characteristic of the Catholic point of view in philosophy? Here it is necessary to remove at once a possible source of misapprehension. The Church which Christ founded is not a school of philosophy. Christ Himself spoke the simple language of the people among whom He lived. Discarding all formal definition and formal proof, He addressed His hearers in natural, direct exhortation, using the most common things in life to illustrate His meaning and convey His message. Yet His teaching not only reformed the ideals of human conduct, but also revolutionized the world of speculation and set up a new point of view for the contemplation of the problems of human life and human destiny. The Church which He founded speaks with His authority. By virtue of its divine commission, "Going, teach ye all nations," it rises above the contentions of the schools and proclaims the Gospel, not as a mere philosophical conclusion, but as a truth divinely revealed and divinely proposed for our belief. But, although the Church is not a school of philosophy, it is a vital organization which grows with the progress of the ages; and, although it cannot add to the revelation it has received, it unfolds

that revelation and develops it according as the opportunity for dogmatic definition affords itself. Nicæa, Chalcedon, Lyons, Florence, Trent and the Vatican do not mark additions to the Church's dogmatic system, but merely new formulations of her doctrine in accordance with the needs of the times. In this task of formulating her doctrines she makes use of the terminology of the philosophers—thus, in our catechism we learned to formulate our beliefs in terms of person, nature, substance and appearance. And, besides, since Christ's teaching reformed the world of speculation, His Church claims that from the time of His coming there has always been the religious aspect of questions which the ancient world discussed without any reference to authority other than that of reason. The Christian philosopher is he who accepts the authority of revelation as supreme, and the rationalizing philosopher is he who tries all truth, even that of revelation, at the tribunal of reason without allowing the right of appeal to a higher court.

The concrete situation, as it presented itself to the early Church, was one of exceptional difficulty. By the end of the first century of our era Christianity had entered into the unequal contest with pagan culture, and for four centuries that contest continued. First came the great apologists, Justin, Irenæus and Tertullian; then came the constructive Christian thinkers of the school of Alexandria, namely, Clement and Origen, and finally the typical Christian Platonists, of whom the chief is St. Augustine. In the beginning there was, of course, no Christian philosophy; there was not even a Christian literature, for the books of the New Testament could not bear comparison with the pagan classics as models of correct style and elegant expression. What was to be the Church's attitude? Some, like the stern Tertullian, placed a ban on all pagan literature and condemned both Plato and Aristotle as teachers of vain and perverse subtlety. For them the Gospel was enough without any of the word-chopping of the philosophers and the rhetoricians. Others, on the contrary, like Justin, Clement, Origen and St. Augustine, took the larger view. They believed that the civilization and philosophy of pagan times were to be regarded as a *præparatio evangelica,* a preparation for the Gospel of Christ. They turned, therefore, to the pagan philosophers for inspiration; they turned especially to Plato, in whom they found a preëminent power to lift us from the sordid cares and mere ephemeral interests of things terrestrial and to raise us to the contemplation of the things that are above us. In this way the first Christian philosophers regarded it as providential that Plato (whom they believed to have been inspired by the Word) lived before Christ came and prepared men's minds for His message. They did not hesitate to make use of

Plato's philosophy for the upbuilding of the Christian system of thought. "I call him truly learned," writes Clement, "who brings everything to bear on the truth so that, from geometry and music and grammar and philosophy itself culling what is useful, he guard the faith against assault."[1] And St. Augustine is still more emphatic. "Let every good and true Christian," he says, "know that truth is the truth of his Lord and Master, wheresoever it is found."[2] Their knowledge of the errors into which Plato had fallen did not deter these men from welcoming the sublime truths which he taught or from blending them with Christian revelation. They were fully persuaded that all truth, from whatever source it is immediately derived, comes ultimately from God, and is therefore capable of adjustment with the truth of Christianity.

Christian philosophy, then, during the first stages of its career, was Platonic in spirit and method. Discarding those doctrines of Platonism which were found to be inconsistent with revelation, the first Christian philosophers appropriated as part of their speculative system whatever they considered to be common to Platonism and Christianity. To this extent they "baptized" Plato. But the age of Platonism passed away with Augustine. Soon after his time came the invasions of the barbarians, which for three centuries continued to inundate the Roman Empire and finally submerged in an era of almost complete illiteracy the last vestiges of the culture and philosophy of Greece and Rome. With the Carolingian revival came the reconstruction of Europe and the beginning of the Middle Ages. A new element was now working its way to various forms of expression in the life of the nations in the first crude literary and artistic achievements of the converted barbarians. To the Greek and Latin spirit a new spirit had been added, the spirit of the Celt and the Teuton, which was to attain, before the end of the Middle Ages, its fullest expression in Romance literature, in Gothic architecture and in scholastic philosophy. Plato, the heavenly-minded, the mystically inclined, the philosopher whose scendent importance of the unseen world, best suited the age which scendant importance of the unseen world, best suited the age which witnessed the decay and dissolution of all that the Roman Empire represented. But when the Celtic-Teutonic spirit—the spirit of freedom and individuality and self-reliance and love of nature—began to make itself felt a change came over the trend of philosophical enquiry, and the philosophy which had satisfied the decadent Latin Europe of the fifth century failed to satisfy the aspiration of the Neo-Latin Europe of the twelfth. Christian philosophy, there-

[1] Strom. Lib. I., cap. 9; Migne, Patr. Gr., VIII., 739.

[2] "De Doctr. Christ.," Lib. II., cap. 18; Migne, Patr. Lat., XXXIV., 49.

fore, turned from Plato to his great rival, Aristotle, who, though he had been denounced in unmeasured terms by writers of the Patristic age, was now appreciated as a student of nature, and came in the end to be recognized as the "master of those who know." Above Plato, the idealist, the mediæval thinkers placed Aristotle, the investigator of nature, the master of exact method, the practical student of political institutions. It was natural that one age should choose Plato and the other Aristotle. For it is with epochs as it is with individuals. Schlegel says very truly that we are all born either Platonists or Aristotelians; to some the dreamer appeals, to others the scientist; some love the genial warmth of the philosopher-poet, others prefer the clear, cold light which the philosopher-scientist turns on the facts of our every-day experience. The Christian age that chose Plato chose well; the Christian age that chose Aristotle chose well also. Each chose him who best suited its temperament and responded to its needs.

With the beginning of the adoption of Aristotelianism by Christian philosophers the history of the relation of the Church to the study of philosophy enters into a new phase. The Church is now a powerful institution, complex in its hierarchical and educational system and keenly alive to its responsibilities as the majestic guardian of Christian truth in the midst of a vigorous and venturesome young race of mingled Celtic, Teuton and Latin stock. When she speaks now it is with all the pomp of her most impressive ceremonial or with all the terrors of her official censures. Her policy is complicated by many extraneous circumstances. Her success is impaired by heresy, disaffection and the encroachments of princes. In her dealings with the first Aristotelian philosophers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries she was confronted with conditions of a special kind, the chief of which was the inaccuracy of the current translations of the text of Aristotle's works. For this reason the career of Aristotle in the Christian schools of the Middle Ages is a checkered one. First condemned, then corrected and finally adopted almost without reserve, Aristotle emerges at the close of the Middle Ages as a kind of Christianized pagan, holding precisely the same place which Plato held at the close of the Patristic age.

But while these two great systems, Platonism and Aristotelianism, have held the most protracted domination over the minds of Christian philosophers, Catholic philosophy is by no means identical with Platonism and Aristotelianism. For not only are St. Augustine, the greatest of the Christian Platonists, and St. Thomas, the greatest of the Christian Aristotelians, to be regarded as representatives of Catholic philosophy, but also such men as Boscovich, the Newtonian;

De Bonald, the Traditionalist; Pascal, the Fideist; Gerdil, the Ontologist, and Balmes, the Eclectic, all of whom recognized the authority of revelation as expounded by the Catholic Church, and are, therefore, to be ranked among Catholic philosophers. It is not as if the Church were to take a certain system of philosophy and to say to us: "Here is the only true philosophy; adopt it or reject it at the peril of your immortal souls"—something which the Church has never done. One need not be an Aristotelian, nor a Platonist, nor an Idealist, nor a Transcendentalist, in order to be a Catholic philosopher. One may be any or several of these and still be a Catholic philosopher. The relation of philosophy to national life once more affords an illustration. There are German Platonists, German Aristotelians, German Idealists and German Transcendentalists, and yet one may be a German philosopher without belonging to any of these schools. The term "Catholic," then, when applied to a system of philosophy, does not imply adherence to any one of the recognized typical systems of philosophy; it is a determinant similar to the qualifications "German," "French" or "English," which may be added to any of several systems.

What, then, is this distinctive quality of Catholic philosophy which differentiates it from non-Catholic philosophy? The answer most commonly given is that Catholic philosophy is subservient to ecclesiastical authority, while non-Catholic philosophy recognizes no such restraint. The description is correct in so far as it represents non-Catholic philosophy. Philosophy outside the Church does not acknowledge the right of any tribunal, lay or ecclesiastical, to decide or influence its conclusions, to direct or dictate its method of investigation. Catholic philosophy, on the contrary, recognizes that its conclusions are amenable to the authority which decides questions of faith and morals, but this recognition is far from implying subservience in the sense in which the word is used by unsympathetic critics.

Let us be philosophers for the moment and go to the root of the question. Christ's teaching, we have said, reformed the theoretical world of ideas as well as the practical world of ideals. We are all, non-Catholics as well as Catholics, agreed as to the latter. Christ set up an ideal of conduct for all Christians to strive to attain. He is our great exemplar in all that pertains to right living and to nobility of sentiment. We are all agreed on this. But we are not agreed as to the importance of His theoretical teaching. Catholics hold that when Christ sent forth His Apostles with the command, "Going, teach ye all nations," He gave to His Church divine authority to teach and develop a body of dogmatic truth which has essential relation to our ideas, just as Christ's own precept and example have

essential relation to our ideals. Catholics believe that the religion which the Apostles preached was, indeed, a religion of conduct which appealed to the consciences of men; but they believe also that the Apostles preached a religion of faith which appealed to the intellectual assent of their converts. Catholics maintain that the successors of the Apostles preserved and developed a system of dogmatic truth, which is outside the domain of philosophy, in so far as it rests not on reason, but on revelation, but which, nevertheless, is in essential relation with philosophy, in so far as both have truth for their object. And what, in general terms, is the message of revelation as contained in the simple teachings of the Gospel and developed in the dogmatic system of the Church? All students of philosophy have felt the attraction of the "intelligible world" of which Plato speaks—the world of Ideas—that sphere invisible which moves in shrouded majesty above the sordid world around us; that home of true beauty, of true greatness, of all that is good and loveable and inspiring. How the eye and the heart of the weary wayfarer among the dim shadows of earthly existence turn to that other world, where all is light and life and love! Now, Christian revelation opens up to us just such a world, which differs from the Platonic world of Ideas chiefly in this—that it is not a thing of fancy, but a reality, the existence of which is believed on the authority of God Himself. It is the world of the supernatural, of the overnature, if one prefers so to style it, the world of Divine Life and Divine Truth and Divine Grace. Of Divine Life we get a glimpse in the mystery of the Trinity; of Divine Truth we gain a faint realization whenever we bow our reason to the truth of the things that are above us; of Divine Grace we attain a faint participation in the struggles of our own hearts towards peace and charity. The supernatural world opened up to us by the mysteries of faith is not only real to us, but really beautiful. Unlike the Platonic world of Ideas, its reality grows on us as our spiritual experience increases with the years; but, like the Platonic world of Ideas, it attracts us by its contrast with the material world around us. To accept this over-world as real is not a task imposed on us by authority; it is a sweetly persuasive vision that appeals to all that is good and aspiring in our natures. The saints and the mystics are they who fully realize its nearness and feel the deepest longing to leave an imperfect world for a world of infinite truth and goodness and beauty. In Tennyson's "Ancient Sage" knowledge, which sees only the world of physical being, is contrasted with faith, which sees the world invisible:

> Knowledge is the swallow on the lake
> That sees and stirs the surface-shadow there,
> But never yet hath dipt into the abysm.

and to the youthful representative of knowledge these words are addressed:

> Thou canst not prove the Nameless, O my son;
> Nor canst thou prove the world thou movest in;
> Thou canst not prove that thou art body alone,
> Nor canst thou prove that thou art spirit alone,
> Nor canst thou prove that thou art both in one:
> Thou canst not prove thou art immortal, no.
> Nor yet that thou art mortal—nay, my son,
> Thou canst not prove that I, who speak with thee,
> Am not thyself in converse with thyself.
> For nothing worthy proving can be proven,
> Nor yet disproven: wherefore, be thou wise;
> Cleave ever to the sunnier side of doubt,
> And cling to faith beyonad the forms of faith!
> She reels not at the storm of warring words;
> She brightens at the clash of "Yes" and "No;"
> She sees the best that glimmers through the worst;
> She feels the sun is hid but for the night;
> She spies the summer through the winter bud;
> She tastes the fruit before the blossom falls;
> She hears the lark within the songless egg;
> She finds the fountain where they wailed "Mirage!"

These lines seem to illustrate admirably the point on which we have been insisting—namely, the faith which is superior to knowledge recommends itself naturally and, so to speak, by the persuasiveness of its spiritual beauty. They illustrate also the next point in our description of the Catholic position. When the poet says that "Nothing worthy proving can be proven" he is not to be taken literally; for then there would be an end of all rational investigation, and, therefore, of all philosophy. One may, however, without incurring the imputation of skepticism, venture so far as to assert that, after all its efforts, the human mind unaided has really accomplished little that is of undoubted certainty concerning God, the universe and the destiny of man. To-day the clash of "yes" and "no" goes on just as merrily as in the days of the Greek skeptic who gave up the contest in disgust, declaring that "Nothing exists; even if it existed, it could not be known; and even if it could be known, we could not express our knowledge of it in words." We need not go so far as to accept this disheartening verdict, yet we are forced to admit that on all the most vital problems of philosophy there are still the "yes" and the "no" and the more modern "I know not." The human mind has its limitations that hem it in and hedge it closely around. We dwell in "a twilight of truth and error, of reality and false appearance," and when such questions as the nature of God, the destiny of the human soul, the meaning and value of life are discussed, we are, to use Aristotle's comparison, like the owl that blinks in the sunlight because of the excessive brightness of the day. In the presence of the most momentous problems of philosophy we feel the inadequateness of our own mental powers and turn confidently to the authority of Him from whom all truth comes.

The Catholic position, so far as it has been described above, may be resumed in two principles: 1. There is an order of truth, the supernatural order, which we cannot understand, but which we accept on the authority of revelation. 2. When by faith we assent to truths of the supernatural order we perform an act which, far from being an unreasonable submission to arbitrary authority, is, considering the weakness of our reason, entirely justifiable. We may now pass to a third principle—namely, that in dignity and authority the supernatural, quite as a matter of course, takes precedence of the merely natural. When there is a clash between the conclusion of the individual mind and the truth clearly set forth in Divine Revelation, who can hesitate to say that reason must be wrong and that revelation must be right?

A Catholic philosophy, therefore, is one which, no matter what its tenets as a philosophy, be it Platonism, or Aristotelianism, or Cartesianism, or Kantism, or Hegelianism, acknowledges the ultimate supremacy of faith in the dogmatic system of the Church. Non-Catholic philosophy makes no such acknowledgment. Herein lies the most fundamental difference between the two—a difference which is intrinsic, basic and, some think, fatal to anything like a mutual understanding between the two. The non-Catholic philosopher seldom understands our position, although (if one may be pardoned for saying what seems so ungracious) we understand his position very well. De Maistre says: "Truth understands error, but error does not understand truth." This, like most of the sayings of the great ultramontanist, sounds harsh to modern ears. If we admit that it is true, we hasten to acknowledge that truth has been unfortunate in its defenders, and that they who view the question from the outside may be pardoned if they fail to distinguish what is essential in the Catholic position from what is merely a matter of personal conviction in the Catholic philosopher. We understand the point of view of the non-Catholic philosopher in so far as he rejects the authority of the teaching Church, and we believe that we are right when we trace this rejection back to the influences of Descartes, who divorced philosophy from theology and implicitly proclaimed the doctrine of the twofold truth, according to which what is true in theology may be false in philosophy, and vice versa. This way of looking at the relation of natural to supernatural truth is well expressed in the question so often asked us: *Why can you not keep your theology out of your philosophy?* The question shows a complete misunderstanding of our position. We do keep our theology out of our philosophy. Theology we define as a science which draws its arguments and its definitions from the Scriptures, from the decrees of the Councils, from the authoritative declarations

of the Roman Pontiffs. Philosophy we regard as a science which derives its definitions and its arguments from reason alone. In philosophy the argument from divine authority is rigorously ruled out. We *do* keep the two sciences apart; what we refuse to do is to admit that there can exist a contradiction between them. Theology investigates supernatural truth; philosophy is concerned with truth of the natural order. But all truth is the truth of God. When He speaks to us in nature and in history His voice is the voice of truth as well as when He speaks to us in the sacred text of the Bible or in the infallible decisions of the Church. He is our teacher in all things. By revelation He unfolds to us the mysteries that are above our understanding; by science and literature and philosophy He teaches us truths which the human mind can grasp. Whether He teaches us by revelation or by reason, His teaching is, and must be, consistent. In this sense all truth, as has been well said, is orthodox. Cardinal Newman was echoing a profound thought of St. Augustine when he wrote: "It is the highest wisdom to accept truth of whatever kind wherever it is clearly ascertained to be such, though there be difficulty in adjusting it with other known truth."[3] This is what the great Catholic thinkers have considered to be the distinguishing mark of Catholic philosophy. Non-Catholics, many of them at least, hold the same doctrines as we do concerning the Trinity, the Incarnation, creation, providence and redemption; but they keep their theology *entirely* apart from their philosophy. This we cannot consent to do. For while we hold that each science has its own proper sphere of activity, we hold at the same time that both deal with truth, and that all truth, from whatever source derived, must be capable of harmonious adjustment.

This is the central point in the Catholic position. There is a supernatural order of truth, a world above us which cannot understand; theology deals with this truth and relies on the authority of Scripture and the Church as its source. There is a natural order of truth, a world within and around us; philosophy deals with this truth and relies on the evidence furnished by our reasoning faculty. Now, one may confound the two sciences by obliterating the distinction of sources; one may try to prove the mysteries of faith from reason alone, or one may invoke the authority of Scripture when dealing with problems that belong exclusively to philosophy. There have been men of this type among Catholics; there was one particularly, who with the best possible motive outstepped the bounds of orthodoxy in this matter—the Spaniard Raymond Lully (1234-1315). On the other hand, one may keep the two sciences entirely separate; one may assign supernatural truth to the faculty of faith

[3] "Idea of a University," p. 462.

and natural truth to the faculty of reason and refuse to admit that they are (to use a colloquial phrase) on speaking terms. This attitude always calls to mind the well-known Arabian legend which tells of a certain sage whose head, severed from the body, continued to expound the maxims of his cult, the brain acting automatically, as it were, out of all relation to the heart and general nervous system. There is the third alternative—to distinguish the two sciences, to assign to each its proper sphere, to allot to each its own special domain and yet to hold that they live, like good Christian neighbors, in perfect accord with each other. And this is the Catholic position.

Here an illustration is afforded by philosophy itself. Greek philosophy in the earliest stages of its development was materialistic in its concept of the human soul. The Atomists, who represent the latest development of the Ionian school of philosophy, taught that the soul is of the same nature as the body. It is one of Socrates' chief merits that he resisted the Atomists as strenuously as he did the Sophists. After Socrates came Plato, who not only distinguished between soul and body, but went to the opposite extreme and advocated the ultra-spiritualistic idea of a soul dwelling in the body as in a prison. After Plato came Aristotle, who, while he distinguished the soul, which is immaterial, from the body, which is, of course, matter, refused to separate them, but taught that both together form one substance, man; that as the body without the soul is dead, so the soul without the body is an incomplete being (if, indeed, the soul without the body has, according to Aristotle, any being at all). This seems to us to be the highest achievement of Greek philosophy in its speculation concerning the nature of man. The materialists were wrong in confounding body and soul; Plato was wrong when he ascribed to each a separate existence in man; Aristotle was right when he distinguished without separating. Now the relation of reason to faith, of philosophy to theology, is similar to that which exists between soul and body in man. What the Greeks accomplished in their discussion of the nature of man the mediæval Christian philosophers, working in the Greek spirit of wholesomeness and completeness, established in their discussion of ultimate truth. There is this wholesomeness, this sense of totality in Greek art and literature, where it taught instinctively the golden mean between realism and idealism, and in Greek philosophy, where it taught just as instinctively the happy compromise between materialism and transcendentalism. So there is a similar spirit of wholesomeness in the mediæval philosophers who, while they refused to confound reason with faith, refused also to admit that reason and faith can contradict each other.

Reason and faith should work, and do work, for the advantage

of both. Reason aids faith by showing forth in many ways the reasonableness of the truths which God has revealed; by the refutation of error; by supplying analogies to help our unbelief; by showing how powerful, how beneficent, how all-seeing and all-providing is the God whose authority is our warrant for believing the things we do not understand. And faith aids reason; for on many of the most vital problems of philosophy—on the questions which concern the meaning and value of life, the nature and destiny of man, the foundation of the responsibility of conduct—there is, as has been said, a lack of clearness and ultimateness in the message which philosophy has brought us. When we realize this partial failure of philosophy, when we realize especially that for the vast multitude in whom belief in God and freedom and immortality is an absolute necessity if they are to live and act as human beings, when we realize how few among them can appreciate the reasonings of philosophy or can understand its message, we perceive at once the necessity of faith; we perceive how wise are they who lean not on the broken reeds of human wisdom, but on the word of God, whose care it is to bring all men to a knowledge of the truth. Maine de Biran, who was not in any strict sense a Catholic philosopher, recognized this when he wrote: "Religion alone solves the problems of philosophy;" and in this sense religious faith is truly the metaphysics of the multitude. And this recognition of the ultimate supremacy of faith has not been detrimental to philosophy. If we study its workings in the minds of men like St. Augustine and St. Thomas, we see that, far from making them *subservient* to authority, it left them free to employ their splendid gifts in the investigation of natural as well as supernatural truth. They were free with the freedom of the sons of God. Faith merely enlarged their horizon and gave them new fields to explore; it placed them on a vantage ground, from which they surveyed new realms of thought.

If, then, there is, as we maintain there is, an order of supernatural truth; if we realize, as all reasonable men realize, that the powers of the human mind are limited to the order of natural truth, and if, as all the greatest of human thinkers admit, the problems of philosophy often lead up to a point at which reason confesses its inability to go a step farther, it is entirely natural and reasonable that at such a point the supernatural should be given precedence over the natural and faith should supply the defects of reason. This, I say, is natural and reasonable; the authority of faith is neither arbitrary nor tyrannical. As the vine sends out its tendrils in this direction and in that, seeking support in tree or trellis or even in the crevices of the rock; as the offshoot from the seed struggles through the soil and seeks the surface of the earth, where it finds light and heat, which are

essential for its growth, so the mind of man spontaneously and naturally seeks the light of evidence, and where evidence fails turns quite as spontaneously and naturally to the light and warmth of divine faith which it finds in the authority of revelation. In obeying this impulse we are not dwarfing our growth, but living the higher law of our natures, and far from blighting philosophy, such a method fosters and cherishes its growth and brings it to its fairest flowering, to its richest fruitage.

It remains to study the application of this method to those problems of philosophy which are concerned with our knowledge of God, of the soul and of human destiny. These are problems the solution of which have engaged the minds of the world's greatest thinkers, and, though the conclusions at which these minds arrived have been varied, there has been one effect which the discussion of such questions has always produced—that of reverential awe. Speaking of philosophy in general, Aristotle said that it is not a human possession —that is, it is not a natural birthright of man, but something borrowed from the gods. To know the world around us in its spatial grandeur, to study the myriad forms of life with which it teems, to trace the history and development of human institutions, to study our own nature in its manifestations of thought, emotion and volition—this is the proper study of mankind, the task which the mind of man may propose to itself without presumption. But to lift the veil of Isis, to penetrate in thought behind the material world, to try to know Him whose thoughts are but dimly shadowed forth in nature, to try to know ourselves in our spiritual being and essence, to dip into the future and read the secrets of the life beyond the tomb—this, indeed, seems to belong to the gods rather than to men; to be an infringement on the prerogatives of the divinity, an act of daring worthy of the fate of Prometheus, who stole the divine fire. And so all who approach these problems of God, the soul and immortality with any profit to themselves and others must approach them in the spirit of reverence and feel that here, indeed, is where angels fear to tread.

The philosophical discussion of the idea of God comprises two questions: (1) The existence of God and (2) the nature and attributes of God. The first of these questions need not detain us very long, because atheism is so opposed to the spirit and methods of Catholic philosophy that it would be a waste of time to discuss the points of contrast between them. There are, as far as our present purpose is concerned, four ways of contemplating the world around us: 1. That the universe is sufficient unto itself; that it is its own explanation; that it calls for no cause outside itself; that it contains in itself no underlying principle of unity and order; in a

word, that it is a chaos in which, indeed, we imagine a certain illusory harmony or accord, while in reality natural phenomena drift and eddy around in a perfectly irrational manner, and once in a whole cycle of æons produce by chance an apparently rational effect. This is atheism. 2. We may imagine that underlying the phenomena or events in the universe there is some rational principle of their being, a force whose all-pervading energy sustains and permeates and directs all things, but is utterly unknown and unknowable. This is agnosticism. 3. We may look upon the world as the embodiment, the corporeal realization of an eternal, omnipresent impersonal force, not only indwelling in the universe, but animating it, a force which is to the universe what the soul is to the body. This is pantheism, according to which God is all and all is God. Finally (4). We may look upon the world as the work of God, a work which shows forth His power and wisdom and goodness; in which, indeed, He dwells, but without being identified with it, for He is a person, not a force, and though He is in all and through all, He is above all and beyond all His works. This is theism.

The relation of Catholic philosophy to atheism, it would, as has been said, be profitless to discuss. With agnosticism, too, we need not deal at any great length. Catholic philosophy, as represented by St. Augustine and St. Thomas and as taught in our Catholic schools to-day, has always admitted and admits the element of truth that there is in agnosticism: We cannot comprehend or adequately understand the nature of God. The agnostic is fond of repeating that a God whom we could know is no God at all; Catholic philosophy emphatically insists that if we adequately know God, either He is finite or we are infinite. The agnostic proclaims the inadequacy of all human concepts to represent God and of all human speech to utter our thoughts of Him. In almost identical terms St. Augustine exclaims: "Verius Deus cogitatur quam est, et verius cogitatur quam dicitur." We say that God is power, but before we apply the term we must rob it of all trace of imperfection; we speak of Him as goodness, but we must first empty the term goodness of all imperfection, for we are good only at the cost of struggle against evil, and He is good by nature and essence. Again, when we speak of His justice and mercy and wisdom, we are using terms which we know to be inadequate, just as when by metaphor we say that Christ sitteth at the right hand of the Father. Catholic philosophy, then, agrees with agnosticism when it proclaims our inability to comprehend God or to speak of Him in adequate language. But it differs radically from agnosticism when it says that we have an imperfect knowledge of God, so far as from the things that we see we can

argue to things invisible, from the works of the Creator to the Creator Himself. Catholic philosophy teaches that this imperfect knowledge is not misleading so long as we know it to be imperfect, and finally it teaches that where our imperfect knowledge ends faith begins. And this is all important. For we cannot worship the unknown, we cannot pray to an abstraction. A worthless legend ascribes to Aristotle the prayer, "Cause of Causes, have mercy on me." No reasonable man could give expression to a petition so utterly absurd. But if we cannot worship the unknown, we can worship the imperfectly known; we can pray that we may grow by faith in knowledge of Him, until faith becomes lost in the higher contemplation of the beatific vision.

Now let it be clearly understood in what sense this remedy against agnosticism is said to be peculiar to Catholic philosophy. We know many non-Catholic philosophers whose religious belief is as quick as ours and who find in faith the inspiration which we find in it. But they do not bring it to bear on their philosophy. They keep their theology *entirely* apart from their philosophy, and the effect (so at least it seems to us) is detrimental to both.

With regard to pantheism, which identifies God with the universe, describing Him as an absolute, a force, an indwelling world-soul, a power, but not a person, the advantages of the philosophy which acknowledges faith as a supplement of reason are still more apparent than in the case of agnosticism. It might be said without exaggeration that all purely rational philosophy as well as all reflective poetry tends towards the pantheistic view of the universe. Philosophy began with the pantheism of the first Hindu speculators, and ever since that time, in Greece, in the Arabian Empire, in mediæval Europe and in the modern world the gravitation of the most serious philosophic thought has been towards pantheism. There have been critical ages, epochs of unrest and intellectual fermentation in which Atheism for the moment obtained full sway; but sooner or later (generally very soon) the pendulum swung surely back to pantheism. All mysticism tends that way, all mystic poetry is swayed by the vague pantheistic realization of the divinity in nature, and all the half-articulate yearnings of the artistic temperament (as soon as it once begins to interpret nature symbollically) are towards the view that nature is but the divinity hidden from the eye of the body, yet visible to the æsthetic sense.

Now the corrective of this erroneous view of the nature of God (for that it is an erroneous view we shall not stop to prove) lies in the thought that God is not merely a power, but a person; that, while He is immanent in the world around us, He is also transcendent; that while He is in all, He is above all and distinct from all

His works. It was the Christian school of Alexandria, especially Clement and Origen and Athanasius, that first clearly defined the notion of personality, which even the greatest of the Greek thinkers had failed to precise, and the immediate occasion of the discussion of this problem was the question of the Trinity. This is one clear and incontrovertible case in which theology aided philosophy. And, what is most noteworthy in this connection, the thoughts of these Christian teachers became part of the formulæ of faith; they found their way into the manual of Christian doctrine; by means of symbols and ceremonies they were kept before the minds of the most ignorant and simple of the faithful, so that they, too, who are debarred from the philosophical discussion of the nature of God are made to feel and think in accordance with truth.

It is, as is well known, a famous question among theologians as to whether the faith of the educated man is more meritorious than that of the ignorant person, whether the Academician who can give a learned defense of his faith is as pleasing to God as the coal-heaver who believes as he has been taught, but can give no learned reasons for his belief. There is no question as to which can do more good in the modern world, where every Christian is in duty bound to defend and explain his convictions and give a reason for the faith that is in him. On the other hand, it is the great merit of Christian teaching that it has reached the minds of the least cultured and by symbols and ceremonies given them a grasp on the world that is above them. Christianity brings thoughts to the thoughtful, but to those that are incapable of thought it brings concrete images of the truths which are essential to human life, if it is to be human and not brutal. Christian philosophy has always conceived God as a personal being, and Christian piety and the practices of devotion have developed this concept, preserved it against the natural tendency towards pantheism and disseminated it so that it is implanted in the minds of all, simple and gentle, uncultured as well as cultured, unlettered as well as learned. Indeed, it might be said without exaggeration that the God of pre-Christian philosophy was impersonal; the God of Christian philosophy is necessarily a person. Who then can blame Catholic philosophers if on this point they refuse to keep their theology out of their philosophy? The course they have pursued is the reasonable one; they have acknowledged the debt they owe to revelation and have ever and always contended that the errors and vagaries of reason in its attempt to realize the nature of God must be supplemented and, if necessary, corrected by an appeal to the message of revelation.

There is one other point on which it is necessary to touch before leaving the question of theism, and that is the problem of evil in its

bearing on the question of God's existence. The realization of pain as one of the ills of life is, of course, as old as life itself. Men needed no Buddha to teach them that suffering is one of the stern realities which we cannot think away as men have thought away matter and motion and change and all the physical world around us. The latest doctrine that suffering is all imaginary does not help us much, for the man who thinks he suffers really suffers. But what is modern is the knowledge that has come to us of the universality of suffering. Men always knew that there are pain and suffering around us, but it is only in recent years that it dawned upon us how essential to the plan of life is suffering, not only widespread, but universal. "Nature red in tooth and claw" is a modern conception of the physical universe. Nature is full of cruelty and has put a premium on cruelty when she ordained that the stronger shall survive at the expense of the weaker. The "struggle for existence" implies this. Now how can a nature inherently cruel be the work of a God absolutely omnipotent and supremely benevolent? Philosophy answers that pain is everywhere prophylactic; that it warns us against sickness; that it is the alarm which heralds danger to health and life. Philosophy, again (as represented by the Cartesians), suggests that much of the apparent pain of animals is only apparent; that their cries are, to some extent, mere automatic reactions; that their contortions are merely mechanical contractions of the muscles. Again, philosophy warns us that much sympathy is irrelevantly injected into the discussion; that we let our hearts run away with our heads, and so on. But when all is said philosophy somehow has made a poor case of it. There is suffering, and the innocent suffer as well as, perhaps more than, the guilty. How reconcile this with the goodness of God? Here faith takes up the question. Its first lesson is that we see only in part; that we see that portion of God's great plan which makes the largest demands on our sympathy; that there are larger views which we cannot attain, for our ways are not like His ways nor our thoughts like His thoughts, but as the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are His ways above our ways and His thoughts above our thoughts. There are tiny creatures dwelling in the sand of our seashores who in the wisdom of their experience or their instinct never build their homes outside the line of the full tide. They forage and roam through the dry sands everywhere, but never build where the incoming tide will flood and destroy their little homes. But when a spring tide comes whole cities of these diminutive dwellings are destroyed, for the tiny builder, who allowed for the diurnal variation of the sea level, knows nothing apparently of the larger cycle of changes extending over a period which is for him what a thousand years is for us. Now, when we judge the

ways of God we are no more sensible than they, for we see in part, and the cycle of all human experience is small, indeed, in the plans of Him to whom a thousand years are as a single day. When the existence of evil baffles our reason, faith teaches us that here is a mystery, the deepest and most perplexing of all mysteries.

Leaving now the problems connected with the existence and nature of God, we come to the questions of the nature and destiny of the human soul. Here reason speaks to us, and our own consciences plainly tell us that mind is more than matter; that to the universal law of death and dissolution the human soul forms an exception. Philosophy from the beginning recognized the superior dignity of man and his claim to a hereafter of some kind. The Hindus were so profoundly convinced of this that they never condescended to *prove* the soul's immortality. For them it was a datum of reason, a self-evident truth. And Greek philosophy at a very early date—from the beginning, perhaps—accepted this truth, though it was long in attaining a full consciousness of it. But with the progress of human knowledge, the advance of physical science rendered it necessary in each succeeding age to adjust our ideas of the soul and its destiny to our conceptions of the laws of nature. At times the material conception of the world as made up of merely physical elements and forces and ruled by inexorable natural laws seemed to crowd out freedom and the spiritual soul and immortality. And then, again, even when the spiritual concept of the soul seemed to dominate, there was always a vagueness, a lack of decisiveness, a consequent hesitation on the part of reason when it tried to bring home to itself the reality of the life beyond the grave. It will be remembered how Plato himself dismissed the problem of immortality by declaring that there are now no grounds for hesitating except such as are due to the sublimity of the problem and the weakness of the human mind. Some say that reason is inadequate to solve the problem of man's destiny; others, on the contrary, maintain that reason is quite adequate to the task. But even those who maintain the adequacy of reason to unravel this riddle of existence must confess that the question is beset with difficulties, and that few are capable of appreciating the arguments which to the philosophic mind are most convincing. The multitude looks for tangible facts, not for abstruse reasons. To the majority of men literature and science are unattainable owing to circumstances, the need of daily toil, the pursuit of the necessities of life. To all but to the few philosophy is a sealed volume. And yet to each and every one it is a matter of vital importance to grasp once and for all the reality of the future life, to know and be convinced that we are made for something more than material existence, to realize that we are not children of

time, but pilgrims of eternity; that we must live and act and plan, not for an existence that is reckoned in days and years, but for an eternal and immortal existence in the world beyond the grave.

Now the fact to which Christian thought appeals is the resurrection of Christ, which to any mind, however undeveloped or however highly cultivated, is an argument incontrovertible for the existence of a future life. While reason can reach a state of probability, a hope reasonable indeed, but yet merely a hope, this fact puts the matter beyond the region of doubt and exhibits it as a certainty. In this sense it is the Gospel that has brought life and immortality to light. We do not, to be sure, maintain the inadequacy of reason alone to prove that the soul is immortal, but we contend that while the argument of the philosopher appeals to the few, the Gospel narrative appeals to all alike. In the second place, it is necessary to remark that in a strictly technical discussion of immortality, in a philosophical treatise, it would be false method to introduce as an argument the facts narrated in the Gospel. That would be to confound the science of theology and philosophy. But while we may not confound the two sciences, here, it seems to us, is a striking instance of the advantage which the one science can gain from the other. If, when reason hesitates, faith speaks authoritatively and in tones of decision, does not common sense approve the policy of bringing faith to the aid of reason?

And if we have touched on these points—the existence and nature of God, the dignity and destiny of the soul—it is in order to show the reasonableness of the method of Catholic philosophy. We do not claim to believe more than other Christians do about God, the soul and immortality; these are the common inheritance of all Christians. What we claim is that Catholic philosophy methodically makes use of this inheritance. And who will say that it has suffered by adopting this method? It suffers, we are told, by its subservience to authority. This is the bugbear of the agnostic and the rationalist, and it must be confessed it is the one objection which sticks in the minds of many excellent men who, far from being atheists or agnostics or rationalists, share with us the common inheritance of Christian faith, yet are unwilling to bring their Christian belief to bear on the conclusions of philosophy. To such men we can make no answer except to ask them to consider our position somewhat more sympathetically. We will tell them at once that we are as keen as they are for the maintenance of the prerogatives of reason, and we ask them to believe us. They will surely agree with us that reason may err and has often erred. When, then, there is open and unmistakable conflict between reason and revelation; when reason thinks that there is no God; when it denies

spirituality, immortality and freedom, while faith teaches these things to be real, we claim that we are entirely reasonable when we say that as revelation *must* be right reason *must* be wrong. When there is no open contradiction, but reason simply confesses its inadequacy, we think we are right when we welcome the light which revelation throws on the problem. And when in the theological discussion of the mysteries of faith we go beyond the domain of natural truth we contend that we are not slaying reason on the altar of faith. The same God who stayed the hand of Abraham when he would sacrifice his son because He was satisfied with the willingness of the patriarch to offer up his first born is satisfied with us when we bow down before the truths which are above our comprehension. When we show ourselves willing to sacrifice our reason, which we love as dearly as Abraham loved Isaac, He is pleased to stay our hands and never makes it necessary for us to make the actual sacrifice.

Philosophy has to do with thought; it also has to do with life. Christianity has to do with life; it also has to do with thought. It is a legitimate boast of Catholic philosophy that it attempts to bring these different phases of philosophy and Christianity into an organic synthesis. The genius of the Cathedral builders, the great Latin-Teuton spirit that knew how to construct, is the genius of the greatest of our Catholic philosophers—Thomas of Aquin, who in his day was the most daring innovator, who certainly gave to God the things that are God's and who also gave to reason the things that are reason's. The conviction which inspired his constructive effort was this: Revelation is reasonable and reason is divine. This is the conviction which gives to Catholic philosophy its *ethos,* its peculiarity among systems of philosophy, and by this is it distinguished from non-Catholic philosophy. There is a Catholic philosophy, not merely in the sense that there are philosophers who are Catholics, but also in the sense that there is a philosophy possessing a character of its own on account of its intimate connection with the Catholic faith.

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BRIGITTINE MONASTERIES.

THERE are at the present time only four Brigittine monasteries in existence, exclusive of the five Spanish houses of the Brigittines of the Recollection. Each of these four monasteries, the surviving daughter of the once great and powerful mother house of Vadstena, has its own history, scarcely less interesting than that of Vadstena itself, for whose restoration all the children of St. Bridget constantly pray. Vadstena was founded by St. Bridget, to whom, as she believed, our Lord Himself revealed the rule of her order, whose proper title is the Order of St. Saviour and whose members are popularly known as the Brigittines, so called after their holy mother and foundress, St. Brigit, or Birgit, of Sweden, born at Finstad in 1303 and married in 1316 to Ulf, Prince of Nericia, with whom she led a most saintly life and by whom she had eight children.

It was after the death of Ulf, who had embraced the religious life in a Cistercian monastery shortly before he died, that St. Brigit laid the foundations of Vadstena and drew up the constitutions of her order. It was on her own estate of Vadstena, near Linkoping, that the monastery was built, which was at one time the centre of Catholicity in Sweden and played a most important part in the history of the country. Diets and synods were held there; Queens chose it as a place of refuge in troublous times, and as a place of retreat from the pomps and vanities of the world in prosperity, and it was sometimes used as a royal house of detention.

It was the scene of processions and of various magnificent ecclesiastical functions; it provided Linkoping with Bishops, and the Cathedral chapter of that city furnished Vadstena with learned monks, for it must be stated that it was a double monastery, one wing being set apart for the monks and the other for the nuns; the church, common to both, separated the convents, and only the confessor of the nuns among the monks had access to their part. This was the original model of all Brigittine monasteries, though in course of time this arrangement had to be modified owing to the Reformation and various other causes, and, needless to say, at the present day these double monasteries no longer exist.

The number of monks appointed for each monastery by the rule was twenty-five, of which thirteen were to be priests, four deacons and the remaining eight lay Brothers. There were to be sixty choir nuns and four lay Sisters, and the abbess, who had the title of lady-abbess, was supreme and was called the sovereign. But though she governed both monks and nuns, she had no authority

in spiritual matters over those of the monks who were priests, and one of the monks, called the confessor general, directed the nuns in spiritual things.

King Magnus II. helped St. Bridget to build Vadstena, which the saint did not live to see finished, and the superioress of some Augustinian nuns trained the first members of the order, while St. Bridget was making a pilgrimage to Rome, where she lived for some years, and to Jerusalem. On St. Bridget's death her daughter Catherine, also a widow, after having labored in Rome for her mother's canonization for some years, went to Vadstena, where she was chosen as the first abbess, the nuns considering the years she had lived with her mother at Rome, during which she became imbued with her spirit, as a sufficient novitiate. Catherine was very beautiful and also very holy, but the process of canonization of her mother was stopped, like so many others, by the Reformation. After her installation as abbess she went to Rome again, and during her visit there the great schism of the West broke out, when Clement II. was proclaimed anti-Pope to Urban VI.; but ultimately Urban wrote Bridget's name in the Golden Book of the saints, and when Catherine returned to her monastery in 1380 the process of canonization only wanted the Papal approbation. She died soon after her return, before the great event for which she had labored so zealously actually took place, in 1391.

Catherine was succeeded as abbess by her niece Ingebord, who in the words of St. Bridget's biographer, the Countess of Flavigny, "brought more dowry than virtues" to the monastery, and having certainly broken her vow of poverty and having been accused of breaking other vows, was compelled to resign and was succeeded by one Gerdica, a simple bourgeoise. The influence of the order under Ingebord, who was very rich and of noble birth, had been very great and wide. A foundation was made in Italy near the gates of Florence, afterwards known as the Monastery of Paradiso. She also maintained excellent relations with the Holy See, and it was through her influence that Queen Philippa, wife of Eric XIII., came to Vadstena and indirectly through her that the Brigittines came to England.

The fourth abbess of Vadstena was Benedicta Gunnari, who reigned from 1422 to 1447. Her brother Birger was prior at the same time. Great storms raged inside and outside the monastery during Benedicta's reign, and in 1430 Queen Philippa, who was now the patroness both of Vadstena and of the order, died in the monastery a few weeks after her arrival and was buried there in the crypt of the royal chapel which she had erected. King Eric gave large sums of money for Masses for her soul to Vadstena, and

Philippa herself left them her jewelry, but Christian, who succeeded Eric, carried off a great deal of the money. In the stormy times which followed several synods were held at Vadstena, and a revolution took place, during which exciting scenes were enacted there. The church was broken into and an assault made upon the convent in 1439, when Eric was deposed and Christopher the Bavarian proclaimed King in his stead. In 1442 he visited Vadstena with much ceremony, and again in 1446 with his bride. He died in 1448 and was succeeded by Charles Bondé, who in his turn visited Vadstena in 1448, and while there received a threatening letter from King Christian of Denmark, who ultimately invaded Sweden and became King. His daughter Richildis took the veil here. He bought the crowns and jewels which had belonged to Eric, and added to the church and endowed the convent with a revenue.

In 1458 Christopher visited Vadstena, when his aunt, the abbess, on his demand delivered to him the money which Eric had left the monastery to found a college of twelve canons on certain conditions, which the King never fulfilled. Wars and plots followed between the two Kings, during which the daughter of Charles, Richildis, and his niece, Marguèrite, were living as nuns in the monastery peacefully under the rule of Christopher's aunt, the abbess.

From the time of Stan Steere, who was administrator of the kingdom after King Charles' death, the political importance of Vadstena declined and is rarely mentioned in the Vadstena diary, which fell into the hands of the Protestants and was mutilated. Steere's only daughter was a nun at Vadstena for over fifty years, and before she died, in 1536, saw the downfall of the convent under Gustavus Vasa.

On August 1, 1489, Stan Steere was present at a tremendous function which took place on the occasion of the exaltation of the bones of St. Catherine. Four Bishops and over a hundred clergy all went in procession to meet the Archbishop of Upsal, and the next day there was a solemn procession of the relics, the Brigittine Fathers leading and Stan Steere bearing the skull of St. Catherine.

Gustavus Vasa spared no pains to try and pervert the learned monks of Vadstena, and, sad to say, some yielded to the temptation and left the faith and one nun also apostatized, while Gustavus' own sister remained true to the faith, and so did all his nearest relations. In 1568 a brief period of prosperity recurred at Vadstena under John III., who allowed the community to have a Catholic priest to say Mass and permitted them to receive new members and restored the building. In 1580 the King, who had been reconciled to the Catholic Church, held a diet at Vadstena, at which the celebrated Nuncio, Possevin, was present.

John's descendants obtained the throne of Poland on account of

their faith, and when Sigismund, his son, succeeded to the throne he resigned the crown of Sweden and went to Poland, and the Vadstena nuns went with him to the convent of Mary Triumphant, the chief Brigittine house in Poland, situated at Lublin. And thus ends the history of the once great and powerful mother house of the Brigittines.

One of the most interesting of the daughter houses is that of Altomünster, in the Archdiocese of Munich Freising. Altomünster itself is a small unpaved town of about 10,000 inhabitants. The monastery was founded by St. Alto, a hermit of royal descent, in the eighth century. He was living the eremitical life in the primeval forest when King Pepin gave him a large territory, on which he built a church and monastery. Some Benedictine monks from Ammergau joined him and he became the abbot. In 1047 some Benedictine nuns at Altdorf exchanged their residence with the fathers at Altomünster. They abandoned it in the fifteenth century, and Duke George of Bavaria gave it to the Brigittines, who built a church dividing the two convents, with a high wall surrounding it. The community continued to flourish until the Thirty Years' War. In 1632, as Gustavus Adolphus and his army entered Altomünster, the nuns fled to Munich, where they were taken in by the Poor Clares. The fathers had a house at Méran, and they fled there, and only a few old nuns and Brothers remained at Altomünster. Two of these monks were shot and one died from the savagery of the soldiers. Three old nuns were found starved—all over eighty years of age. Part of the convent was destroyed by fire, part was spared because the soldiers found that St. Bridget was a Swedish Princess. The community returned to the monastery as soon as it was considered safe to do so, but in 1646 they had again to flee, this time before the Swedes and French. After the Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, the monks and nuns returned and the relics and treasures were brought back from Munich.

In 1703 all had once more to flee to Freising and then to Munich. In the following year the enemy burnt both houses. In 1714 peace was again declared and the community all returned once more. In 1723 a new monastery for men was built, and in 1745 the present church. The monastery now flourished. The nuns, many of whom were of noble birth, by their sanctity and their strict observance of the rule, won respect from all. They were also noted for the beautiful lace they made.

In the revolution of 1803 the convent was suppressed; the library and art treasures were carried off and many valuable things lost. The religious received small pensions from the government, and the nuns lingered on in their part of the house till, in 1844, they

were released by Papal dispensation from any connection with the monks, and Ludwig of Bavaria, at their request, restored the order, and since that date a community of Brigittine nuns has been established there and carries on the work.

During the tenancy of the abbey by the Benedictine nuns abuses crept in, for only postulants of high rank were admitted, and only twelve of these were entitled to vote for the abbess. After the community had been dissolved and Duke George and his wife Hedwig, who knew the Order of St. Saviour well, had given the convent to the Brigittines, having rebuilt it, they added some land to the property and fifteen nuns and eight monks were chosen from the Brigittine monastery of Mary Mayingen, in Oetting Wallerstein, to make a foundation, and they acquired great fame for their learning.

At the Reformation no less than ten members of the community—four priests, five lay Brothers and one nun—apostatized and embraced Lutherism, but after this terrible defection the numbers increased and the buildings were enlarged, and the monks maintained a high reputation for learning and the nuns for their artistic work, especially lace making and miniature painting. A beautiful little legend is told of a nun in this connection. She tore herself away from a vision of the Holy Child Jesus in her cell to obey the call of the bell and fetch some firewood, and on her return she found Our Lord waiting for her in her cell as a grown Man, to show her the growth in saintliness she had made by her prompt obedience.

When the community returned to their beloved monastery in 1842 there were among them six venerable mothers who had made their vows fifty years ago and ten postulants were clothed. They found the monastery very dilapidated, and an eye-witness reports a touching sight seen in the garden, where these six venerable nuns, bowed down with age, were walking, and pausing every now and then and bowing profoundly to north, south, east and west, they said a "Gloria Patri" for all those who neglect to worship God. Five of these six nuns died before 1845, but Mother Rosa lived till 1848, by which time she had trained the ten novices and taught them to sing the office, and besides training them in the religious life had taught them various kinds of work, for which the convent was celebrated. Among these was lace making, as we have said, also mounting relics, making wax candles for use in the choir and making quince preserve. This good work is still carried on by the descendants of those trained by Mother Rosa.

Holland possesses two Brigittine monasteries at the present day—one at Weert and the other at Uden. The Brigittine monastery at Weert is a plain whitewashed building in the middle of the little

quiet market town of Weert, in the province of Limberg. The chapel has Gothic windows covered like those of the convent with blinds, which are always drawn down. The nuns' choir is above the entrance and vestry and part of the church. This arrangement is similar to the old double monasteries where the nuns' choir was always over that of the monks. A visitor to Weert now would be shown into a spotlessly clean parlor with a grille, at which some of the nuns in the habit of their order sit to interview strangers. The peculiarity of the Brigittine habit is the white linen crown with five little crosses made of red cloth to represent the five wounds of Our Lord worn over the veil. The habit is gray.

The history of Weert is briefly this: In 1840 William II. of Orange gave permission to all convents to receive novices, and the lady-abbess of Uden, who had been long praying to open another house, in 1843 was able to buy an old disused convent in Weert, and here four nuns from Uden took up their residence. Others soon followed. For the first few years they suffered much from poverty, but as other subjects joined they were able to rebuild the house to suit their requirements. At the request of the dean of Weert the nuns in 1844 undertook the infant schools, and in 1846 they opened a school for girls, and in the next year a poor school. The dean died in 1863. He had been for twenty years their patron and confessor, and his death was a great loss to the community, but his successor, his former secretary, was equally good to them. Then came the Kulturkampf in Germany, which drove many educational orders to Holland, where they gained their living by teaching. Some of these orders relieved the Brigittines of these schools, and they were able to give themselves up to an enclosed contemplative life, for which they were intended and to which they are now devoting themselves.

Uden, the mother house of Weert, was founded from the celebrated convent of Maria Wasser, which had a marvelous beginning. According to the pious belief of the order, a certain farmer at Rosmelin, in the Netherlands, one night heard a great commotion among his beehives, so he got up and went to see what was the matter. On reaching the hives he heard heavenly music coming from them, and on opening one he saw a model in white wax of a church, and on each side of the church was a convent with bees keeping guard. He was so impressed that as soon as it was light he fetched the priest and some other people, who also beheld this wonderful sight, the news of which ultimately reached a rich widow named Mila von Kamfen, who went to Rosmelin and bought the farm from this Peter Gorter, the farmer, and with the sanction of Pope Eugenius in 1434, she built a double convent for the Brigittines

and a church, with the high altar over the place where the beehive had stood.

The dean and chapter of Herzogenbusch at first opposed it, but finally the dean himself became one of the monks and afterwards prior of the monastery. The first abbess and three nuns came from Maria Thron, in Stralsund; one monk came from the convent of Paradiso, in Florence, and two others from Mariboo, in Denmark. The pious foundress of this convent herself took the veil, and ultimately became the abbess and died there in 1453, aged sixty-six. Many persons of noble birth entered the community, which grew in sanctity and importance until the Reformation, when, between 1566 and 1572, the inmates had to abandon it; but they afterwards returned, though the date of their return is not known.

When the monks were expelled from Holland, in 1629, a few were allowed to remain here as secular priests. The property of the monastery was all confiscated, the nuns received a small pension and a few lingered on in the convent till in 1711, when the last one having died, the monastery was sold and passed into secular hands. Before the last nuns died they had trained several young girls who had a vocation in the rule of the order, and these formed the nucleus of Uden, where they took refuge when the last nun of Herzogenbusch died in 1711, as it belonged to the Elector of Pfalz, who was, happily, a Catholic. The superior bought a ruinous building here which had formerly belonged to the Knight Templars, and later built the stately pile now occupied by the present community. The style of architecture chosen is what is known in England as Queen Anne's, introduced into England by William of Orange from Holland. The nuns at first opened a boarding school, which lasted till 1794, when they were obliged to flee on account of the French Revolution; but they were able to return the next year, when they found their church had been robbed of its ornaments, the beautiful trees cut down and the furniture all destroyed. The buildings, however, were left standing. Again in 1812, when Napoleon ordered the dissolution of the monasteries, the nuns were driven out and took refuge in a small house in Uden till 1814, when under William of Orange they were enabled to return; but they were not allowed to receive any postulants for many years, until in 1840 an act was passed permitting them to do so, and Uden now began to flourish until in 1850 it had fifty nuns besides having, as we have seen, founded the house at Weert. The confessor of the nuns is now a secular priest with the title of rector, and he lives in the outer buildings of the monastery. Uden possesses some precious relics of St. Bridget, including a skull cap of red velvet, now faded to a fawn color. Here, too, the choir of the nuns is above. The church, which is very fine, was built in 1739. It was struck

by lightning in 1879, when the tower ceiling fell and would have crushed the nuns, but an alarm of fire caused them to leave before.

The house of St. Bridget in Rome, where the saint lived during her residence there, was not a monastery, though from time to time some of the monks lived there. This house originally belonged to a Roman lady and was in the Campum Florum. St. Bridget went to it after Ulf's death and also after all her pilgrimages. She died there in 1373. There, too, she wrote her revelations, the most popular work in Swedish literature after the writings of Linnæus. Here St. Catherine of Vadstena, her daughter, stayed for five years when after her mother's death she came to Rome to work for her canonization. The formal transmission of this property did not take place till two years after the death of the first Abbess Catherine, when the original owner, Francesca Papazi, transferred it to the former chaplain of Bridget, Magnus Petre, then staying in Rome for the canonization of the saint. It was at first quite a white elephant to the Vadstena community, and it seems always to have been a source of trouble and anxiety, owing to its remoteness in days when communication between the countries was slow and difficult. The Vadstena nuns proposed to the Bishops to use it for a hostel or hospice for Swedes visiting the Eternal City. Later on they appointed two monks of the order to govern the house, which arrangement lasted with some interruptions until 1554, when the tie between the two houses was snapped and all connection between Sweden and the hostel came to an end. A century later two monks from Altomünster were put in to take charge of the hospice in 1692, and the usufruct of the property was granted forever to the Brigittine Order. At the present time the Sisters of the Blessed Sacrament inhabit the house and use the church, which was built over St. Bridget's chamber and her chapel.

The fourth Brigittine monastery is that of Syon Abbey, Chudleigh, Devon. This community returned to England in 1861, after having been in exile since 1539, when their original home in England, Syon House, founded by Royal Charter on the 3d of March, 1415, was suppressed by Henry VIII., although Cardinal Pole reported of it in one of his visitations that "it was in a high state of fervour and regular observance."

Syon House, situated on the Thames, was founded from Vadstena, which monastery sent four fathers and four nuns to begin the foundation. In 1420 the first English professions took place in the presence of the King, Henry V., the founder and patron, who endowed the monastery for sixty religious and twelve priests. At this first profession twenty-seven nuns, five priests, two deacons and four lay Brothers took their vows.

The first stone of the church was not laid till six years later, and the buildings of the monastery were not finished till 1468. The community flourished for one hundred and fifty years, and the monastery received additional endowments from Henry VII., "in honour of the Resurrection of Our Lord."

At the suppression in 1539 there were twelve fathers, five lay Brothers, fifty-two choir nuns and four lay Sisters. These all received a small pension and were sent to their homes. The father general had been executed in 1535, on May 7, with the Carthusian monks, for resistance to the supreme will of the King, Henry VIII. Syon House was then turned into an ordinary dwelling house and was the scene of some strange historical events. The catalogue of the large and valuable library of 14,000 volumes is still preserved among the MSS. of Archbishop Parker at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. Here Catherine Howard, one of Henry VIII.'s wives, was imprisoned in 1541, and in the following year she was led forth from here to execution. Five years later Henry's own body rested here on its way to Windsor to be buried, and the coffin burst at Syon House, thus fulfilling the prophecy of Friar Peto, who had said fourteen years before: "Dogs shall lick up thy blood, O King." The place belonged to the Lord Protector, the Duke of Somerset, until his execution, and from here Lady Jane Grey was taken to the Tower to be executed. In 1553 the Duke of Northumberland, Lord Dudley, took possession of it, and that very same year he was beheaded for treason, and then Syon House became crown property again. Thus it seemed as if no blessing rested on any of the inmates of the monastery after its rightful owners had been expelled. While all this was happening in the once peaceful monastery the expelled nuns, with Katherine Palmer as their superior, went to one of their houses in Holland, at Dermonde or Dendermonde, founded from the Dutch monastery of Maria Koudewater, where they were received with great kindness. They returned to Syon House on the accession of Queen Mary, but only to be driven out again when Elizabeth came to the throne. The Duke of Feria, Ambassador to the King of Spain, obtained the Queen's permission for them to embark for Flanders, and he also furnished them with a vessel, in which they sailed for Flanders and again took refuge at Dermond, where they lived on alms sent them from their friends in England in a separate wing of the monastery, and they received many subjects from England, and here they remained till 1563, when they moved first to Zurich Zee, where they did not stay long, then to Meshagen, near Antwerp, from whence they had to flee to Mechlin, where they remained for seven years, where Sir Francis Englefield secured a house for them. Here the Abbess Katherine Palmer died, to the

great grief of the community, and as they were now deprived of their annuity, some of the nuns resolved to come to England to ask for alms to support themselves, but they were arrested by Elizabeth's myrmidons and cast into prison, where by their patience they edified all who saw them. Meanwhile their sisters in Mechlin were not faring much better, for they were persecuted by the Lutheran soldiery, who insulted them, and if it had not been for some English Protestant officers who protected them they would have been in as bad or worse condition than those in England. Eventually, with the assistance of their own countrymen, they escaped to Rouen, where they remained fourteen years, and then finally settled at Lisbon under the protection of the King of Spain.

While they were at Rouen they twice endured the horrors of a siege, and they were constantly subject to persecution from the Huguenots, and at last when Henry of Navarre came to the throne and the English Ambassador of Elizabeth, his great Protestant ally, arrived at Rouen it was imperative to move the Brigittines out of France, or at any rate out of Rouen.

They had at this time for their confessor general Father Foster, who had taken the Brigittine habit in 1584 and devoted himself to the spiritual care of these nuns, who had suffered so much for their holy religion. He proposed to them either to return to Flanders or to migrate to Spain. After a good deal of deliberation and many prayers for guidance, they chose the latter alternative, and with Father Foster the community of monks and nuns set sail on Good Friday, 1594, from Rouen to Havre. Here they were detained for twenty-four days and subjected to much annoyance, but eventually, after many difficulties, Father Foster succeeded, on May 5, in obtaining a passage for them in a Flemish vessel from Havre to Lisbon. After an eventful voyage, in which they experienced many dangers, they arrived safely at Lisbon on May 20. Here they were kindly received and at first took refuge with the nuns of the Esperanza, but the Queen gave them some land at Sitio de Mocambo, where they built a church and monastery, and Philip of Spain settled an annuity upon them, and here at last they found a home for upwards of two centuries, until they returned to England in 1861. Their convent was destroyed by the great earthquake at Lisbon in 1775, but no member of the community was injured. The monastery was soon rebuilt and the nuns continued to reside there for another fifty years. An attempt to return to England was made in 1809, but it did not succeed.

On their arrival in England they first went to Spettisbury, where they had bought a house of some Augustinian nuns, and here they settled after an exile of nearly three hundred years. There were

then eleven nuns. Neither the climate nor the situation of their new home in Spettisbury suited them, but their poverty prevented them from moving for twenty-six years, though they never seem to have looked upon Spettisbury as more than a temporary residence. At length a very suitable site was given them by an English Catholic gentleman near Chudleigh, in Devon, and the present abbey and church were built, and thither the nuns moved in 1887.

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THE THOUGHT-VALUE OF PROOF: AN EIRENICON.

IF IT can be truly said that all men are naturally desirous of acquiring knowledge, the great majority can be said also to be desirous of possessing some sort of proof substantiating it. It is not only in a carping or critical spirit that man asks for a demonstration of what is put forward, or of what he himself advances as truth. The mathematician certainly does not undertake to explore untrodden paths in his pure science with any desire to find flaws in his own work; nor does the pioneer in a science that is striving to make itself "exact" put forward an hypothesis in the expectation of finding it false. Yet both require proof in their respective sciences, and rightly so. The mathematician has certain fixed principles which he has undertaken to observe. He has certain definite lines to work upon prescribed for him by the very nature of his subject. The man of science welcomes any criticism of his hypothesis as best tending, in the long run, to secure that very result for which he labors. A clear sequence from its principles is the triumph of mathematics. The hypothesis that comes out of a storm of criticism unscathed has gone very far towards establishing itself upon a firm basis. For truth is great and will in the end prevail.

Proof, in matters where proof is possible, will always be demanded by the reasonable man. He is anxious to see clearly and distinctly just how far his knowledge holds together; and proof, he is confident, will show the links that bind it into a unity with its first principles. For he has certain fixed principles of thought that he cannot dispute, and he naturally wishes to have all the conclusions that he adopts properly related to them. Therefore he asks for proof.

Even in those matters of which he is certain, about which no doubt lingers in his mind, he desires to have further corroborative evidence, to see clearly the foundations of his certitude. Many men go further

than this. They are not satisfied until they have actually seen the chain of evidence welded and have personally tested every link of it. Even then they examine it again and again, lest some flaw in the workmanship should have escaped them and the proof be not so valid as they thought. And when they have got their valid proof they do not always stop. They go behind it and ask for the justifications upon which the demonstration rests. They question the first principles themselves and demand a satisfactory theory of human knowledge. Even when they have done all in their power to satisfy their craving for knowledge and certainty, there are some who do not rest content, but go on, over and over again, probing and testing and verifying what has been done. For the skeptical habit of mind often makes its own conditions as to just how far it will go in accepting evidence of any particular sort.

The desire for proof, in the first instance, is not necessarily a sign of doubt. The mind is held perfectly free to accept whatever comes to it, provided it comes clearly and distinctly. The search for further evidence of truth already possessed has its root in a desire to know clearly and distinctly the mental process by which it was attained. We ask for demonstrations of things because we desire to perceive them for ourselves. And, recognizing that the demonstration, if it is to be of any real value, must be our own, in asking for proof we are doing no more than attempting to project our own consciousness outside ourselves, as it were, in order that we may examine its nature, its sources and its processes. Proof, then, is principally a setting forth of the method by which our reason has already reached its conclusions. It has no place in the fixing of axioms or first principles, since these cannot be said to be methodical. If the mind assents to first principles, it is for no other reason than that it is of the nature of the mind to do so. But, strictly speaking, no proposition that is untrue can be proved. No falsehood can really be demonstrated. For once consciousness is projected in the form of propositions, the mental processes by which they were reached can be reviewed and tested. They are themselves the proof of the truth or falsehood of the projected propositions. Thus everything that is a natural object of contemplation on the part of the mind can be proved, or else can be shown to occupy the position of a first principle, for it can be projected as an origin or as a conclusion with its process.

If knowledge in general is a possession of mind, it follows that the mind is in a sense identified with the truth it possesses. There

* It is hardly necessary to point out that "projection" is used here in a sense excluding in the strict sense any participation of the Divine nature on the part of creation.

is no natural truth outside mind that is capable of entering into knowledge. Even the truth of beings (or ontological truth) is only true in so far as it is for mind. Our concepts—to go at once to the raw material from which the whole intellectual fabric is built—are true only in so far as they are accurate mental representations of those things of which they are the concepts. They are true because in the mental representation there is a conformity between intellect and thing. And the things, to a conformity to which the truth of our concepts is due, are true in so far as they express imitable modes of the Divine Mind. The projection of the Divine consciousness in creation is the world of actuality, the realities with which we are surrounded; and that world is true in itself (ontologically) in so far as it conforms to the imitable modes of the Divine consciousness. For us it seems to be true primarily in itself, since the truth in our human consciousness is first of all perceived as in conformity with it. But in reality it is only true because of its relationship to God. Thus, while we have a primary likeness to God in ourselves (since we, too, are parts of external nature and thus conform to imitable modes of the Divine consciousness), we acquire another likeness also when our concepts conform to those realities that express, each in its own fashion, the consciousness of God.

But when we go on to formulate truth as judgments, when we affirm or deny, we leave the early stages in the subjective genesis of knowledge. We compose and divide, we analyze and synthesize, until the stately fabric of knowledge rises in its greater or less completeness as a mental counterpart of the world of realities. It is not so difficult to realize that such a growth of consciousness can be a faithful counterpart of that real world when we remember that the real world itself is a counterpart of consciousness.

But all natural human knowledge must of its nature be limited and fragmentary, for it is thus seen to be made up of many items of truth derived from created beings. The ontological truth of any creature, as has just been pointed out, exists by reason of the infinite intelligence. It exists as true for God. But it is an expression of truth limited by the nature of that particular created being to which it belongs. And, consequently, the truth that we possess of any sensible being is a limited truth. Moreover, it is also limited by the finite nature of our own minds; so that, even were an infinite truth before us, we should be unable to include it as such in our knowledge. The only absolutely unlimited truth is God's own knowledge of Himself. For He is infinite. His understanding is infinite. And the truth of God's knowledge is God. Because of the limited and fragmentary nature of the truth we possess, it is not always an easy matter to project consciousness in the form of valid propositions;

and for many kinds of proof the partial contributions of several consciousnesses are required to make its validity apparent.

It may be asked, What is the force of proof if this is what it means? How can proof be said to convince? First principles, as has been noted, need no proof. They are evident. But the manner in which assent is given to them illustrates to a certain extent the way in which proof may produce its effect. If an intelligence reflects upon its contents, or, in other words, upon itself, it perceives a certain number of truths that it is unable to break up into any more primary ones. It can refer them to no other truths from which it has derived them. Similarly, when a real first principle of knowledge, using the term in its broad sense, is formulated and presented to an intelligence, its truth is immediately perceived. The human mind recognizes a certain number of truths naturally. They are clearly seen and they are evidently true. In other words, they are congenial to the nature of the intelligence, and that is their best title to the claim of full assent that they make upon it.

There are other principles less broadly applied, as a rule, and generally belonging rather to departments of knowledge than to knowledge as a whole. They are limited to a definite subject-matter. For this reason it follows that when such axiomatic principles are offered for consideration their truth is not always seen at once. When the intelligence first evolves them it does not give its full assent to them with the same freedom and spontaneity as characterize its acceptance of the first principles of a broader application. In such cases a certain amount of mature reflection is necessary. The terms in which the axiomatic principles are announced, the ideas in the relation of which they are found, must be carefully and exactly determined by a deep and searching meditation. Their full importance must first be realized. And the result of such a process, which is not reasoning, but scrutiny, is the development of their lights and shadows. They rise into consciousness with greater clearness and evidence. Their truth is perceived.

The two cases in which these principles are seen by the intelligence can be compared by a rough simile to physical vision. It needs but to open the eyes to see certain objects. To see others an accommodation of focus may be necessary. In the one case we see easily and without any effort. In the other we stare, we look again and again.

The dispute raised by some philosophers as to first principles does not affect materially the statements just advanced, for it relates not so much to first principles in general as to the order of precedence which first principles should have among themselves. And there may be a confusion of thought involved in any attempt to place one before another in the same order. The principle of contradiction

undoubtedly expresses a truth, but for us it is true because it is evident. The principle of evidence also expresses a truth to which we are obliged to assent by our very nature. Yet if the principle of contradiction were conceivably false, the principle of evidence would not necessarily be true. May not both, and others as well, be classed together as first principles of different orders? May not the principle of contradiction be the first ideal truth—that is to say, a principle presupposed by every truth whatever, and that of evidence the declaration of a primitive necessity of our nature, as the first accepted fact upon which all our intellectual activity is based? All real first principles are seen to be naturally congenial to the mind in which alone they can have their place as truths. No proof is asked for and none is legitimately desirable in their regard, for they are the fundamental conditions of knowledge in the intelligence of man.

Besides the truth expressed by the first principles of all knowledge and the axiomatic principles, there is the great bulk of truths which are not so easily perceived. These are the truths that are not seen with a sufficient degree of clearness and evidence to produce their immediate recognition. This fact doubtless follows from the natural limitation of the mind. It is conceivable that a created intelligence should exist which would be capable of recognizing all finite truths immediately. And, as a matter of fact, it has been said that there are certain individuals for whom what for the majority of men are conclusions reached by processes of reasoning are so plain and evident in themselves that they do not need any demonstration. The propositions of Euclid over which many of us spent our youthful hours in labor and tears did not present the same difficulties to the mind of Isaac Newton or Réné Descartes. It is difficult to be certain that it is not the result of the process of thought by which the truth was once reached, but there are those to whose minds the *Pons Asinorum,* say, does not appear to stand in need of proof. Are not the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle evidently equal? And might not truths such as this be evident in other cases as well? The difficulty of speaking positively upon such a point arises from the fact that a mental process has *de facto* been gone through; and it may be precisely because of that mental process that the conclusion now seems to be as evident as its own principles. However this may be, it is certain that conclusions can rise in consciousness with a strength and evidence similar to that of principles; and where they do not so rise, but remain as conclusions, they can be shown to be connected with an evolution and construction that takes place in the mind itself.

By the method of induction, by reflection upon principles, by the evolution of their contents and by the gradual unfolding of their implications, the non-intuitional truths are reached. The mind has

the power of acting upon and transforming unique sensible experiences that can only be united, related and combined in the spiritual simplicity of a perceiving subject, into factors of truth. There is no truth but for and in a mind. Why, then, are proofs ever advanced? Why do we seek to demonstrate in forms of words those conclusions of whose certainty we are persuaded? There are at least two possible answers to be given. If we are consciously certain of our conclusions we are, by implication, certain also of the process, whatever it may be, by which they were obtained. And if that process can be communicated to others, we shall have succeeded in adding to the common store of knowledge by helping their minds to unfold the truth for themselves. Moreover, even if we think we are consciously certain of both conclusion and process, we know by experience that not all conclusions have been true for us in the past, nor all processes legitimate. In either case, therefore, we advance what we call our proofs as lines of thought projected without ourselves, as objectivized processes, by which our conclusions have been evolved within our consciousness. If those lines of thought or processes really are legitimate, if they represent the normal and natural workings of the mind, they will, when expressed in words as proof, appeal at once with a convincing force to any one who has, consciously or not, developed intellectually along the same lines. In the case of him who has never directed his attention to the subject-matter in which the proof is the natural expression of the mind's activity, they will act inductively in producing or setting up similar evolutions and trains of thought.

In any case, when the subjective process is objectivized and set out in order, it can be followed and tested—that is, proved—step by step, as it can never be while it remains *in globo,* part and parcel of the living intelligence. This is really the principal function and office of proof; for it is the expression of the method and growth ot truth within the intellectual subject. There is no truth in it, for truth is only in mind, in the actual and vital nexus of ideas; and proof consists of words spoken or of written or printed symbols. Only can it be compared to ontological truth—the truth of beings as expressions of the imitable modes of God's consciousness. For proof can be likened to this truth, in that it is the expression of the consciousness of man; and the consciousness of man, being itself a real effect and likeness of the Divine consciousness, its projection should be in harmony, according to its nature, with world of realities.

Etymologically, "to prove" signifies to test, to try, to verify. In this sense I conceive proof to have its true thought-value. It does not prove in the sense popularly supposed. By it the thought-processes, the working of the intellect, the mental development of

themes, is approved. Even a valid proof cannot force certainty. It can at most only induce a process similar to that of which it is a projection. In most cases it does not even do that much, but merely serves as an objectivized process for another intelligence considering it.

Naturally the human mind is set like a compass towards all natural truth. Like a compass, it is deflected from its object by various causes and for various reasons. Truth is its life-blood, and in so far as it is deflected from truth it becomes withered and decrepit. Ignorance and error are the sicknesses of the intelligence. Now, natural truth is reached both naturally and spontaneously, provided the mind is not deflected from its object. Only when it is called in question, or when man wishes to know precisely how he has obtained it, are the hidden processes of the intelligence by which it came into being reviewed. And in their projection and examination an antidote is found for the false or erroneous processes worked in the unhealthy mind. Conclusions and processes can be checked when they are expressed formally, baldly, categorically, in words—precisely as proof.

But proof thus advanced by one has no effect upon a second intelligence considering it unless it does in truth correspond to the similar processes of that second intelligence. It fails to convince. It carries little or no weight. In that case, if in consequence of a careful examination of and a profound meditation upon it, a similar line of mental activity is inductively set up, the proof approaches more closely to that which is meant in the ordinary use of the word.

It is thus that in conversation—even with those with whom few ideas may be shared in common—such valuable thought-processes are so often set up. The fact will be patent to the reader. The process of the one mind induces processes in the other; and, from the interchanging play of heightening inductions, the subject of conversation rises with a vivid exactness of definition and a newly perceived evidential value.

Another factor, however, enters here of which it may be well to take notice in passing. The objectivized or projected processes of the one, by reason of his personal modifications, idiosyncrasies and bias, tend to modify, counteract and neutralize what may be the result of personal modifications, idiosyncrasies and bias in the other. And as the heightening of induction continues and the extraneous matter is stripped off from both conclusion and process, what may at first have been blurred and indistinct outlines come out sharp and clear with an evidence that is the measure of their truth.

It has been said—and for this very reason probably—that conversation is like the forming of a model in clay. We are able to

round off the curves and cut the angles sharply while the model is yet plastic. If there is truth in this statement, it is precisely because of the intelligence acting inductively the one upon the other and correcting what in either may be abnormal or purely personal.

II.

Up to this point the nature and force of proof has been considered only in subject-matters which nature has made the potential common property of the human mind, and the considerations advanced make no claim to be exhaustive, though by them the conclusion seems to be well established. Proof is the objectivized expression or projection of those mental processes which express the natural life of the soul in its faculty of reason as distinct from will.

But, more than this, the human mind is capable of an elevation to supernatural truth, just as the human soul is capable of an elevation to supernatural life. And as the natural life of the intelligence consists in those vital processes that develop natural truth within it and spiritually identify it with the things that it understands, so its supernatural life, we must suppose, consists of parallel but higher vital processes developing supernatural truth and conforming the faculty, in a sense similar to *intentional identification,* with the beings or truths supernatural which are the objects of its higher understanding. In its identification with this higher truth the soul leads a new life—or, rather, its life is at the same time more complete and more intense. It is furnished with new motives for action, not so much considered as ends without, but as real motive springs within itself. And this new life is normally lived with all its consequences. The implications of the supernatural life of truth in the intellect are unfolded and developed, not in that faculty alone, but in the will as well. There is not only a faith; there is also a love. And in the manifestations of either, as well as in the mutual play and interchange of influence between them, is to be discerned the full spiritual life of the human soul raised above nature by the grace of a living faith. For faith is not a mere supplement of reason. The supernatural life is not a mere appendix to the natural. In the order of truth, as in the order of goodness, it is the fulfilling, the completion, the plenitude. It is not a radical change that is wrought. It is not an addition as brick is added to brick in a building. It is an elevation of the natural individual to a supernatural order, an identification of his intelligence with supernatural truth, a strengthening and perfecting of his will by supernatural love.

To narrow the question once more to its intellectual aspect, the soul holds or is identified with supernatural truth in virtue of its

elevation to the supernatural life. But what criterion has it of the validity of that truth? Can it be proved to be true? Such questions differ very little from those relating to purely natural truth. The nature of the faculty is not destroyed by grace. Its elevation to the supernatural order does not supplant reason. It perfects and transcends it. In its newer life it may still perceive its old principles unchanged in substance, but taking on a newer and a fuller meaning. It may be prepared to find new principles as an evidence of its larger horizon and of its more certain power. To it they are clear and evident. It does not dispute them. It cannot doubt them. They are as fixed and as immutable as the principles of natural knowledge; even more fixed and immutable, since they add their own peculiar guarantee to the clearness and the evidence of the latter. So also the conclusions in this supernatural order are evident and clear in the light of the principles. They are part and parcel of the elevated intelligence with which they are identified as truths, just as the natural conclusions are part and parcel of the purely natural mind in so far as they are identified with it. But if a merely negative doubt should arise, or if an individual wishes to render an account of the possession of such truths, he inquires, as before, as to their origin. He projects them and the processes connected with them, as it were, outside his consciousness. He renders them objective. Then he examines the processes. He tests. He approves. The same desire to see the chain that binds all, conclusions and principles, together welded and tested link by link obtains again. Again he is certain of his truths and, by implication, of the processes of consciousness also. He is as anxious to have a complete, related statement of his supernatural faith as of the natural certainties occupying the place of principles and conclusions in his knowledge. Thus he labors to project and objectivize the certain principles of what may here at once be called revelation, as well as its certain conclusions. He projects the processes, either of the natural or of the supernatural life of the intelligence, by which both principles and conclusions are identified with his consciousness. And this objectivized form of consciousness is for him the proof not only of the supernatural life and its truth, but also of the validity of the processes. In other words, he uses proof suitable to the subject-matter with which he is occupied. He projects his supernatural consciousness not to criticize, but to approve. He objectivizes that which is identified with his elevated consciousness to test it for himself, to see that it is normally in accord with that of others, to induce similar processes and their conclusions from similar premises—in short, to prove.

It may seem that a hard and fast line is here drawn between the

natural and the supernatural; that in laying down a distinction between the two the thought-value of the former is minimized and that of the latter thrown into an altogether undue and mystical prominence. I do not think that this can be urged precisely as an objection to the doctrine. It is not, surely, as an objection, but simply as a statement of fact, that a certain mystical value can and ought to be attributed to the principles, conclusions and processes of a consciousness that is really elevated and expanded to a fuller and a supernatural life. The principles are not repugnant to those of the same consciousness taken upon a lower plane. The conclusions are not incompatible with the results in a more restricted order. The processes are not diametrically opposed to the processes obtaining in the purely natural intelligence. At least we should be led to expect as much in a comparison of the projection of both. And we do find it so; for they are not really two distinct and separate consciousnesses, but one and the same. The fact that it is supernaturalized does not alter its nature. Even when we abstract the one from the other we observe a sameness of nature and method in our abstractions. In the one case of proof the condition of approval is the naturalness of the method by which the intelligence is seen to have been working. In the other, to this condition is added the consideration that the natural intelligence is strengthened, filled out, perfected. In the first case the compatibility of the various items of certain truth is perceived in their cohesion, when projected, to the fixed and fundamental truths that justify themselves by their own evidence. A conclusion is said to be evident in its principles. The justification of a conclusion, then, is the naturalness of the intellectual process by which it grew out of its principles and came to be identified with the intelligence as truth.

In the other case, the same method holds. The compatibility of the various items of certain truth is perceived in their projected cohesion to the principles of revelation. These principles are justified by their own evidence. They are identified with the supernatural life of the intelligence. The justification of the conclusions, here again, is the evidence that they are one part of legitimate thought-processes of which another part is the principles. As truths, they also are identified with the intelligence and thus are neither approved nor disapproved. They simply convince. And it is noteworthy that here, as in the natural consciousness, false principles carelessly adopted and erroneous conclusions depending upon non-normal processes also simply convince. Thus he who acts according to his mistaken conscience and, not having any doubt as to the validity of the processes of his consciousness, adopts its principles and conclusions, is said to act erroneously, indeed, but not sinfully. He is

morally bound to examine when there is a prudent doubt, not before. So the religious consciousness is projected or objectivized in order that it may be approved. Thus proof is seen here again not to be proof in the popular meaning of the word, but a mere setting out objectively of the truth with its thought-process. Argumentative demonstration can never convince directly, for conviction is a state of mind in which it perceives the truth as part of itself. It presupposes experience.

It may be asked, Does not such a view take away all vestiges of reality from the truths of revelation? Is it not an extreme and hopeless subjectivism, in the last scrutiny of the purest individualistic type? I think it can be shown not to be so. In our natural knowledge, if we search among its fixed and certain principles, we shall find one in virtue of which we are obliged to concede an objective reality to things. We are not, as a matter of fact, able to rest in a pure subjectivism. The truth of such a principle as that of causality, in so far as it is a truth and thus identified with the mind, must be subjective. But we refer, and by the constitution of our nature we are obliged to refer, it to realities external to ourselves. We point to external things as evident. We cannot but realize the objective value of the principle, and that realization, itself also a truth and identified with intelligence, takes us very far back along the essential lines of our nature. We grope here at the very roots of intelligence. Like Pyrrho, we find it hard—impossible—to throw off human nature. No matter what detailed account we are prepared to give of the origin of our knowledge, it can never be a purely subjective one in the face of this principle. While truth lies within only, reality is recognized as being without the mind.

And so for the subjectivism of revelation. We objectivize it in order to appreciate it and approve it as consciousness and as valid processes of consciousness. In that sense, objectively, it contains no truth. Our words and formulæ can only be considered as true in a sense analogous to the truth of beings. They are true in so far as they faithfully represent and embody our consciousness. But we should be unable to rest in such an appreciation were there no more than this. As we are obliged, naturally, to refer the truth of natural consciousness, expressed by the principle of causality, to realities without the mind, so are we obliged to refer these truths of the higher supernatural consciousness to realities without itself. And as we can point to fact external to ourselves in the one case as evident; so, in the case of supernatural truth, we can point to external historic fact as evident. In the one case we can adduce the evidence of our senses here and now. In the other we can appeal to the evidence of history. And it is necessary that we should do so.

Our consciousness, even in its spiritualized and supernatural plane, must get into touch somewhere with reality. In the manifestation of the Christ—to take the concrete case—the two planes coincide. Our consciousness of Christ, our experience here and now, the facts of revelation and the grace of intellectual strengthening are referred to and derive from the historic Christ. If, then, the supernatural consciousness is necessarily subjective and out of touch with objective reality, so is the natural. As a matter of fact, neither the one nor the other is so.

What we know as the laws of nature are only generalized expressions of external facts, the extreme generalization of which is the law, or principle, of causality. But precisely as they are generalized expressions they can only have their place in consciousness. Nevertheless, the facts of which they are the mental expression are exterior to and exist independently of ourselves. Just so, the dogmas of revealed theology can only be found in the intellectual consciousness; but they have their ontological truth in real and exterior facts. To point to the one and to appeal to the other is to follow the permanent and necessary working of consciousness towards the real objects of which it has knowledge, with which it is identified in truth. To project the whole subjective aspect of truth, to objectivize the entire consciousness, is to put forward a proof.

Proof, then, would of its nature seem to be quite secondary. It does not, and it is not intended to convince. It only registers the process of conviction. Moreover, it only registers the results of reflex action. It objectivizes what the mind finds in contemplating itself, and the processes and the convictions are often there before any such contemplation is begun. This is true for him, at least, who advances proof.

Among the natural functions of all proof, the following might be noted as summarizing the results already obtained:

I. It is a function of proof, considered as objectivized and projected consciousness, to show the natural identification between the pure—or the elevated—intellect and the things understood; to account for principles, processes and conclusions by presenting them in an orderly and related manner for inspection.

II. It is a function of proof to appear to demonstrate conclusions to those who recognize it as a projected statement of their own consciousness. To such it at once appeals as identical, in a sense, with themselves. It also has the function of inductively setting up similar processes and evolutions of consciousness in other minds. In this function it most closely approximates to the common idea of proof.

III. It has the function of providing a basis for the weeding out and minimizing of error arising from extraneous factors entering

into the mental processes, personal peculiarities, unequally balanced attention to the various parts and details of the process, lack of attention.

IV. Lastly, it has the function of satisfying the purely intellectual craving for knowledge by exhibiting the bare essentials in which it consists stripped of and removed from all unnecessary matter. It shows how those bare essentials are really involved in the process by which consciousness identifies itself with truth, and that they are necessitated by the very nature of the human intelligence. And it does this by bringing that consciousness and intelligence reflexly into a state in which its own evidence is apparent to itself.

III.

It may be interesting, by way of illustration, to consider how the foregoing theory of proof works out in concrete examples. Certainty is a condition, a subjective attitude, of consciousness. Truth is the conformity of consciousness to the realities known. The implicit trust in the worth of our intellectual faculty—or, better perhaps, for we need not build all on "belief," the nature of our minds impels us to invest all certainty with the character of truth. The only possible test of the value of our consciousness is evidence; and evidence, as we have seen, is to be sought in the principles and processes of thought.

It was at one time commonly held that the sun moved round the earth. This was to many, at the time, a certainty and held as true; but it was not a truth. A fuller knowledge of facts and of the quasi-axiomatic principles connected with them was sufficient to dispel the error. The principles, but not necessarily the processes, were at fault. The conclusion was valueless because its process lacked true foundations. The old conclusion and process were not to be welded to the new principles. So the conclusion went by the board as a certainty of consciousness, not because it was not a part of a valid and natural process, but because the process, when separated from its principles, was incomplete. A process nowhere coming into touch with reality is barren. Thus A is B, B is C; therefore A is C is fruitless and worthless (except as a generalized formula). And how could these principles be mistaken? Because they were not first principles, but secondary ones. Because they were not axiomatic in the sense of the mathematical axioms, but as inductions. They were, in fact, false conclusions of another and a prior process of consciousness, the result of hasty and incomplete generalization. And so, just here, where the planes of reality and thought ought to have crossed, there is no contact between them;

and, this point once perceived, the certainty of the conclusion had to be abandoned as having no real contact with facts.

A form of the atomic theory that is sometimes advanced is a good example of the way in which an apparently legitimate mental process may be seen, when projected, not to be congenial to the nature of consciousness. Granted here that the observations which are generalized are true and that the guiding thought-principles are valid, when the process bearing with it as a conclusion this form of the atomic theory is objectivized it is seen to exceed the normal lines of mental activity. There is a break in the continuity of what ought to be one continuous process, where the mind apparently leaves the thought-forms of chemistry to plunge abruptly into the middle of another process having to do with the ultimate constitution of substance. The evidence of the original facts and principles induced is clear. To a point, also, the process is evident. Then comes a gap. The new process, were there evident principles to justify it, would tiself be evidently natural. But the first set of principles and their dependent process will not stand the strain of the second process and its conclusion. The evidence is seen to be lacking in a scrutiny of the complete objectivized consciousness, for the second process and its conclusion has nowhere a contact with reality and fact.

A further example may be borrowed from the pages of theology. An intellectual being *confirmed in grace* is incapable of sinning. Radically, of course, since the nature of the being is unchanged by grace, the power of choice of evil or of good remains intact. The free will is not destroyed. But to that power of choice is presented a *something* which, as a matter of fact, secures the constant actual choice of good. The free choice of the will is irrevocably set towards good. Now, since the will follows the intelligence—since *nihil volitum nisi præcognitum*—we are free to suppose that *something* to be in the latter faculty. In the light of the theory advanced, it will be that certainty of principle, process and conclusion which is identified with the consciousness and which is perceived reflexly to be indeed congenial to its nature. The "confirmation in grace" of theology obtains in the supernatural order; and the principles of that order come from without consciousness in some form of revelation. They are not evolved by the mind or generalized from observations. The consciousness with which they are identified lives its life, strengthened, perfected, heightened by grace. Its processes are, if it may be so expressed, supernaturally natural. Its conclusions are adequately seen. And its reflex vision of its own being and contents is so clearly evident that there is no possibility of its mistaking. It is certain of its identification with truth. The will follows it in a complete adhesion to good.

Although the number of examples could be prolonged indefinitely, a last one can be found in an account of mysticism. It is difficult to find a precise and distinct definition of the subject. I here take it to express that attitude of mind towards things spiritual which cannot be accounted for by any identification with purely natural principles, processes and conclusions. Mysticism is, apparently, non-natural and exotic. In the intellect it is denoted by new and fuller conceptions; in the will by a stronger adhesion to its object; in the senses by a downward play of the higher nature which sharpens and intensifies; in the whole individual by a heightened life. This is clear from the lives and writings of such mystics as St. Teresa or St. John of the Cross. Interpreting these characteristics in the light of the theory of proof advanced, it would seem that either the conclusions of the natural consciousness rise as evident principles of the supernatural or new supernatural principles become self-evident. In any case the natural consciousness would be quickened beyond its normal intensity and scope and the mental processes would close in certain conclusions. For their truth the evidence of the principles and processes are the guarantee. All the implications of such supernatural certainty, as of the natural, work out in the other faculties. The constancy of the mystic in adverse circumstances, his—to the ordinary man—curious estimate of the facts and realities in the natural order, his domination of the lower plane of consciousness and of his sensitive nature, find an explanation. He is living the supernatural life. His mind is raised to a higher plane and is more closely identified with truth. His will follows in its closer adhesion to the good. His natural imagination is subdued and responds to the higher quickening.

But to certify to all this reflex scrutiny is necessary. To perceive the certainty as also truth an objectivization of consciousness is required. Thus it is possible to understand the existence of false mystics. The projected consciousness is tested, first as consistent with the thought-principles of the supernatural life, then as a real filling out of the natural. And where it is inconsistent with itself, where the principles, in the last resort, are not evident in fact or in revelation, or the processes congenial to the strengthened faculty, or the "certain" conclusions related as parts of the processes, the thought-value of the whole is nil; the mysticism is false. And as a further test there is the comparison of the supernatural with the natural consciousness that can be made by means of a mental abstraction of the one from the other. Since the latter is not destroyed by the former, its principles, processes and conclusions must remain intact. But though no contradiction must exist between the two under penalty of false mysticism, the discovery of an entire shifting

of principles and conclusions need not surprise us. That the principles are all evident in consciousness and the processes are congenial to its nature are the tests. In the projection of the whole consciousness as a related and coherent unity lies the evidence, or proof, of mysticism and the guarantee of its implications and consequences in all departments of life.

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THE IRONY OF SHAKESPEARE.

WHEN Marc Antony said, "I am no orator as Brutus is," he was talking ironically and thereby transgressing the boundaries of truth in an opposite sense to that of Falstaff when he related his memorable adventure with the men in Lincoln Green. St. Thomas, after Aristotle, opposes *ironia* to *jactantia,* or boasting, each being a species of lie involving, the one an understatement, the other an overstatement of our own merits. When the Pharisees disfigured their faces in order to show men that they were fasting, they were guilty of both these forms of lying, because they concealed one kind of excellence in order to make pretence of another. The prophet Amos when he says, "I am no prophet," is acquitted[1] of the charge of irony because the truth of his words is saved by the fact that he did not, by birth, belong to the class of professional prophets. For similar reasons, doubtless, Antony might be found guiltless of the charge of irony as understood by St. Thomas. At any rate, if we contrast him with Sir John Falstaff he was *in comparatione illius multo innocentior.*

Of the morality of the different forms of irony it is not our present intention to speak. The irony or feigned ignorance of Socrates is a device which many a schoolmaster would be loath to forego. The graceful humility of an author who pretends that his choicest inspirations are due to some unknown fifteenth century manuscript instead of to his own sweet inventiveness is an excess of reserve which may or may not edify the reader. But even those who perceive ethical defectiveness in such departures from the way of plain truth would still be willing, probably, that the transgressor should keep his tongue in his cheek and follow his own conscience, such as it is.

The irony of life in its manifold forms, and dramatic irony, which

[1] 2a 2ae cxiii., 1.

is a poetic presentment of these, imply the striving of a human agent who shapes his destiny in ignorance of some impending catastrophe, or in despite of certain facts which change the issues of his action. The defect from truth here consists not so much in an actual understatement of the facts as in the withholding of complete knowledge. The irony resides in the mind of him who, whether studiously or otherwise, withholds such knowledge and permits the agent to live for unattainable ends or to reap the consequences of his ignorance. Thus irony is attributed to fate or necessity, which endows an Achilles or an Œdipus with all the gifts which seem to mark him out for a great and prosperous career, and then gives the lie to its promises by plunging him in undeserved calamity. The irony of God, who allowed Adam's culpable ignorance to work out its own retribution, is expressed in Scripture by the words, "Behold Adam is become as one of us, knowing good and evil."

Examples of the studied irony, which prepares the situation on dramatic lines in order to deliver a blow with greater effect, are to be found in Nathan's rebuke of David, delivered suddenly home with the words, "Thou art the man," and in the pageant organized by Assuerus when he had Aman hanged on the gibbet prepared for Mordecai.

The leading *motif* of the Greek drama was the idea of necessity considered in its inexorableness rather than in its irony. Yet this latter element was naturally prominent as a consequence of the former. The Athenians, always keenly alive to the subtleties of terse dialogue, loved to hear an Œdipus, in language of double import, allude unconsciously to the network of destiny that was already enfolding him.

The irony of things may be reflected in a peculiar and personal manner in the mind of an author, and when this subjective or reflex irony is connected with the power that comes from reserve, it will contribute not a little towards giving a character to his style. It enables him to suggest more than he says, or to point to conclusions the opposite of those which his words might be taken to imply.

We like to moralize on the various vanities of life, but the moral must not be pointed too directly by one who does the moralizing for us. Thucydides avoids the didactic shoal by means of the speeches which he puts into the mouths of his historical characters. In that made by the Athenian envoys in the council hall at Melos we have an elaborate picture of the kind of pride that comes before an unexpected fall, while from this dialogue and others we gather, too, the peculiar cynicism and contempt for the democracy which lay deep in the mind of the author himself.

A favorite form of irony with certain quasi-scientific writers con-

sists in the suppression of a "but." It is used by those who, standing on a superior level, "classify" the beliefs and most cherished convictions of their less enlightened fellow-men. They do not refute or condemn, they merely state the position of their victims and with sympathizing condescension set forth all that is to be said for the grounds of it. Their statement is so like a panegyric that the reader is apt to be deceived unless he can find between the lines the adversative clause which dashes the victim from the pedestal to which he was lifted. The author knew, though he did not state, where the weakness lay.

A Jesuit father once complained in a review of a well-known novel that the author had made an ignorant and unfair presentment of the typical Jesuit. While regretting that he had given offense, the author protested that he had depicted what he considered to be a fine character. He had expected, no doubt, that it should be said: "They were classified and were not ashamed."

It is one of the ironies of the drama that it is unable, or nearly so, to deal successfully with absolute perfection. The Christian hero as such, at any rate, does not appear to advantage on the stage. Whether from the necessity of the case, or that the genius to deal with him has not yet arisen, he is apt to look very like a prig. Who would wish to see St. Edward the Confessor or St. Louis on the stage? The hero must have his faults and his weaknesses or else he will be undramatic.

No dramatist knew this truth better than Shakespeare. Macbeth is even more sinful than he is heroic. Othello is unrestrained in his jealousy and without that resignation which would have checked and saved him, while it would have spoiled the play. Lear is barbarous and extravagant alike in his love and in his hatred.

The irony of life is nowhere more powerfully reflected in the drama than when a noble character is undone or rendered mischievous by some inherent and even unrecognized weakness. When the weakness is obvious, as in the three cases just cited, the minds of the spectators are divided between pity and admiration in the proportion intended by the author. But when party passions and party principles are at play it is not always clear what kind of sympathy the author wishes to evoke.

For purposes of illustration we will take the case of an imaginary dramatist who produces a trilogy of which the rise, the glory and the fall of Napoleon are the respective subjects. In the second piece, let us suppose, the hero appears in the character of the ideal patriot who has raised his country from the state of confusion and terror so powerfully represented in the first. Such is the enchantment of his personality that, at a crisis in the battle, every officer

about him begs for the privilege of dying for him on a forlorn hope. In a speech to his men he asks for forgiveness if he has sinned in loving glory even more than he has loved his country, adding that, if this be a sin, he is conscious of none other. No one is even tempted to condemn him. The curtain falls and the spectators depart, each one fired with an overwhelming sense of patriotism. But certain indications in the piece itself and the whole tenor of the sequel go to show that the author was all along much more reserved in his sympathies. The hero in exile soliloquizes on the outcome of his glorious career. The manhood of France, many times decimated and sacrificed to his favorite goddess of glory, haunt him in spirit and reproach him for having left their country, widowed and defenseless, a prey to the invaders whom they had so often defeated for him and not for her. His glory has been his ruin and their own.

With the purpose of the action thus clearly forced upon them, the critics of such a dramatist would hesitate to say that, in any part of the series of events, he has stooped from his high level of detachment and thrown himself in with his hero. If the series had ended with the second play, the known facts of history and certain suggestions in the play itself might have led some of the spectators to suspect his irony, but the majority would not have recognized it. As it is, they are able to see that the hero is a creation of the poet rather than an emanation from his mind; that he has a quasi-independent existence, acts, as it were, according to the nature wherewith he was originally endowed, but that the whole sphere of his activity and his interests is made subordinate to the higher purpose of showing his creator's vision of life.

Now, instead of an imaginary Napoleonic trilogy, let us take Shakespeare's "Henry V." The author of it more than any other dramatist has the name of being a true creator of his characters. They are individualized types, thrown off from his mind, and he does not send them as prophets to utter his messages among men. They mirror life as he sees it, and while doing so, they reflect, by their combination, the fairest vision of all—the mind of Shakespeare. If the word of God is in Scripture, the character of God is in nature, especially in mankind; and in the poet's imitation of the creative act his mind and character are analogously impressed on the creatures of his fancy. All that is true and real in human life has God for its author, yet human life by no means expresses God's idea of things as they ought to be; nor is the poet's world, nor any part of it, intended to convey lessons of absolute perfection. His idealizing consists in so adjusting the circumstances to the characters that the latter may work themselves out more rapidly and consistently than in the humdrum of real life. Moreover, since he idealizes life as he

sees it and not as it ought to be, it will be harder to find a man after the poet's own heart in the drama than a man after God's own heart in the world.

Yet among Shakespeare's heroes many find a notable exception in the case of Henry V. Here, at any rate, there would seem to be no such thing as irony, no implied suggestion of wasted greatness and no reserve on the part of the poet in identifying himself with his hero. Shakespeare seems here to be simply abandoning himself to his sense of patriotism and throwing himself into the effort to produce a truly national play. The hero has plucked away the weeds which sprang from the exuberance of his nature and comes forth to answer the hopes of a nation weary of division and longing to be united under a King who is at once a God-fearing Christian man and a leader without fear and without reproach. If he is not an ideal monarch in the strictest sense, if he has not the spotless integrity of a King Arthur nor the fenced and guarded majesty of Cæsar, he is at any rate a complete Englishman. His character is pitched in an attainable key, and no one more exactly than he could fit in with the special needs of the time. If there is irony at all, it will be discovered only by such as would look for the note of exalted majesty in their national hero and find a dramatic disappointment of their hopes in his love of practical jokes and his rather undignified wooing. But of irony on a grand scale, of the hanging of great destinies on the fall of a handkerchief or the belying of high promise through some unnoticed flaw in the character, there seems no suggestion in Henry V.

It is true that there is, properly speaking, no sequel to this play, and therefore no studied attempt on the part of the poet to effect in his audience a sudden change of feeling towards his hero. The possibility of creating such a transformation might have been too strong a temptation for a weaker man than Shakespeare, as it has proved too strong for many a rhetorician exulting in his power of swaying the feelings of his audience. The expressed "but" is not to be looked for in "Henry VI.," which seems to have been written earlier and which probably is not entirely from the hand of Shakespeare. Yet the known facts of history are such as to prevent a sober moralist from allowing his undivided sympathies to go out to the hero of Agincourt. Henry's claim to the French throne was based on a palpable fiction, and his attack upon France in the hour of her weakness was as unchivalrous as it was unjustifiable. The policy, moreover, which prompted it was of that desperate character which sometimes drives the ruler of a divided nation into foreign wars in order to escape from civil strife at home. In Henry's case this policy, though successful for a time, in the end only aggravated

the evil it was intended to cure. The wars of Edward III. had given rise to a class of professional soldiers or *retainers* who, like the *condottieri* in Italy, were the curse of the country and the terror of all peaceful citizens. Under a capable military ruler like Henry V. they were attached to the throne, but when the pageant of conquest came to an unexpected end they poured back into their own country and sought employment there. Under the unwarlike Henry VI. this sudden influx of landless resolutes had its natural consequence in the Wars of the Roses and in a long period of anarchy, which came to an end only when these bravos and their employers were destroyed by mutual slaughter.

Regarded from the point of view of that larger patriotism which has not only country but Christendom for its object, the Hundred Years' War was even more deplorable in its consequences. Cressy, Poitiers and Agincourt were fought at a time when the Ottoman Turks were growing rapidly in power and threatening to overrun Europe. That they did not succeed in doing so was scarcely owing to the patriotism of Christian peoples and princes. These latter were doing their best to prepare the way for the common enemy by warring with one another. If the military undertakings of Richard Cœur de Lion and St. Louis in the East ended ingloriously, they at least had the merit of a larger public spirit and gained some measure of respect for the Christian arms. The performances of their successors in the fifteenth century were surely less creditable from every point of view. "People are apt to ask," says Newman,[2] "what good came of the prowess shown at Ascalon or Damietta, forgetting that they should rather ask themselves what good came of the conquests of our Edwards and Henries, of whom they are so proud. If Richard's prowess ended in his imprisonment in Germany, and St. Louis died in Africa, yet there is another history which ends as ingloriously in the Maid of Orleans and the expulsion of tyrants from a soil they had usurped."

With this view of the facts before us we shall do well to ask ourselves whether Shakespeare is in reality maintaining considerable deserve in his presentment of Henry V. or whether he identifies himself with that idea of patriotism which is current among the unthinking multitude. Is it his purpose to stir up universal admiration for his hero, or is there an appeal for the more discriminating among his audience to their sense of tears in human things? The mind of Shakespeare is not merely many-sided but universal, and when he deals with facts under some particular aspect he does not lose sight of their bearing on the whole scheme of life. Hence when, with an Englishman's pride, he recalls the glories of Agin-

[2] "Historical Sketches," Vol. I., Lect. VI., sec. 4.

court, he can hardly wish to banish from his mind certain deeper sympathies evoked by the whole course of events of which those glories were but an episode. Were it otherwise "Henry V.," amid the unity of Shakespeare's plays, would appear with an incongruity resembling that of certain monuments in Westminster Abbey which display a species of patriotism strangely out of keeping with the spirit of the place. Henry's own tomb in the Abbey and that of King John in Worcester Cathedral are both monuments of patriotism tempered and elevated by religion. The glory recalled by the one and the weakness and disgrace associated with the other are left to the judgment of God, while the dust of either monarch reposes in the peace of God's temple. So, analogously, in the temple of Shakespeare's mind nothing is extenuated and naught set down in malice, while over the hurly-burly of human passions and human interests reigns that peaceful influence which creates and embraces all.

The whole series of plays which deal with the rise and fall of the Lancastrian dynasty naturally suggest the idea of the working out of a great retribution—the penalty which has to be paid for the usurpation of Henry IV. and the murder of Richard. The keynote is truck by the Bishop of Carlisle in the fourth act of "Richard II.:"

> **The woe's to come; the children yet unborn**
> **Shall feel this day as sharp to them as thorn.**

That it ever occurred to Henry V. that he himself, by his victories, was preparing the way for this retribution, so as to render it the more heavy for his own house and his people, there is no indication in the play. The shadow of Nemesis does not haunt him as it haunted Orestes. Yet it seems hardly consistent with the character of Shakespeare's genius, as gathered from his works as a whole, to suppose that the thought of the coming Nemesis was not actively present to him as he wrote. If he does not point the irony, it is because it is already pointed by our knowledge of his mind.

But there is another kind of irony which does seem studiously pointed. It concerns the inherent injustice of the claims by means of which Henry sought to reconcile his conscience with his passion for military glory. His claim to the English throne was questionable enough, and he was eager to begin his reign by showing conclusively that, whatever might be thought of his title *de jure,* he was fit to be King *de facto.* His dying father says to him:

> **Heaven knows, my son,**
> **By what by-paths and indirect crook'd ways**
> **I met this crown . . .**
> **. . . Therefore, my Harry,**
> **Be it thy course to busy giddy minds**
> **With foreign quarrels; that action, hence borne out,**
> **May waste the memory of the former days.**

To this his son replies, with true English logic:

My gracious liege,
You won it, wore it, kept it, gave it me;
Then plain and right must my possession be.

But though actual possession and the will of the nation were in his favor as sovereign of England, there was not a shadow of reason in his pretensions to the throne of France. If the claim of his great-grandfather, Edward III., could not bear examination, his own was still less worthy of serious attention. Yet he has made up his mind that glory must be won, and, being no less desirous to square his conscience with the enterprise, he determines to abide by the judgment of the highest prelate in the land.

Archbishop Chichele was a penitent of the same school as Henry IV. That monarch had designed to atone for his usurpation by the conquest of Jerusalem. The Archbishop, who was perhaps more sincere in his repentance, founded All Souls College in order to provide Masses in perpetuity for the souls of those for whose death he felt himself responsible when he counselled the invasion of France. He appears before us in the play as a man hardly less well formed for dealing with the practical side of life than Henry himself, and as little given to counting the difficulties that lie in the path he has once chosen to follow. His knowledge of divinity seems on a level with the King's, of whom he says:

Hear him but reason in divinity,
And, all-admiring, with an inward wish,
You would desire the king were made a prelate.

He sees clearly that the King's eagerness for ready money provides him with a favorable opportunity of averting a wholesale confiscation of ecclesiastical property, threatened by the Commons. He therefore makes a generous offer on the part of the clergy as a contribution to the war. Henry, who thus knows what sort of decision to expect from him, has no hesitation in laying before him all his scruples, and begs him to answer according to his conscience. The Archbishop, without looking either to the right or to the left, takes the King's own point of view and makes the whole question turn upon the interpretation of the Salic law. With a great parade of special knowledge and an argument from Scripture, he proves that the law in question is no bar to Henry's title, and bids him unfold his flag in God's name. The King's scruples are completely set at rest, and without any misgivings about the justice or the policy of the proceeding, he promptly invites the French King to yield up his dominions. His buoyancy and confidence last through the campaign, and his splendid unconsciousness of guile is fittingly expressed by his words after the victory:

Do we all holy rites;
Let there be sung *Non nobis* and *Te Deum.*

Henry, the man of action, brings all his purposes to a successful issue because, unlike Hamlet, the man of many thoughts, he is not given to "thinking too precisely on the event." Both men are conscientious, but Hamlet is the slave of doubts and fancied possibilities suggested by a conscience which he cannot control, while Henry, on the contrary, has the fortunate gift of being able to form his conscience very much in accordance with his wishes. The irony in this case lies in the shaping of a career which seems to display all the qualities of heroism in action, but which is in hidden antagonism to the moral law. In the mind of Shakespeare Henry, at least in his regenerate days, is the typical English gentleman, the soul of sincerity and honor, wanting in subtlety of mind, but possessed of a practical judgment which, though sound in most respects, is capable at times of ignoring objective morality in the most invincible persuasion of righteousness.

Not less devoted to principle than Henry V., and far more philosophically studious of principles in the abstract, is Brutus, the secondary hero of "Julius Cæsar." He is sometimes considered the principal hero of the play, but it is hard to see how this can have been intended by Shakespeare. It is true that Cæsar appears but seldom, and that in him there is no serious attempt at characterization, whereas Brutus is the most prominent actor in the drama and his character is minutely drawn. But then Cæsar is the dominant influence which, whether in life or in death, shapes the whole action of the play. He is foremost in the minds of men, and even his murdered body is the energizing centre of all the passions that play around it. As in a religious picture the central figure is sometimes conventionally drawn, out of reverence or from a feeling of inability on the part of the artist to rise to the dignity of his subject, so Shakespeare is content to mark the position of his hero above the common level by portraying him in a manner that is somewhat angular and melodramatic. Cæsar's high estimate of himself is expressed in language which in real life would appear ludicrously bombastic and calculated only to destroy the dignity it was supposed to maintain. A great man in real life endeavors to hide the nakedness of his pride by clothing it in dignified language so that the flaw in his greatness is not betrayed at every turn. But it is precisely the flaw in Cæsar's character that Shakespeare wishes to make prominent, and he does so by making his words express the nakedness of his thoughts. The conventional method which is adopted justifies such treatment. It distinguishes the resultant from a mere caricature and effects the main purpose of exhibiting acknowledged greatness marred by extreme self-consciousness.

Brutus is no doubt a better man than Cæsar, but he is a much

smaller figure on the stage of life. The irony of his fate is that his sense of rectitude and his presumably stern devotion to principle lead him on to the murder of a greater and wiser man than himself at the bidding of a lesser. He sees life through the medium of books and is incapable of estimating the characters of living men. He thinks that Cassius is actuated by the same high principles as he is himself and takes Antony for what he pretends to be, "a plain, blunt man," from whom no harm is to be feared. But the great flaw in his character is the lack of a certain healthy opportunism which should have supplemented his philosophy and led him to see that the Rome of his day was not the Rome of old, and that the strong hand of Cæsar was needed to prevent license and anarchy in a State in which freedom had become impossible. Brutus was Cæsar's friend. Cæsar had a power of surveying things as they are, an initiative and a masterly force of will which were entirely lacking in Brutus. Yet Brutus had qualities admirably fitted to supplement those of such a leader, and Cæsar was well aware of it. "For Brutus, as you know, was Cæsar's angel." That was his true destiny. A governor of a province or as a counsellor at home, his uprightness, gentleness and amiability would have corrected what was harsh or arrogant in his master and plucked the sting of tyranny from his rule. To bring his philosophy to bear usefully on life, to enable him to do great things, he needed the direction of a man of action capable of giving the necessary impulse to his practical energy for good. He deliberately chooses to take his lead from Cassius, under whose guidance he misses his destiny. His active qualities are called into play, but they are directed upon a course which ends in the murder of his benefactor and the ruin of his country.

In the management of his conscience Brutus stands in a position half way between that of Hamlet and of Henry V. He fails to get rid of his scruples, but he does not allow them to interfere with his purpose. He is partly conscious that the motive which chiefly sways his mind is the personal influence of Cassius, and when he seeks for arguments in justice for the murder of Cæsar he finds them so intrinsically weak, while those telling against his resolve are so strong, that his solitude is tortured and he cannot sleep. He tries to satisfy his conscience that the murder is for the general good, but the only reason he can find is that Cæsar's elevation to power is likely to convert him into a tyrant:

> So Cæsar may;
> Then, lest he may, prevent.[8]

Hence he is in a state of mental anarchy common to all habitually conscientious men who have made a doubtful resolve.

[8] Act II., scene 7.

> Between the acting of a dreadful thing
> And the first motion, all the interim is
> Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream.

It is the single purpose born of a double mind that upsets the balance of his judgment. There is no such conflict in the counsels of Henry V. nor in the well-poised scheming of such a calmly resolute villain as Iago.

It is in the company of his fellow-conspirators, where he is nerved by contact with others, that the resolution of Brutus gathers force. He even becomes the leading figure in the plot, though the real prime mover is Cassius.

The habit of meditating on general principles and the conscious endeavor to apply them in action is apt to make a man somewhat stilted and angular in his movements and to give a certain character of pedantry to his judgments. This want of complete naturalness is very noticeable in Brutus, in whom high principle has to supply the place of real depth of feeling. The balanced rhetoric and the formal appeal to reason in his speech on the death of Cæsar make some impression on his hearers, but the effect of it is soon swept away by Antony's direct appeal to their feelings. Antony is almost the exact counterpart of Brutus, for his is a strong character marred by the absence of principle, while in Brutus it is precisely the adherence to principle that gives a certain measure of steadfastness and nobility to a character otherwise inconsistent and weak. There is irony in Antony's words when he says, "But were I Brutus," but behind the irony of the man there is the irony of his destiny, for had the better part of Brutus been blended with Antony, there had been no Cleopatra and no Augustus Cæsar.

Speaking from the depth of strong feelings directed by a clear judgment, Antony is able to bend the minds of his audience entirely to his will, and in this kind of power he compares with his rival as a giant with a pigmy. His grief at Cæsar's death is sincere and at least as deep as that of Brutus when he hears of the death of Portia. But it does not destroy the balance of his mind. It gives fire to his oratory, and yet is no bar to the cold-blooded scheme of proscription which he concerts with Octavian. Brutus attributes his resignation on the loss of his wife to his "meditating that she must die once." The probable reason, however, why he is so little shocked by the tidings is that his spirit is already dulled by anxiety. His stoic calmness is more affected than real. It does not prevent him from being irritated with the meddling poet who trangresses his cherished principles of military discipline, nor from running pell-mell into unnecessary personalities in his famous wrangle with Cassius. Cassius is the first to master his own feelings in the encounter, and

when he has done that he has little difficulty in calming Brutus. He rightly regards the poet as too inconsiderable an object for his wrath, but, in order to humor his irritable friend, he allows him to be summarily dismissed. For the sake of peace he even sacrifices his better judgment to the military theories of Brutus and allows the army to descend from an advantageous position and so invite destruction.

The suicide of Brutus is confessedly against those stoic principles which gave a general direction to his life, though they never really formed his character. His philosophy forbids him,

> **For fear of what might fall, so to prevent**
> **The time of life,**

but the dread of adorning Antony's triumphal car, the counsels and example of Cassius and his own natural love of notoriety are motives too strong for his philosophy. He dies as he has lived, "with himself at war," and his last words:

> **Cæsar, now be still:**
> **I kill'd not thee with half so good a will,**

are an unconscious acknowledgment that he himself has been his greatest enemy. His dying consolation is the thought that his name will be remembered as that of one who has made great sacrifices and done great things for his country in the stern, grand manner of the ancient Romans. Antony's kindly estimate of him when he says that he was "honest" and that "his life was gentle" gives us a truer summary of his character. There seems to be a touch of irony on Shakespeare's part when he makes Brutus reject the name of Cicero from the list of conspirators, for of all the characters in the play Cicero is the one that most resembles Brutus, and his name is proposed for the same reason that led Cassius to make Brutus his first accomplice—viz., to give dignity to the plot by connecting with it the most respected names in Rome. Moreover, though Brutus has more of the militant spirit than Cicero, who, besides,

> **Will never follow anything**
> **That other men begin,**

yet it is precisely his own pragmatical insistence that ruins the cause at Philippi.

The two examples of Henry V. and Brutus are here selected because they especially seem to illustrate that reflex and covered irony which is characteristic of the mind of Shakespeare and which is distinguished from the more objective irony of life which it is the business of every dramatist to mirror in his works.

In order to understand Shakespeare aright considerable effort is necessary, as he expects much from the coöperation of the reader's imagination. The unities of time and place are set at defiance in his

plays, and even the unity of action is often only verified in the unity of thought. Hence minor incidents such as the interference of the poet, alluded to above, are thrown in in order to give play to particular traits of character, even though they break the continuity of the action. The incident of the glove in "Henry V." has nothing to do with the main plot, but it adds to knowledge of the hero's character. Among Shakespeare's greater plays such interruptions are least frequent in "Othello" and most so in "Hamlet." Voltaire's pleasantries at the expense of the latter play are well known, and Manzoni speaks of the poet as "un barbaro che non era privo d'ingegno."[4] The absence of regular development in the plot seemed an unpardonable defect to critics of the classical school, but, though unity of action is desirable, it is not so important as the perfect adjustment of the circumstances to the characters, so that these latter may be enabled to reveal themselves fully and consistently. If this adjustment is consistently made there will be unity of thought in the play and unity of action, too, at least in so far as every action is made subservient to the one purpose of illustrating the characters in their relations with one another.

The appeal to the intelligence of the reader is made by inviting him to use one incident as a commentary on another and so to grasp the bearing of the several parts on the central idea. Similarly, in order to discover the true orientation of the author's mind so as to see everything from his point of view, it is necessary to use one play as a commentary on another until we perceive how the whole series of plays, taken in conjunction, fulfills its purpose as a commentary on life. The more carefully this process is carried out by one familiar with the genius of the English language, the less reason will there appear for being shocked by that uncouthness and want of finish in Shakespeare which so often makes him distasteful to readers of the Latin races. It is the very comprehensiveness of his view on life as a whole that causes the defects in question. He differs from Sophocles as a beautiful landscape differs from a perfect garden. We love the wild freedom of the one no less than the tasteful restraint of the other, for nature is ultimately the presiding genius in both. It is his masterly sweep, too, over the whole range of human nature which gives to Shakespeare his peculiar attitude of irony with regard to life. Like Coheleth he has "seen all things that are done under the sun, and behold all is vanity." Yet he is neither a pessimist nor a cynic. He can enter with equal sympathy into the follies of a Falstaff or the etherial musings of a Prospero, and all the while maintain the detachment and preëminence of his own mind. Modern art is commonly most successful when it deals

[4] Promessi Sposi, c. vii.

with the strength of morbid passions and the humors of low life, and the power of the writer or artist comes from the fact that his own mind is impressed and dominated by his subject. There is a partisanship in his sympathies which indicates that he has surrendered rather than lent himself to the emotions with which he deals. He portrays life as the sensitive plate of a camera rather than reflects it with the unsullied cleanness of a mirror. Hence he is too greatly identified with his subject to rise to that preëminence which is the mark of a master mind. The mind of Shakespeare, on the contrary, seems to contract no stain of vulgarity nor to be overmastered by any strength of emotion through inordinate attachment to his creations. He lends himself to his work. His attitude towards life is analogous to that of the perfect Christian as summed up by St. Paul:[5] "It remaineth, that . . . they that weep [be] as though they wept not; and they that rejoice as though they rejoiced not; . . . and they that use this world as if they used it not; for the fashion of this world passeth away." It is as a passing thing that life is reflected in the mind of Shakespeare, as passing objects are reflected in a mirror. We see at one and the same glance both the mirror and the image, but the two are distinct and independent. The warm rays and the dry light are received and thrown back in new directions by a surface which is indifferent to either.

This power of dealing with the subtlest thoughts and most violent emotions without endorsing the one or being shaken by the other is inseparable from a certain attitude of irony. The comparison of the poet's mind to a mirror is imperfect in so far as he throws back more than he receives. There is always that coloring from his own mind which renders his work not merely an image of but a commentary on life; but it is his reserve and economy in using this element of himself that constitutes his subjective irony.

Another consequence of this calmness of his inner self is the habit in Shakespeare of mingling an abundance of healthy dry light with the warmth of the passions he calls forth. It is not administered in regular doses by a chorus—the chorus in "Henry V." is anything but impartial—but must be sought for in all the circumstances, however trivial they may appear, which form the intellectual setting of the play. The studious reader of Shakespeare has this advantage over the average theatre-goer, that he is better able to arrive at that intellectual standpoint which is the cenre of unity of the whole action and towards which all the minor incidents converge. These last will not appear to him to be mere appendages, for they are all bound together in the unity of thought which, by careful study, he is trying to grasp. To any one who looks for a supposed unity of emotion

[5] I. Cor. vii., 29-31.

rather than to the unity of thought, they may seem unnecessary and, as a fact, are often omitted. But then the result is not the pure essence of Shakespeare, who, if sensuous and passionate, is not sensational for sensation's sake. In him the emotion is for the sake of the idea and not the idea for the emotion. Hence he is never lurid. Healthy, regulated, average human nature is his zero point, from which all intensities, whether positive or negative, swing towards either infinity and balance one another. His heroes, in whatever key their character is pitched, breathe the same atmosphere as ordinary mortals, though the interaction of their passions and their relations to their environment are defined with more visible purpose than in ordinary life. The general tendencies of life are accentuated and freed from irrelevant circumstance, so that the present results, though not the Providential aims, of human action are revealed in the light of the poet's mind. In his world of active character the perfect blending of high qualities is never realized, and the high tide of life, in love and victory, lasts but for a moment. It is the theory of Thucydides. Every human agent is moved by an inscrutable destiny which seems to withhold permanent fruition as a thing not to be granted to mortal men, and to bestow the gifts that make for success with studied disregard for the fitness of the recipients. Political wisdom is stored up in the mind of Polonius as in an uncut manual; the moral utterances of Iago are no indication of his inner mind, and the kingly bearing of Richard II. is no sign of his fitness to rule. If such, then, is the irony of life so often and so pointedly reflected in Shakespeare; if a deep but not cynical irony pervades his whole view of human life, it would seem that there is a strong presumption for the existence of the same note of irony in disputed instances, and that the hypothesis of its presence in the cases of Brutus and Henry V. provides us with a useful clue in our attempt at forming a full and consistent estimate of their characters.

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Malta.

SIDE LIGHTS ON THE CHILD-LIFE OF OUR LORD.

A FRENCH PROFESSOR'S REVERENT RECONSTRUCTION.

I.

The Christ-child lay on Mary's heart;
His hair was like a fire.
(O weary, weary is the world,
But here the world's desire.)
—Gilbert K. Chesterton.

THE Gospels leave a veil over the childhood of Our Lord from the return to Nazareth till the first Pasch at Jerusalem, that is to say, from the beginning of the second to the end of the twelfth year of His life. Since the earliest era of the Church there have not been wanting writers to peer through the twilight, often with luckless results. There have been the foolish false gospels of "Thomas the Israelite" and others, and the last century gave us the sentimental "Lily of Israel."

Christian poets have done better by leaving miracles alone, and remembering that the "*first* beginning" of these was at Cana of Galilee, hastened indeed by Our Lady's prayers, but not until Our Lord was in the prime of manhood. Their gift of poesy, ennobled by musings on the Incarnation, has empowered them to gaze betwixt warp and woof in such wise that the Church has never said them nay. Yet all their holy songs might be put into six words of St. Luke: "And He was subject unto them."

The reconstruction of what may be called the routine life of the Nazareth home, after nineteen ages of Christendom, has been left to scholars of the dawning century.

Arianism sent Catholics to their books and widened and deepened their knowledge of Scripture and the Fathers. So also what is needlessly called the "higher criticism" (for the profane carpings of Colenso and Ingersoll were not textual criticism at all) is raising rich fields of wheat within our borders for all the cockle it has sown without. Such is the fate of heresies. From Arius to Haeckel assailants of the Church have done her scholars service. Need it be added that the gain of the Church Teaching is the consolation of the Church Taught?

The Infant Jesus, as our children love to call the Child of Nazareth, was brought up like other Galilean little boys. What follows from this? Surely that a careful study of Jewish tradition and social life in the days of Christ, together with the tiresome yet invaluable Talmud and such works as Simon's "Education de l'Enfant Juif" will give in bold outline a picture of the child-life of Our Lord.

A little book[1] has been written on these lines by the Abbé Chauvin, sometime professor of Holy Scripture at the Seminary of Laval. Of the author's learning and safeness as a guide, no more need be said than that he is a consultor of the Biblical Commission now sitting in Rome. Let us dip into his pages, in the spirit, however, of devout recreation rather than of research. For the "Childhood of Christ," exquisitely simple as the title sounds, is written mainly for priests, who will certainly find the first three chapters invaluable. Their compression is intense, but the references are so full that any book-loving pastor with leisure could readily amplify them into lectures. They deal with: 1. Legends and Errors Concerning the Divine Childhood. 2. Christmas Night: The Time and the Hour: The Ox and the Ass: and The Shepherds at the Crib. 3. The First Weeks and Months of the Holy Childhood.

This last would well repay a little patience spent in turning up the authorities cited. It deals with the eighth day and the thirtieth day (the Circumcision and the Presentation), the Magi and the Massacre of the Innocents. In the author's view, the babes murdered by Herod numbered no more than fifty. I am tempted to give the abbé's persuasive argument, but it would lead us far from our purpose. Let us turn to the next chapters of the Abbé Chauvin and muse upon the child-life of our rescued Lord after His safe return from the Egyptian village of Matarieh.

Like most little Israelites, Our Lord would be at the breast for some two years. "His Mother, blessed amongst women," writes the Abbé Chauvin, "would carry Him in the village street, now in her arms, now on her hip, or even upon her shoulders, as was the wont of Nazareth women then, and still is at this very day." St. Joseph toiled all day, combining blacksmith work with carpentry, according to Christian tradition, at least to the extent of fashioning ploughshares as well as ploughs. We need no scholarship to divine how often the dear saint would pause from his labor to caress the God-made Man for us.

In due time came the day of weaning. From the time of Abraham this was a festival in the Jewish home. Our Lady and St. Joseph would offer a simple feast, in token of rejoicing, to their Nazareth friends and kinsfolk.

When Our Lord was three and a half or four full years of age Our Lady would dress Him every morning in the fringed garment made according to the rule given to Moses by God: "Speak to the children of Israel, and thou shalt tell them to make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments, putting in them ribands of

[1] "L'Enfance du Christ. D'Après les traditions juives et chrétiennes." Par M. l'Abbé Constantin Chauvin. Paris, Bloud et Cie.

blue; that when they shall see them, they may remember all the commandments of the Lord, and not follow their own thoughts and eyes going astray after divers things, but rather being mindful of the precepts of the Lord, may do them and be holy to their God." (Numbers xv., 38-40.)

Catholic mothers may like to hear the Abbé Chauvin's explanation of the twists and knots in the fringes upon Our Lord's little robe. He prefers to call the fringes "tassels;" the Hebrew word, in English characters, is TSITSITH, and I must leave the matter there, for the sacred tongue of the Old Law is beyond me.[2] In the New Testament the word of St. Matthew, kraspedon, seems to fit in better with the "fringe" translation of our Douay Version. According to Liddell and Scott, this means the "edge, border, margin or hem" of anything. The Abbé Chauvin's "tassels," however, may give housewives a better understanding of the meaning of the *tsitsith*.

Each of these was made of eight strands of wool, seven of white wool and one of blue—the "riband of blue" of both the Catholic and Protestant versions. The white wool was an emblem of purity: "If your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; and if they be red as crimson, they shall be white as wool." The blue strand typified heaven, the throne of God.

These eight woolen strands were so twisted and knotted that they indicated to their wearers the oneness of God and the number of His written precepts—six hundred and thirteen. The explanation must be followed with some care, and we should remember that Hebrew letters were used for arithmetic as well as for spelling. Each character so used had a definite numerical value, not a varying one, like the x and y of our algebras. We may think ourselves advanced, with our convenient 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 0. Yet these are only imitations of letters from the Arabic alphabet, as any traveler will tell you.

The fringe, or "tassel," was, first of all, given seven twists and knotted once; then it was twisted eight times and knotted twice. By this means the number 15 was arrived at (7 plus 8). In Hebrew letters the number 15 is written I H, and this, to the Jew, is the all-holy name of God written short, being the first two consonants of the sacred tetragram or four-lettered cipher I H V H (Iehovah, or Iahveh). This stands (without vowels) in Holy Writ for the unutterable name of the Most High.

The tassel was again twisted, receiving thirteen turns and another double knot.

Now the consonants of the Hebrew word meaning *one,* in their

[2] Apart from Hebrew, which he generally translates, the Abbé's book is too plentifully besprinkled with Greek and Latin terms for popular reading.

arithmetical values amount to just thirteen. Oddly enough, therefore, to our notions, this third twisting conveyed the idea of unity. And the seven-fold, the eight-fold and the thirteen-fold turns together brought forth the root-teaching of the Old Testament—*i. e.*, the Oneness of God, "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one God." The Hebrew child was taught to spell out the shortened name of God by counting the fifteen twists, and from the thirteen to arrive at the word "one" by figuring it out as we have seen. Thus his *tsitsith* said to him: "God is One."

Further, in the word *tsitsith* we have three consonants, for the *ts* sound (many readers may need to be informed) was made by one character, as was the *th*. The *ts* stood, in Hebrew arithmetic, for 90. The *i* was 10. The *th* was 400. So the two *ts's*, the two *i's* and the *th* came to 180+20+400=600. Taking with this the number of knots, one single and two double, 5, and the number of woolen strands, 8, we reach the figure 613, and there we stop.

For this is the number of the precepts, including, of course, the ten which are binding upon all mankind, to be found in the law of Moses, according to the careful reckoning of the Jews. They numbered 248 positive commands in the Mosaic writings. This number (their surgeons said) was also that of the members and organs of the human body.

Of prohibitions, their sedulous poring discovered 365, the number of days in the year. Together the affirmative and negative precepts made 613, and home teaching made this number, worked out as has been described from the fringes on a child's garment, synonymous with the law of God.

"Thus the Jews," exclaims the Abbé Chauvin, "from childhood to extreme old age had ever beneath their eyes the remembrance of the One God and His law."

The first time the Blessed Virgin put the *tsitsith* on Our Lord, she would say, with Him and St. Joseph, the following customary prayer: "Blessed be Thou, O God, King of the world, for that Thou hast hallowed us by Thy commandments, and ordained our wearing of the fringes that betoken them."

As the days went by, Our Lady would teach her Son some verses of the Holy Scripture by heart. The earliest of these were texts proclaiming the unity of God: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength," from Deuteronomy, and similar texts. These learnt, the Blessed Virgin would teach Him others. She also taught Him to join His little hands in prayer every morning, and to repeat to His Heavenly Father a shortened form of the sacred *Schema,* which the Jew said every dawn and even of his life: "Hear, O Israel, the

Lord alone is God. Thou shalt love Him with they whole soul, forever. His commandments shall be always in thy heart; in the house; when thou shalt set out on a journey; when thou liest down and when thou risest up; thou shalt bind them as a seal upon thy hands. I am the Lord thy God who brought thee out of the land of Egypt to be thy God. I am the Lord thy God."

So prayed Our Lord every morning on His awakening, while the birds He had made were twittering beneath the eaves of the holy home of Nazareth.

The saying of the *Schema,* it may be noted, was not *binding* upon a Jewish child until his legal "manhood," when he was twelve years of age. But it was taught and practised long before this, as soon, indeed, as the baby boy could lisp the sacred words.

Besides the large phylacteries, or prayer bands, against the exaggerated Pharisaic use of which Our Lord inveighed, the Jews had smaller strips of inscribed vellum for the use of children containing striking passages of the law, memorable words from the prophets and the high deeds, under Divine guidance, of the chosen people of Israel. When the day's work was over, or the Sabbath rest came, St. Joseph would take Our Lord upon his knees and put one of these small rolls into His hands, telling Him what is contained concerning His Father's dealings with the stiff-necked race.

Another small sacred scroll that played a part in the home life of Our Lord was the *Mesusah.* Our Lady and St. Joseph, like all devout Israelites, fastened over the transom of their door a tiny roll of parchment containing, in twenty-two lines, two passages from Deuteronomy; the first (Deut. ix., 4-9) upon the love of God; the second (Deut. xi., 13-21) declaring the blessings that follow obedience to His law. The writing was enclosed in a white metal case and nailed over the doorway well in sight. How often did the Child in Mary's arms instinctively stretch forth His little hands to the bright *Mesusa* box, especially when He saw His Mother and others touch it reverently as they entered or went out. It would be for St. Joseph to explain the meaning of this pious practice and to repeat to Our Lord the words sealed up within the shining tube.

To St. Joseph, again, fell the task of explaining, every seventh day, the excellence and the origin of the Sabbath. He would teach his Foster Son the meaning of the blessings prescribed by custom for the day, the significance of the rites observed on festivals, the reason for the leafy bowers erected at the feast of Tabernacles and for the solemn reading of the Book of Esther at the feast of Purim, or "Lots," and why Pentecost recalls the giving of the Law on Mount Sinai. As Sabbath after Sabbath came round, he would unfold to the Christ-child the glories of the Pasch, with the mystic meaning

of its rites, the unleavened bread, the bitter herbs, the varying cups of wine, the joyous chant of the Hallel and—unfathomable mystery of the Word made Flesh—the Paschal Lamb itself.

At six years of age the boys of Israel began to learn to read, copy and memorize the Bible. Their days were no longer spent with their mothers, but at the *"Bethhassepher,"* or "bookhouse"—*i. e.,* schoolhouse. The Abbé Chauvin thinks it likely that Nazareth had no regular *Bethhassepher* during the days with which he deals, but that there was an informal school dependent on the synagogue. To this Our Lord and the little Nazarenes would go, if not daily, several times a week, and always on the Sabbath day.

The schoolmaster, or *hazzan,* of Nazareth would make it his business to develop the memories of his pupils. Even nowadays small people in Palestine are drilled in the synagogue to know their Bible by heart by means of a droning, mechanical repetition. The success of this sing-song method astonishes the Western mind. Dusky little scholars absorb text after text with ease and a glue-like tenacity that recalls the Talmud's metaphor of childish memory—"a well-mortared cistern from which no drop of the water poured into it escapes." We may safely picture Our Blessed Lord, seated on a little mat, repeating the Messianic prophecies of His coming, or attentively watching the teacher's hand as the *hazzan* traced on a tablet or on the wall the characters of the Hebrew alphabet.

Often, and especially on the Sabbath, the lesson was given in catechetical form. The Jewish method of question and answer was not, as with us, one-sided. At times it was on the lines of the catechism we are familiar with, but at least as often the *hazzan* expounded the subject of the lesson *and the pupils catechized him.* His replies were in the form of parables, which in their turn elicited further questioning from his class.

As the twelfth year approached—the year when Our Lord began to earn His living as St. Joseph's apprentice—He would do a hundred and one little tasks for His parents, especially for Our Lady. Imagination may securely depict Him aiding Our Lady to draw water and to carry the earthenware pitcher used then as now by women in the East. Often He would do this work Himself—He who came on earth to give men Living Water, of which whoso drank should never thirst again.

Our Lady was kept busy in household cares, especially wool-spinning and the weaving of garments, while the grinding of corn in a small stone hand-mill would take yet more of her time than the actual preparation of meals. She who sang the "Magnificat" disdained not to knead bread from flour which her holy hands had ground.

Emmanuel—our God with us—was the joy and the glory of this home. His voice, sweeter than that of angels, rang through the little rooms; the beauty of His humanity glorified all with soft radiance from the Godhead. From on high His Heavenly Father looked tenderly upon Joseph and Mary and the beloved Son in whom He was well pleased.

II.

The Christ-child stood at Mary's knee,
His hair was like a crown,
And all the flowers looked at Him,
And all the stars looked down.
—Gilbert K. Chesterton.

Father Chauvin[3] opens his study of Our Lord's twelfth year by the simple words of St. Luke: "And when He was twelve years old."

In the life of the Jews this date was very solemn. The child then became "a son of the commandment" and was obliged to observe the law. For the first time, then, the Child Jesus went up to Jerusalem, as of obligation, for the Pasch with Our Lady and St. Joseph, "according to the custom of the feast."

It was a good step from Nazareth to the Holy City—a journey of four days on foot. There is some uncertainty as to which route across

Those hallowed fields
Over whose acres walked those blessed feet
Which (nineteen) hundred years ago were nailed
For our advantage on the bitter cross,

was chosen by the Holy Family. Galileans as they were (and as Our Lord was slightingly called in His public life), they had the choice of three routes—that by Samaria, leading straight to Jerusalem through Jezrahel, Engannim, Sichem, Jacob's Well, Bethel and Beroth; that of the Jordan Valley, through Scythopolis, Succoth, Jericho and Bethania, and the seaside road, by Carmel, Joppa and the plains of Sharon and of Sephela. Most writers deem the first of these the one chosen by St. Joseph.

Father Chauvin demurs, on the ground that in the first century relations between other dwellers in the Holy Land and the Samaritans were strained to so dangerous a breaking point that Galilean caravans bound for Jerusalem would select either the seaboard track or the further bank of the Jordan. In his view, the Holy Family chose the latter. Then, according to his method, he patiently sets about reconstructing the events in which the Child Jesus took part.

On leaving Nazareth Jesus, Mary and Joseph joined a party of their neighbors making their way, like themselves, to Jerusalem.

[3] Consultor to the Biblical Commission now sitting in Rome, and author of "L'Enfance du Christ, d'après les traditions juives et chrétiennes."

The men walked together in one company, the women in another, precisely as did the exiles of the Irish famine when they came seeking work in the English counties during the years of the Great Hunger—a custom which, with a dozen others enumerated in "Luke Delmege" by Canon Sheehan, gives color to his brilliant conjecture that the Irish race is of Oriental origin.

Children were children ever, and joined their fathers or their mothers as they listed. It was only at nightfall that families reassembled, when a halt was made by some fountain or well or on the outskirts of a friendly village.

The separation of the sexes on the Paschal pilgrimage throws a vivid light upon the loss of Our Lord in the temple. "And thinking that He was in the company, they came a day's journey and sought Him among their kinsfolk and acquaintance. And not finding Him, they returned into Jerusalem seeking Him." Until the first evening's halt of the return, St. Joseph among the men and Our Lady among the good women, had minds innocently untroubled by the absence of Our Lord.

The road which the Abbé Chauvin is convinced was chosen by the Holy Family winds down from Nazareth to Naim and Jezrahel, across the rich plain of Esdrelon. It is a smiling countryside. With the Pasch at hand, "winter is over and gone." The after rains have yielded place to spring and to floods of brilliant sunshine. The wheat is in the ear; vast harvests wave in the plain beneath the warm breezes. The barley is golden-hued and awaits but the sickle. Flowers bespangle the green sward, as yet unscorched by the heats of summer. The lovely anemone is their queen, the "lily of the fields" of Holy Gospel. It is everywhere, this flower of the Palestinian spring—along the valleys, by the wayside, on the hill-slopes, in the meadows, even in waste places overgrown with briars, flaunting the exquisite crimson petals that are a more wondrous array than Solomon's in all his glory. On one of these days the Spouse in the Canticles sang to her beloved, whose footsteps we now are following:

> The flowers have appeared in our land, the time of pruning is come: the voice of the turtle is heard in our land.
> The fig tree hath put forth her green figs: the vines in flower yield their sweet smell. Arise, my love, my beautiful one, and come. My beloved to me, and I to him who feedeth among the lilies.

The pilgrims from Galilee fared on cheerfully. Some said prayers in common; others sang the *maaloth,* the psalms of pilgrimage:

> I rejoiced in the things that were said to me: We shall go into the house of the Lord.

Now joined by many others, the caravan crept forward, happiness in all hearts, prayer on all lips. In one of the two Nazareth com-

panies was the Holy Child, now with Mary, His Virgin Mother, now with Joseph, his foster-father.

There were several stages in the first day's journey of some nine hours on the march. Very probably one halting place was Naim, or perhaps Sunam, the home of the good Sunamitess who was kind to the prophet Eliseus. Towards noon the Galileans would camp near Jezrahel, not far from the modern tourist's fountain of Djaloud, with its abundant sparkling waters. Thence, making their way again down the valley, they would reach Bethsan (Scythopolis). Here, in the author's careful conjecture, they would finally halt for the night. "The place," he says, "was favorable, secure and well-watered."

At early dawn the Holy Family and the Nazarene caravan set forth on the second day's journey, severer than the first, and amounting to twelve hours on the road. At nightfall the camp would be in the valley, no matter where, on the Jordan side, to leeward of dense thickets that shield both banks of the river. Some of the travelers might know of deserted ruins, relics from richer days in Israel; if so, a surer shelter might be secured. At all costs, they must avoid contact with the loathed and dangerous Samaritans.

On the third day the caravan would wind along the valley in the shade of tamarisks, palms and evergreen oaks. Four hours' march would bring them to Sartaba, where the noonday halt could be made. Towards evening they would make for Phasaelis, a new town built by Herod the Great, and safely spend the night there.

Another three hours' march next morning and they would reach the gates of Jericho. "What memories of His home teaching," exclaims the Abbé Chauvin, "must not this name have awakened in the mind of Jesus!" Glorious memories assuredly. The walls of the city crumbling to the blare of Josue's trumpets, the bitter waters of the neighboring fountain made sweet by the Prophet Eliseus, the Jordan curbing its tide close at hand to let the Ark of the Covenant pass over its naked bed—these had been among St. Joseph's Sabbath lessons.

Jericho, "the town of palms," was the last halt before Jerusalem. The ancient stronghold stood in a refreshing oasis at the extreme end of the hot valley traversed by the Holy Family. Another six hours or so, and they will stand before the walls of the Holy City and see the house of the Lord. The weariness of the journey was all but forgotten as the pilgrims gladly renewed their *maaloth:*

Even as the hart panteth after the water-brooks, so doth my soul pant after Thee, O God.
When shall I go and appear before the face of the living God?

The journey is uphill on the advance from Jericho to Jerusalem.

The path grows narrow and climbs between two rugged mountains. At the bottom of the ravine runs a noisy torrent. This last day's journey must have been painful to the boyish limbs of Our Blessed Lord. Tradition called the forbidding heights He trod the "Red Ascent"—*maaleh adumim*—word for word the ascent "of red men" —probably on account of the blood there spilt by outlaws.

At length the ridges of Mount Olivet appeared upon the horizon. Our pilgrims were soon at Bethania. Another half hour to wind round the summit of the hill, and Jerusalem was in sight.

All knelt. With "Alleluias" the 121st Psalm was triumphantly sung:

> Our feet were standing in thy courts, O Jerusalem.
> Jerusalem, which is built as a city, which is compact together.
> For thither did the tribes go up, the tribes of the Lord: the testimony of Israel, to praise the name of the Lord.

For the first time through human eyes Our Lord beheld—with what yearnings of the Sacred Heart it is not now our purpose to consider—the vast and splendid panorama unrolled beneath His feet.

The Holy Family descended the Mount of Olives, crossed the brook Cedron, climbed the opposing slope and entered Jerusalem by the Sheep Gate. Thence they turned at once towards the temple.

Let us follow them into the Court of the Gentiles, by which they have entered. It is a vast arcade, superbly paved with mosaic, surrounded with lofty colonnades and so thronged that the uproar is deafening. Buyers and sellers are jostling, cheek by jowl, for the feast day is upon them. They haggle, they shout; they even quarrel. The money-changers sit at their little tables offering sacred coin for Roman silver bearing the heathen head of Cæsar.

Further on are countless cages of pigeons and turtle doves. Then follows a row of shops and small bazars, where hawkers vend oil and wine and flour and the incense used for sacrifices. They have their wares in packs swung about their bodies by the girdle.

Assuredly Our Lord can scarce restrain His wrath. But His hour has not yet come—the hour when

> With angered face,
> With knotted lash and word of blazing ire,
> He drave both trafficker and foolish buyer
> From forth His temple's consecrated space.

What must also grieve the Sacred Heart is the irate discussion of rabbis and doctors of the law. Nearly all of these would be present, drawn thither by the Paschal feasts from the remotest corners of Palestine. Here are Sadducees, pagan in morals and disbelieving in the God of that temple in whose vestibules they swarm. Proudly swathed in silken robes, they disdain the common people, especially Galileans, who, like St. Peter and doubtless the Holy Family themselves, speak with their provincial burr or accent.

Then we have others, Pharisees, affecting austerity of mien, mincing along the porch with eyes half closed. They pass by, muttering prayers, their garments fringed with tremendous *tsitsith,* their foreheads bound with great phylacteries—broad strips of parchment inscribed with holy texts.

Roman soldiers mingle with the throng, showing proud Italian faces, looking with half-humorous indifference upon the disorder which they hardly attempt to control.

The Holy Family makes no long stay in the throbbing Court of the Gentiles. Our Lady, with St. Joseph and Our Lord, at once goes up the short stairway leading to the *Azarath Naschim,* or "Women's Court." Entering one of the galleries, she remains there, for her sex forbids her to go further. If the gallery be not full, she takes a place at its front nearest the sanctuary by a balustrade low enough for her to see over. There she remains and prays.

St. Joseph and Our Lord go on further, to the *Azarath Israel,* or Court of the Israelites. There, of course, they find only men, who have come to praise the Lord. From where they thus pray they can see the scaffold "of benedictions," whence the priests bless the people. Further on is the still smoking Altar of Holocausts, and beyond it the door of the Holy Place, into which only priests "accomplishing the office of sacrifices" may enter.

St. Joseph and Our Lord bow down their heads and pray.

As the head of the household, St. Joseph bought the Paschal lamb as soon as possible after reaching the Holy City. Indeed, the law wished the choice to be made no later than the tenth day of the month, within four days of the Pasch. We do not know with exactitude what "lambs without blemish" then cost, but it is certain (says our guide) that a poor carpenter of Nazareth must have saved from his wages for a year to find the price of the victim.

On the evening of the 14th of Nisam St. Joseph betook himself to the temple, accompanied by Our Lord. He carried the lamb on his shoulders, and offered it to the priestly slaughterers. These were awaiting at the entry of the priests' court, barefooted and wearing the garb of their office, the white tunic and girdle and linen breeches, and what our version calls the "mitre" and the abbé the "sacerdotal turban." Beside them were Levites, holding bowls of silver and gold.

At three in the afternoon of our reckoning a trumpet sounded, and the slaying of the lambs began. "At this sight," exclaims the Abbé Chauvin, "must not Our Lord have mused upon the day when He Himself would be immolated on Calvary for the redemption of the human race?"

Yes, the Boy who stood watching the mute little victims being

killed was "Christ our Pasch" (I. Cor. v., 7), of whom these were but types. The abbé does not dwell, in what is not primarily a book of devotion, upon the fulfillment of the foreshadowing of the Passover. But readers may readily consider for themselves that Our Lord was slain at the very time of the Pasch; that no bone of Him was broken, "so that the Scripture might be fulfilled;" that He saved the world from the bondage of sin while the Paschal lamb commemorated Israel's rescue from the bondage of Egypt, and that He was truly the "lamb without blemish" in an infinitely and eternally higher sense than the spotless little creature St. Joseph was carrying.

"The priests are hurrying," writes the Abbé Chauvin, "with Gallic swiftness; the victims are innumerable. St. Joseph's lamb is slaughtered, flayed and drawn. The fat is laid aside to be burnt at evening, with incense, on the altar; then the bowels are replaced. St. Joseph and Our Lord pick up the victim, withdraw from the temple and return to Our Lady in one of the huts put up in the vale of Gethsemane, whither Galileans have betaken themselves, crowded out of the swarming city. The lamb is spitted crosswise on two pomegranate sticks and set to the fire to roast."

Let us also follow our author *verbatim* in his details of the Holy Family's Paschal supper: "By set of sun, when the feast must begin, Mary and Joseph have gathered their acquaintance and kinsfolk to help them to eat the lamb. As they wait Our Lord and the rest remain seated upon mats. Then the ritual repast begins and is celebrated in the customary order. To begin with, a first cup of red wine, called the 'Cup of Bitterness;' then a second, entitled the 'Cup of Rejoicing.' On the table are set forth the lamb, the unleavened loaves, the *charoseth* and the bitter herbs. When this is done the Holy Family and their guests intone Psalm cxii.:

> "Praise the Lord, ye children:
> Praise ye the name of the Lord.
> Blessed be the name of the Lord,
> From henceforth now and forever.

The 113th Psalm—the *In Exitu Israel*—follows, as far as the *Non Nobis, Domine,* which in the Hebrew division begins another psalm. The Child-God blends His voice with theirs to sing the songs of David his forefather. The feast goes on in cheerfulness. The hallowed lamb is eaten, a third cup of wine is drunk, the 'Cup of Blessing;' then comes a fourth, the 'Cup of Hallel,' Psalms cxiv.-cxvii. are sung, and all is over."

We are not told the garb in which the Holy Family ate the Pasch, nor of its being girded, probably because they were already dressed as wayfarers, and thus no change was needed to fulfill the precept.

The next day, the 15th of the month of Nisan, was the solemn

day of the feast. The Jew was forbidden to do any work whatever throughout its hours, and thus the Holy Family spent them all in prayer.

At the third hour and the ninth (9 A. M. and 3 P. M.) they went up to the temple to be present at the sacrifices. And, for the first time in the troublous history of that fabric, perfect praise was offered up within its walls, so soon to be destroyed forever.

When the Pasch was over, Our Lady and St. Joseph set out with the Nazareth caravan. Unknown to them, Our Lord remained in the temple, "about His Father's business," in the midst of the doctors, hearing them and asking them questions.

There were three places in the temple where the doctors taught; one near the main entry of the court of the Gentiles, another beneath Solomon's Porch, while the third was in the Hall Gazzith, where the Sanhedrim met, adjoining the priests' court. Built of hewn stone, it drew its Hebrew name from this fact, and was thus readily distinguished from the two neighboring halls, "Of Wood" and "Of the Spring."

Who were these masters that the Child-God astonished with His wisdom and His answers? The Gospel tells us not, nor does tradition. All we know is that there was no dearth of rabbis then in Jerusalem. These belonged to the opposing schools of Hillel and of Schammai. Their disciples gathered about their feet, squatting in Eastern fashion on the ground or on thin strips of matting. There they would silently drink in the words of the oracles of rabbinism. When the Rabbi Jonathan expounded the law, says the Talmud, "birds scorched themselves at the flaming wings of angels gathered to hear him!"

We must picture Our Blessed Lord, then, in the boyish beauty of His twelve accomplished years, sitting on the floor with many others, while the doctors of the law held forth. Little attention would at first be paid to this unknown Galilean boy of quiet garb and manner. Besides, there were so many lads of his age, on whom the Paschal precept had newly fallen, to be found in the courts of the temple. But with the utterance of His opening question—doubtless a divinely pregnant one, which we shall never know till hereafter—all eyes were fixed upon Him. Then the keen theologians in their chairs set to questioning the wise Child seated on the floor and were "astonished"—that is to say, for the most part disconcerted—by the depth and piercing truth of His replies.

As this went on, the dear bewildered and sorrowing St. Joseph and Our Lady approached the eager group. If Our Lord had been, as some think, in the Hall Gazzith, by the priests' court, where women might not enter, Our Lady's presence would be hard to

explain. It is likelier that the gathering of the doctors at which Our Lord was present took place further down, under Solomon's Porch or in the gateway of the court of the Gentiles.

Here we must take leave of our devout and learned cicerone. Let us turn to another writer for the inspired words which round off the childhood of Our Lord in the hour when, by Jewish observance, His legal manhood began: "And seeing Him, they wondered. And His Mother said to Him: Son, why hast Thou done so to us? Behold, Thy father and I have sought Thee sorrowing. And He said to them: How is it that you sought Me? Did you not know that I must be about My Father's business? And they understood not the word that He spoke unto them.

"And He went down with them and came to Nazareth, *and was subject to them.*"

JOHN HANNON.

London, England.

ST. CYPRIAN AND THE "LIBELLI MARTYRUM."

ST. CYPRIAN is dear to the hearts of Anglicans. Besides presenting the rare spectacle of exalted holiness of life throughout a controversy with Rome, he has passages in his writings like the famous *Episcopatus unus est, cujus in solidum pars tenetur,* which have made the followers of the Tractarian movement claim this martyred doctor as peculiarly their own. His treatises are among the earliest translations gotten out by the Oxford divines in the "Library of the Fathers," with its prophylactic prefaces and ready footnotes for protecting readers against obvious "Romish" errors in the text. Dr. Pusey, in his foreword to St. Cyprian's letters, feelingly acknowledges, "How much we owe to God through him (St. Cyprian) as mitigating to us the difficulties of a position as yet unavoidable and justifying our adherence to it;" and some ten years ago, when the validity of Anglican orders was being so warmly discussed, an Archbishop of Canterbury brought to an end a biography of the saint with which he had long been occupied.[1]

It is from this same St. Cyprian, nevertheless, that our theologians draw some of their strongest proofs, *ex praxi quae viguit in primis Ecclesiae seaculis,* for many a distinctively Catholic tenet; and this is especially the case when the existence in early times of so very Roman a doctrine as that of indulgences is called in question. For

[1] E. W. Benson, "St. Cyprian: His Life, His Times, His Work."

nowhere, perhaps, are better arguments for the "primitive" character of the theory and practice of this seemingly modern dogma to be found than are supplied by numerous passages in the correspondence of this third century Bishop.

It is the purpose of our paper to gather together these passages and to examine the force of the arguments drawn from them, sustaining at the same time the reader's interest by placing both letters and correspondents in this proper historical setting.

Thrascius Cæcilius Cyprianus was Bishop of Carthage from 248 to 258. A teacher of rhetoric and quite well-to-do, he became a Christian in middle life, when conversion calls for a "true holocaust of the heart." Only two years after his baptism he was forced by the clamors of the people and the gentle violence of the clergy to emerge from the hiding place to which, according to the ancient practice on such occasions of many holy men, he had retired, and was constrained to become a Bishop.

Two years later the short but sharp Decian persecution broke out. St. Cyprian, being admonished in a heavenly vision to withdraw, "preferred," as his affectionate biographer and deacon, Pontius, bears testimony, "to be dutiful to God's precepts rather than be crowned together with the breach of them." So he bowed to the storm, sought a place of concealment, and from there, as long as the persecution raged, guided and comforted his flock, with great wisdom and sweetness, in a series of magnificent pastorals which form, in the main, the documents used in preparing this paper.

And his sheep, truth to tell, were sorely in need of comfort and guidance. For the thirty-eight years' peace the Church had enjoyed since the close of the Severian persecution had chilled the fervor and relaxed the spiritual vigor of many of her children, particularly those of Northern Africa. For in his pastoral "On the Lapsed" St. Cyprian complains that:

"Every one was applying himself to the increase of wealth. . . . Priests were wanting in religious devotedness, the ministers in entireness of faith; there was no mercy in works, no discipline in manners. . . . Ties of marriage were formed with unbelievers; members of Christ abandoned to the heathen. . . . .Numerous Bishops, despising their sacred calling, engaged themselves in secular vocations, deserted their people, strayed among foreign provinces, hunted the markets for mercantile profits and multiplied their gains by accumulated usuries."[2]

So God, "to prove His family" and to sift the wheat, permitted

[2] The references are to the Benedictine text of St. Cyprian's works, Migne, Patrol. Lat. Tom. IV. For the most part, the Oxford translation is used.

the third great persecution. What made the Decian persecution such a fierce one was the fact that the Emperor ordered torture to be used expressly for forcing Christians to apostatize. The imperial edicts formerly read: "Whosoever confesses himself a Xtian shall be put to death;" now they ran: "Shall be tormented till he renounces his faith."

The result was that throughout the empire thousands of Catholics recanted. In St. Cyprian's diocese especially the tempest, as he writes, "overthrew the greater portion of my people and even reached a portion of the clergy, too."[3] Surprised and terrified by the edict, large numbers did not even wait to be arrested, but hastened to prove themselves no Christians by spontaneously offering sacrifice.

Many, too, who at first courageously confessed the faith, yielded in the end to torture. "While I was contending in the struggle," Cyprian imagines one of this sort saying, "my successive torments and protracted pains became too much for me. My mind continued steadfast, and my faith kept its courage; my spirit long wrestled, unswerving, with the torturing penalties. But when my most hard judge's cruelty again freshened, and my body was tired and wearied out, and the scourges lashed me, clubs bruised me, the rack strained me, the iron claw dug into me and the flame scorched me, the flesh fell short in the effort, the infirmity of my frame yielded and my body, not my mind, gave way beneath the suffering."[4]

But besides those who offered incense to idols, or who shared in sacrificial feasts in honor of some pagan deity, there was another class of "lapsed" called *libellatici,* who had in some way persuaded themselves that they could keep the faith and at the same time escape the torturer by accepting from the venal Roman magistrates in return for a substantial "consideration" a piece of parchment or *libellus,* which formally certified that the holder had either denied that he was a Christian or had actually sacrificed, whereas he had done neither.

But while these "libellatics," now no longer molested, were congratulating themselves on having "witnessed a good confession" by paying a fine for not conforming, their watchful shepherd, writing from his retreat, caused consternation in their ranks by showing that those who were "defiled with the profane certificates of idolatry" were little better than those "who had tainted their hands with impious sacrifices." Such did "in profession what another had done in reality."

Now those who by word or deed formally denied the faith were *ipso facto* excommunicated. Homicide, adultery and especially idolatry were held in early times to be such heinous crimes that those

[3] Epis. V.

[4] De Lapsis, XIII.

guilty of them could hope to be absolved, and thus restored to "the peace of the Church," only after long years of severe penance, though the African Church of Cyprian's day does not seem to have required such sinners to pass through the four penitential stages we find so widely in vogue by the middle of the fourth century.

So, while the prisons filled with staunch confessors and the torture chamber and the arena ran red with martyrs' blood, "the lapsed," stricken with remorse for their crime, and realizing too late the value of the prize they had thrown away, eagerly sought to avail themselves of a well-known means that then existed of being restored to communion in an easier and quicker manner than the rigorous penitential canons of the period afforded—viz., by having recourse to "the martyrs."

In the primitive Church a "living martyr" was not an oxymoron. All those in Christ's name "had resisted unto blood," though not as yet unto death, and those, too, it would seem, who were merely awaiting in prison their day of torture or of execution—nowadays we should call them confessors—were then styled "martyrs."[5] These Christian heroes enjoyed a peculiar privilege. For in letters to the Bishop they could recommend that certain excommunicated sinners, named therein, who had with great contrition already performed a large portion of this canonical penance, should forthwith receive absolution, the rest of this penance being remitted in view of the vicarious satisfaction the martyrs were ready to make for them by a voluntary death for the faith.

The dogmatic basis on which this practice rests is familiar. The Church, remembering that Christ has promised that all who confess Him before men He will confess before His Father in heaven, has always taught that martyrdom, "a second baptism," washes every stain of sin away and pays fully every debt incurred by sin. Therefore heaven opens at once to receive the soul of Christ's triumphant witness. "Without the penalty of delay," writes St. Cyprian, "the reward (of martyrdom) will be rendered by God, the Judge."[6] "He wrongs a martyr," St. Augustine says, "who prays for him."

But as the *martyr designatus,* rich in merit, knew that he would have no need himself of the vast propitiatory power of his sufferings and death, he naturally desired to transfer it, if he might, to friends of his who still had satisfaction to make for actual sin. And this the Church permitted, her Bishops, by the power of the keys, granting leave to the martyrs "to fill up" by their torments "what was wanting to their fallen friends "of the sufferings of Christ."

Nor was the practice a novelty in St. Cyprian's time. It had been

[5] It is generally in this sense that the word is used in our essay.
[6] De Martyrio, Cap. XIII.

in vogue as early at least as the persecution under Severus in 212. For the Catholic Tertullian in his "Exhortation to the Martyrs"[7] says: "This peace (reconciliation), some not finding in the Church, have been wont to entreat of the martyrs in prison. And therefore you ought, were it only for this, to have and to cherish and to keep it among yourselves, that you may be able, if need be, to give it to others also." And the same Tertullian, when a Montanist, by his condemnation of the practice in his treatise "On Modesty," bears witness to its prevalence. "But you go so far," he storms at the Catholics, "as to lavish 'power' upon martyrs withal! No sooner has any one . . . put on bonds . . . than adulterers beset him. . . . Instantly prayers echo around him; instantly pools of tears from all the polluted surround him; nor are there any who are more diligent in purchasing entrance into the prison than they who have forfeited communion with the Church."[8]

And the custom of excommunicated sinners, according to Tertullian, had seeking "peace" through the intercession of the martyrs that the Emperor Severus had made, also existed at the time of the Decian persecution, as is plain from frequent references to the practice in St. Cyprian's letters; as, for instance, in the Tenth Epistle, where he exhorts the martyrs "to weigh cautiously the requests of your petitioners," and in the Eleventh he says: "The blessed martyrs have written me about certain persons, requesting that their desires be considered," and again, in Epis. X. he refers to certain letters "you (martyrs) sent me, wherein you desired that your requests might be examined and peace granted to certain lapsed." In fact, almost every citation from St. Cyprian in this essay shows, at least by allusion, how common the custom then was.

But the question now arises were these *libelli* which the martyrs gave really indulgences—indulgences in the same sense as the word is used to-day? Yes; in all essentials, it may be safely said, they undoubtedly were. For an indulgence, broadly speaking, is a relaxation, valid *in foro divino,* of the temporal punishment due to sin by means of an application made in favor of worthy penitents, of the satisfactory works of Christ and the saints, by those who have the power of distributing the spiritual treasures of the Church.

Now that the object a martyr had in giving his fallen friends a *libellus* was to secure for them a mitigation of the severe canonical penance of the period is clear from what has already been said, and that such a relaxation, if granted by the proper authorities, was valid *in foro ecclesiastico,* is also plain. But was it considered equally valid *in foro divino?* Yes; there are many indications that it was.

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[7] Cap. I.

[8] Cap. XXII.

Otherwise St. Cyprian would scarcely be so vehement as we find him in correcting disorders in the use of the *libelli,* nor so earnest as he is in exhorting the martyrs, when giving letters, to be guided by the advice of priests and deacons who have carefully examined the dispositions of all who thus sought the "peace of the Church." That nothing might be done "contrary to the Gospel, contrary to the precepts of the Lord," the saint wished only those who were truly contrite and who had already done part of their penance, to be favored with indulgences.

For thus he writes to the martyrs: "The anxiety of my station and the fear of the Lord oblige me, most valiant and most blessed martyrs, to admonish you by my epistles that they by whom faith in the Lord is so devotedly and valiantly maintained ought, moreover, to maintain the law and discipline of the Lord. For as it behooves all the soldiers of Christ to guard the injunctions of their Commander, so it is more in keeping that you should more diligently obey His precepts, in that you have been made an example to the rest, both of constancy and of the fear of God. And I had trusted, indeed, that the presbyters and deacons who are with you were advising and instructing you most fully in the law of the Gospel, as was ever done in times past under my predecessors, that the deacons visiting the prisons, by their advice and by precepts from the Scriptures, guided the requests of the martyrs. But now with the utmost pain of mind I learn that the divine precepts, so far from being suggested there to you, are even hindered, etc., etc."[9]

And surely it was because the martyrs' petitions, when duly authorized by the Bishop or his representative, were valid *in foro divino* that the saint directed: "That they who have received letters from the martyrs, and may be helped by their privilege with God, if they are seized with any ailment or danger of sickness, may without waiting for my presence make confession of their sin before any priest at hand, . . . that so receiving imposition of hands unto repentance, they may go to the Lord with that peace which the martyrs in their letters to me have requested for them."[10] And again in the same tenor: "They who have received letters from the martyrs, and may by their aid be assisted with the Lord amid their sins, if they begin to be sore pressed by any sickness or peril, may, after they have confessed and received imposition of hands from you, be remitted unto the Lord with the peace promised them by the martyrs,"[11] which seems to be the third century way of saying: "They may gain a plenary indulgence at the hour of death."

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[9] Epis. X.
[10] Epis. XII.
[11] Epis. XIII.

Nor was this belief, either, a novelty in St. Cyprian's day. For Tertullian, the Montanist, some thirty years before the above letters were written again bears witness by attacking it to the existence of a similar belief among the Catholics of his time. "Let it suffice to the martyr," he writes, "to have purged his own sins; it is the part of ingratitude or of pride to lavish upon others also what one has attained at a high price. If you are a sinner, how will the oil of your puny torch be able to suffice for you and for me?"[12] Now, unless what was loosed on earth at the martyr's intercession was believed to be loosed in heaven also, the taunt of this keen-witted third century Puritan would be robbed of its sting.

This same passage would indicate that the penitents of Tertullian's time were firmly persuaded that they could satisfy the Divine justice for their own sins through the imputation to themselves of the superabundant satisfactory works of martyrs. And if it were not a tenet of St. Cyprian's faith that only by martyrdom could the imprisoned confessors pay the debt due Almighty God for others' sins, he would hardly blame certain priests, as he does, for reconciling the lapsed "almost before the departure of the martyrs themselves."[13] The correspondence, too, of the confessors Celerinus and Lucianus, as will shortly be seen, testifies to the strong faith of the martyrs themselves in their power to give by their own death "peace" to their fallen brethren.

As is not surprising, the conditions under which an indulgence was granted were far stricter in early times than now. The greatest care was taken that *libelli* should be given only to the worthy. Those penitents only were to be named in the martyrs' petitions who had given undoubted signs of true contrition and who, by already performing a large part of the conventional penance imposed for their sins, had shown themselves deserving of having the rest remitted at the martyrs' intercession. And to be sure that penitents were deserving, priests and deacons were appointed to examine in the very prisons all applicants for letters. Nor was this examination deemed sufficient. For another scrutiny into the lives of those the martyrs recommended seems to have been made by the Bishop himself in the presence of the laity. For St. Cyprian in one of his letters to his flock, after referring to certain petitions sent him by the martyrs, promises that, "When peace is first given to us all by the Lord, and we have begun to return to the Church, each case shall be examined in your presence and with the aid of your judgment."[14]

And another safeguard against any relaxation of penance being

[12] De Pudicitia, Cap. XXII.
[13] Epis. IX.
[14] Epis. XI.

granted to those unworthy of it was the martyrs' custom of expressly naming in their letters just whom they wished to recommend for an indulgence. "Designate by name," their Bishop bids the martyrs, "those to whom you desire peace to be granted."[15] Indeed, from the neglect of this precaution many evils resulted.

Finally, ancient indulgences, like modern ones, could be granted only by those who possessed, through the power of the keys, authority to distribute the spiritual treasures of the Church—namely, by the Bishops. The letters of recommendation, accordingly, which the lapsed received from martyrs were addressed to the Bishop and had no value as indulgences until endorsed and executed either by him or by those with faculties from him. This is plain both from many passages in St. Cyprian's letters already cited and from his stern rebuke of certain factious priests who were restoring to communion, without Cyprian's leave, some lapsed that the martyrs had recommended: "For what peril must we not fear from the displeasure of the Lord when some of the priests, mindful neither of the Gospel nor of their own station, and, moreover, nothing heeding the future judgment of the Lord nor the Bishop now set over them, do that which was never at any time attempted under our predecessors, with contempt and dishonor of the Bishop, arrogate sole authority to themselves?"[16]

The saint again complains of this abuse in a letter to the martyrs, and then earnestly entreats them like the martyrs, their "predecessors in times past . . . to weigh anxiously and cautiously the requests of your petitioners . . . lest anything should have been rashly and unworthily either promised by you or *executed by us.*"[17] Consequently when we read in Cyprian's correspondence of the martyrs granting penitents "peace," it is to be understood that they gave it only mediately, the Bishop's confirmation being necessary before the indulgence was really granted.

From indulgences, moreover, as thus used, many great spiritual advantages followed. Discouraged sinners, for example, took hope and did penance; added prestige was given to martyrdom, and the comforting doctrine of the communion of saints and of the efficacy of vicarious satisfaction became a commonplace with the people.

Such being the case, if St. Cyprian appears in places to inveigh against the *libelli martyrum,* it will be found on more closely studying these passages that it is not the *lawful practice* of seeking and granting indulgences, but its *abuse* that he condemns. For abuses in the use of indulgences there unfortunately were, even in the primitive

[15] Epis. X.
[16] Epis. IX.
[17] Epis. X.

Church; abuses arising from ignorance, laxity or greed—just as there have been since.

It is easy, for instance, to understand how multitudes who had fallen from grace during a fierce persecution, in their desire to be restored to communion as soon as possible, but filled with little love for the long and thorny road of penance, would hasten to the prison where the martyrs were confined, bribe the jailer to let them see their friends, and then beg piteously of them commendatory letters to the Bishop. It is equally easy to understand how some of the martyrs, being but men, flattered by the confidence shown in their power, wearied by the importunity of the suppliants or blinded by affection, without examining each case as they should or neglecting the advice of the clergy, lavishly granted letters of peace to many who were quite unworthy of them.

How could a martyr, for instance, steel his heart against the pleadings of a poor old mother, who had been frightened into offering sacrifice, and now finding herself outside the Church, ran to the prison and tearfully begged the means of speedy restoration from her martyr son? It was wrong, of course, to recommend for reconciliation those who had not already done a good portion of the canonical penance imposed for apostasy; but now the petitioner was his own mother.

Another grave abuse arose from the ignorant belief of some of the martyrs that, without making any inquiry themselves into the worthiness of those they recommended for reconciliation, and without even bothering about writing any names in the *libelli,* they might give general letters of indulgence to any of the lapsed who happened to desire them.

Considerable trouble and anxiety was caused St. Cyprian by the prevalence of this mistaken idea. Two letters especially which have come down to us along with his correspondence, the one from a Roman and the other from a Carthaginian confessor, while showing admirably how strong the faith was of third century Catholics in the efficacy of indulgences, also seem to indicate that one of the writers did not understand perfectly just how indulgences should be granted.

Celerinus, the Roman, having himself steadfastly confessed Christ in the very presence of the tyrant Decius, was therefore the more sorely grieved at the spiritual death of his two sisters, Numeria and Candida, one of whom had denied the faith by offering sacrifice to idols, and the other by purchasing a certificate. So in his sorrow and shame he sends to a brother confessor named Lucianus, who was confined with many others in an African dungeon, and asks for a *libellus* expressly in favor of his repentant sisters. "Great as is their sin, I believe," he writes, "that God will pardon them on the entreaty

of you, his martyrs. Therefore, my lord, I beg and entreat, by our Lord Jesus Christ, that you would refer the matter to the rest, your colleagues, your brethren, my lords, and entreat of them that whoever of you shall first be crowned will remit that so great sin to those our sisters Numeria and Candida. . . . When their cause was lately heard the ruling priests bade them wait as they are until a Bishop is appointed, but as far as you may, by your holy prayers and petitions, in which we confide, since ye are friends, and, moreover, witnesses of Xt, that you will indulge us in all things. . . . I entreat, therefore, dearest Lord Lucianus, that you would remember me and grant my petition."[18]

Celerinus thus expressly states for whom he wants *libelli* sent, and his sisters' billets of indulgence were presumably submitted to the proper authorities for confirmation, for he is afterwards praised by St. Cyprian for his moderation and caution and was subsequently "incardinated," as we should say nowadays, into that Bishop's diocese, being made a lector as a preliminary step to the priesthood.

Lucianus, on the other hand, "glowing indeed in faith," as St. Cyprian bears testimony, "and strong in courage, but insufficiently grounded in the word of the Lord,"[19] in his answer to Celerinus, and also in a pompous note to Cyprian, presumes in his ignorance to grant "peace" so illegally and lavishly as to arouse the episcopal wrath of his ordinary.

"When the blessed martyr Paulus was still in the body," Lucianus writes his Roman friend, "he called me and said to me: 'Lucian, I charge thee before Xt, that if any one shall ask peace of thee after I am summoned away, grant it in my name.' Moreover, all of us whom the Lord, in this so great tribulation, hath deigned to summon, all of us by mutual compact have by our letters given peace to all. . . . Therefore, dearest brother, greet Numeria and Candida, who shall be . . .[20] according to the injunction of Paulus and of the other martyrs, whose names I subjoin."[21]

And in his note to Cyprian Lucianus condescendingly informs him with what princely generosity "we have granted peace to all of whose behavior since the commission of their crime you are satisfied; and we desire, through you, to make known this decision to other Bishops also. We wish you to maintain peace with the holy martyrs."[22]

In spite of the mollifying clause, "of whose behavior you are satisfied," these two letters of Lucianus, on account of their conse-

[18] Epis. XX.
[19] Epis. XXII.
[20] The sense is incomplete: "Pardoned?"
[21] Epis. XXI.
[22] Epis. XVI.

quences, evidently vexed St. Cyprian exceedingly. For it was no sooner noised abroad that the martyrs themselves had magnificently granted peace to all the lapsed than multitudes throughout "Archbishop" Cyprian's large province clamorously besought their Bishops to give formally the absolution which the people believed had already been granted by the martyrs.

St. Cyprian rightly considered such proceedings quite subversive of all ecclesiastical order and discipline. For in a letter written during the vacancy of St. Peter's chair to the "presbyters and deacons abiding at Rome," St. Cyprian speaks of the announcement Lucianus had made in the name of all the confessors as one, "Whereby the whole bond of faith, and the fear of God, and the commandment of the Lord, and the sanctity and strength of the Gospel were well-nigh dissolved. The blunder has stirred up the odium of the people against me in that when I have begun to hear and examine the cases of individuals, I must seem to deny to many what all now insist that they have received from the martyrs and confessors."[23]

And worse still, a like abuse, which some of the martyrs countenanced, opened the door to an unholy traffic in indulgences on the part of unscrupulous men. For after securing from the martyrs billets loosely recommending for reconciliation "such a one and his friends," these simoniacs for a suitable sum were willing to number some twenty or thirty frantic penitents among "their friends." This practice the saint in his Tenth Epistle sternly condemns. And in a letter written to the *Clerus Romaus* during the vacancy of the chair of "the principal church, whence the unity of the priesthood took its rise,"[24] as St. Cyprian elsewhere styles the Roman See, he takes occasion, while rendering the priests and deacons there an account of his "acts, discipline and diligence," to deplore the fact that many of the lapsed in Carthage had been "canvassing the martyrs everywhere, . . . so that without any discrimination or inquiry into the several cases, thousands of letters were daily given against the rules of the Gospel,"[25] presumably through the hands of those who sought profit from an illicit traffic.

It should be noted also that these abuses in the use of indulgences crept in the more easily because while Cyprian was in retirement a half dozen seditious clerics of Carthage had headed a schism, arrogated to themselves the powers of a Bishop, and with a view to winning the people's favor, presumed to reconcile to the Church, without examination, all who seemed to be recommended by the martyrs. These fomenters of discord St. Cyprian, of course, promptly suspended and excommunicated.

[23] Epis. XXII.
[24] Patrol. Lat., Vol. III., colum. 841.
[25] Epis. XIV.

It was doubtless on account of such abuses as these in the use of the *libelli martyrum* that St. Cyprian decided to stop granting indulgences until peace was restored to the Church. An exception, however, was made, as has been shown, in favor of those lapsed who had fallen seriously ill. All others were ordered to keep their letters for formal examination till the close of the persecution.

This, then, is a sketch of the manner indulgences were granted in Africa some 1,600 years ago. Such spiritual favors are now much easier to get than in the days of Cyprian. Just by devoutly using certain aspirations, twentieth century Catholics can gain indulgences that penitents of Cyprian's time got with difficulty only after a long period of rigorous penance. And these relaxations were, no doubt, more highly valued by those who received them than are present-day indulgences by us. For there was a very perceptible reality about an indulgence which actually shortened by several years the grim canonical penance of the early Church that modern Catholics, who regard indulgences chiefly as a means of obtaining for themselves or others a speedy release from Purgatory, can scarcely realize.

Nor were indulgences so lavishly granted in the third century as now. During and after the Decian persecution especially, the question of how the lapsed should be treated was a burning one. A Bishop's or a cleric's attitude of mind on this point was almost a test of orthodoxy. Stern and exacting as we should now consider St. Cyprian's treatment of the fallen, we must remember that severity with flagrant offenders against God's law, and especially with apostates, was a characteristic of Church legislation in primitive times. Cyprian's rigor, too, is accentuated, perhaps, by the laxity of the schismatics among his clergy and the weakness of some of his "suffragans." Yet he regarded himself, and was apparently considered at Rome, as almost too indulgent toward apostates. "I am well-nigh a delinquent myself," he writes, "in remitting delinquencies;" and the purpose of more than one of the saint's letters to Rome was to clear himself, it would seem, of the charge of laxity in reconciling the lapsed. Indeed, compared with the Novatians of his time, or with those Spanish Bishops who framed some fifty years later the decrees of the Synod of Elvira, Cyprian was a veritable St. Francis of Sales for sweetness.

It should be also remembered that throughout the duration of the Decian persecution the Bishop of Carthage in governing his diocese very probably had the direct guidance, in those famous visions of his, of the Holy Spirit—an extraordinary grace that many a modern Bishop would doubtless value highly—while it is the remarkable knowledge of the Scriptures and of canon law, of which the writings of this new-made Christian give evidence, that makes Baronius of

the opinion that the saint had either been miraculously enlightened at baptism or else had studied the books of the Christians for many years prior to his conversion.

Be it observed, finally, that if this great doctor seemed hard on others, he was much harder on himself. As Newman, in a characteristic paragraph, sums up the life and work of our saint: "While exhorting to almsgiving, he is already an example of voluntary poverty; if he praises virginity, he has himself embraced a single life; he insists on the nothingness of things earthly, having first chosen contempt and reproach; he denounces the heathen magistrate, with the knowledge that he is braving his power; and he is severe with the lapsed, because he himself is to be a martyr."[26]

A martyr, indeed; for eight years after the close of the persecution that raged under Decius that of Valerian broke out, and one of its most distinguished victims was the great African Bishop. Warned in a vision that he was soon to be crowned with martyrdom, he set his affairs in order, and being in all probability fully restored by Pope St. Xystus to communion with the See of Peter, he who had so earnestly exhorted others to martyrdom received that palm himself, being beheaded within sight of his episcopal city, as he had desired, and surrounded by his faithful clergy and beloved flock. St. Cyprian suffered in the year 258, on the 14th of September. His feast, however, is annually celebrated two days later, together with that of his dear friend and "brother," Pope St. Cornelius, who preceded him to martyrdom by six years, and with whose name St. Cyprian's is also united in the Canon of the Mass.

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CATHOLICITY IN SPENSER.

COLLIGITE QUAE SUPERAVERUNT FRAGMENTA.

THE temptation to interpret an author in a way differing from the ordinarily accepted one is by no means uncommon. We have seen a story turned inside out; as in the hands of Browning the tale of the Glove, where the current of sympathy is diverted from the knight whose ladylove has shown an exactingness born of an abnormal vanity, to her in whose face the Glove, recovered from the lions, has been flung. And as in the hands of Mrs. Boole, who once turned the hair of even the youngest members of the New Shakespeare Society white by proclaiming that Portia,

[26] Preface to the Oxford translation of St. Cyprian's treatises.

whom all had been brought up to admire, was a barbarous and unfeeling woman, the hard-hearted cause of evils too terrible to conceive. To make a hypothesis and fit facts thereto; to take a story and find in it a meaning hitherto undiscovered, a meaning unknown to the author himself, has had, and always will have, a fascination for some among us. But to say that such and such is a writer's meaning is one thing, and to find in him that large suggestiveness which is an unfailing mark of the greater among the poets is another; for the measure of a poet's mind is not to be taken merely by what he has thought and said, but by that also which he has made others think, or say, or do; not only by the ear delighted, but also by the tuning of the voice; also not only by the deaf ears unstopped, but by the tongue of the dumb made to sing. The great poet will make us sing, in our hearts at least, because of the beauty of his music, as he will set us thinking because of the depth and height and breadth and justice of his thought. If, as Emerson says, there is a double meaning, or a quadruple, or a centuple, or a much more manifold meaning in every sensuous fact, there is also a manifold meaning in the word, words being, to quote again from Emerson, a kind of action. Thus, may it not be granted that to give out something of what Spenser has *suggested* as Catholicity is not necessarily a mistake?

There seem naturally to be two divisions of this subject—what might be interpreted in a Catholic sense and what is, in its nature and expression, essentially Catholic.

We may, I think, illustrate the former of these divisions by the mode which Browning adopts in his treatment of the story of Alkestis. To the Greek the death of the young where the old might possibly have been a substitute would have seemed in its very nature an outrage on the eternal laws of fitness, and hence on the law of beauty. Browning goes deeper with a plummet surely belonging to the ages that have lapped in the clothing of Christianity; and so with him Pheres must through his grief find purgation from his sin and redemption from the power of his selfishness. And do we not all, consciously or unconsciously, read into the stories of the olden days meanings which, if not always larger, are at any rate different from those which they would have conveyed, or even could have conveyed, to those in whose ears the story first was told?

I am not, of course, going to make any attempt to prove that Spenser was a Catholic. I am perfectly aware that he cannot be claimed as such. But he certainly was no Puritan; and it would be difficult to study his work without feeling that in some ways he was less far from the kingdom of God, by which, of course, I mean the Church, than many of his readers would have us to believe.

It is quite true that our poet exhibits an animus against the Catholic Church which it would be dishonest, even if it were possible, to attempt to explain away. Whenever he directly refers to the Church of his forebears he has no good thing to say of it; he thinks of the Spanish King, and of the throwing away of the shield of his faith by Henry of Navarre, and of attempts to overthrow the sacred queendom of Elizabeth Tudor by the false rebels who clung to her Popish cousin, and of the horror of superstition and blindness of heart, and evil and cunning, and all that deserves his deepest hatred and loftiest scorn. But I think it is rather as an Englishman to whom the independence of his country is passing dear that Catholicity seems to embody for him lack of patriotism, and disloyalty, and the preference of darkness to light. When there is no question of foreign attempts at usurpation, no thought of an England less free than the England he has known, no dream of a ruler less heart enthroned than his beloved gloriana, Spenser walks in a larger space, in a lovelier liberty.

A dram of sweet is worth a pound of sowre,

he tells us. How much, then, does not his pound of sweet outweigh any sour he may have given us?

Was there nothing in Spenser's environment to account for his sympathy with Catholicity in at least some of its aspects?

We remember that his very earliest recollections would be those of a little Catholic boy; for he was six years old when the brief time of the restoration of the altar ended, and five of those years would have been spent under the guardianship of the Church. Again, in his day there must have been a good many who, not recognizing the significance of outward change, held practically to their old beliefs, thinking, as many English people now think, by a revival of the theory allowed to pass away so many years ago, that it is possible to be a member of the Church Catholic without being under the Papal obedience. And in Elizabeth herself as well as in others a certain comfortable eclecticism arranged at least a meeting between Catholicity and Protestantism; though for the matter of their kissing each other, the less said the better.

There was also in Spenser's literary environment much of the affirmative element which so essentially distinguishes the old faith from the new. He had browsed on poetry made in the atmosphere of the ages of belief, as well as on the great classic literature whose long-neglected pastures the children of the Church had been the first to reënter. Chaucer, as we know, was his beloved master, his well of English undefiled; that Chaucer who, curiously, has been supposed in sympathy with Wiclif and that ilk, because, forsooth,

he hated a bad life and took no pains to conceal that most of all he hated it in priest and religious—as all good Catholics have always done, and, please God, always will do. He must have well known that wonderful book of Malory's, steeped as it is in the glamor that Tennyson could never succeed in capturing. That, too, of Tasso and Ariosto, to say nothing of the greatest of all Catholic poets, Dante. Edward Kirke says of Spenser, in speaking of his language, that, "having the sound of these ancient poets still ringing in his ears, he mought needs, in singing, hit out some of their tunes." May it not also be said that echoes of the bells of holiness and consecration were sounding in his spirit ears so that he could not but give out some of their sound?

Plato was a strong influence upon Spenser; and, as we know, it had not been left for Protestants to trace in the teaching of the great Greek something of that which found its highest expression in the teaching of Him who spoke as never man spoke, even the Supreme Teacher by whose word all who have taught any part of truth have found their utterance.

To consider first what might be read in a Catholic sense or taken as suggesting Catholicity. In "An Hymne of Heavenly Beautie" we have a lovely description of that eternal wisdom which found its incarnation in the Mother of Our Lord.

There in His bosome Sapience doth sit,
The soveraine dearling of the Deity,
Clad like a Queene in royall robes, most fit
For so great powre and peerelesse majesty,
And all with gemmes and jewels gorgeously
Adornd, that brighter than the starres appeare,
And make her native brightness seem more cleare.

And on her head a crowne of purest gold
Is set, in signe of highest soveraignty:
And in her hand a scepter she doth hold,
With which she rules the house of God on hy,
And menageth the ever-moving sky,
And in the same these lower creatures all
Subjected to her powre imperiall.

The fairenesse of her face no tongue can tell;
For she the daughters of all wemens race
And Angels eke, in beautie doth excell,
Sparkled on her from Gods owne glorious face,
And more increast by her owne goodly grace,
That it doth farre exceed all humane thought,
Ne can on earth compared be to ought.

Let Angels, which her goodly face behold
And see at will, her soveraigne praises sing,
And those most sacred mysteries unfold
Of that faire love of mightie heavens King;
Enough is me t' admyre so heavenly thing,
And, being thus with her huge love possest,
In th' only wonder of her selfe to rest.

But who so may, thrise happy man him hold,
Of all on earth whom God so much doth grace,
And lets His owne Beloved to behold;
For in the view of her celestial face
All joy, all blisse, all happinesse, have place;
Ne ought on earth can want unto the wight
Who of her selfe can win the wishfull sight.

For she, out of her secret threasury
Plentie of riches, which there hidden ly
Within the closet of her chastest bowre,
Th' eternall portion of her precious dowre,
Which mighty God hath given to her free.

May we say, as St. Paul said to the Athenians, "What therefore ye worship without knowing it?" Have not poets and thinkers in all ages sung and spoken of what, indeed, they knew not in anything like its fullness?

As I have said, I think it will be found that Spenser is not given to inveighing against Catholic doctrine. In the "Shepheards Calendar" the criticism of the unfaithful pastors applies to conduct, not to teaching or belief. It would apply equally well to unfaithful priest and unconscientious minister. We require the argument to the fifth eglogue and E. K.'s Gloss to make us understand that Catholic pastors are a bad lot and Protestant ones the reverse. It is true that in the first book of the "Faerie Queene" we have Archimago, the deceiver, masking under the semblance of a religious, breviary at side and eyes bent lowly on the ground, who leads Una and the Red Cross Knight to his little lowly hermitage with its holy chapel close by; he bids his beads, and strows Ave Marys "after and before." But how well Spenser knew that the spiritual life is fed by contemplation we see in the tenth canto of the same book, where again we have a little hermitage close to a sacred chapel, not now—and this is surely significant—in a dale, but on a hill both steep and high. Here heavenly contemplation lives apart—that heavenly contemplation who leads the knight up to the highest mount and shows him the path that leads to the city of God:

The new Hierusalem, that God has built
For those to dwell in, that are chosen his.

It is also true that we have Blindheart (Corcoca) praying day and night upon her beads, with her nine hundred Our Fathers and her two thousand seven hundred Hail Marys every day; her painful penances, her sackcloth and ashes and her fasts. But, as we shall see, all these things are also represented as accessories to the life of devotion, most fruitful as most deep. For sham does not disprove, but prove, the existence of reality, and, "Though all foul things should wear the brows of grace, yet grace must still look so."

How nobly this poet sets forth the beauty of that chastity which, alike in man and woman, the Church has always glorified. Catholics in all ages have reverenced this virtue, its cherished revelation in all the magnificence of its glory being in and by the Mother Immaculate. Una, Belphœbe, Britomart, Florimel, all are lovely in its sheen. If, indeed, the Elizabethans, in honoring this virtue with a special honor, idealized the Queen of England instead of

realizing the Queen of Christendom, let us ask whether such an ideal would have been possible had the Reality never been known? The spirit of praise had poured out precious perfume upon the feet of the lady of ladies before it vulgarized itself to kiss the shadow of Elizabeth Tudor.

In seeking to point out marks of the Catholic spirit in Spenser, I do not intend to reverse the allegory of his greatest and loveliest work, the "Faerie Queene." I am not going to make Una the Catholic Church, slandered and robbed by Duessa, as Protestantism. But Spenser, who, I am fain to believe, sees now "with larger, other eyes" than of yore, could not resist the form and pressure of the influences that had gone to shape him as man and poet.

Who is the Red Cross Knight?

In one aspect, as we know, the England of Elizabethan days—that England which knew not the faith as the "one entire and perfect chrysolite," and yet had some light from the fragments that still remained after the shattering and the trampling on, and the casting upon the dunghill. He is also called the Knight of Holiness. Yet surely he appears rather as the seeker after holiness than as the actual personification thereof. And so with Una, for she is more the truth seeker than the very truth itself, and in this would, of course, correspond to the non-infallibility of the Church of Protestant theology. And yet, imperfect the allegory would be which in her shadowed forth the Living Truth, there are certain things which suggest that the poet had at least some conception of the meaning of a Church. In her name we have the first of the four names by which we know the Church of God—Una, Sancta, Catholica, Apostolica—and so we have an acknowledgment, at least a tacit one, that unity must accompany truth; or, rather, indeed, be of its very essence, and inseparable from its conception. Without unfairness, we may surely see in Una a witness to Spenser's belief in the existence of a truth that is worth living for and dying for; as well as in Duessa the protest of heart and soul against the multiform falsehood which ever seeks to sunder us from the living truth. In her garb, as we see her at first, Una has the look of Holy Church as in England for centuries she went, black stoled and as one that inly mourned; and how can we be grateful enough for the toleration by which, though it may be born of indifference as well as of charity, is yet indeed toleration, our goodly Royal Lady may approach to the wearing of her fullest earthly splendor? So, in canto 12, we have this description of her glorious gear:

> For she had layd her mournefull stole aside,
> And widow-like sad wimple throwne away,
> Wherewith her heavenly beautie she did hide,
> Whiles on her wearie journey she did ride;

And on her now a garment she did weare
  All lilly white, withoutten spot or pride,
That seemd like silke and silver woven neare,
But neither silke nor silver therein did appeare.

The blazing brightnesse of her beauties beame,
  And glorious light of her sunshyny face,
To tell, were as to strive against the streame:
  My ragged rimes are all too rude and bace
  Her heavenly lineaments for to enchace.
Ne wonder; for her own deare loved knight,
All were she daly with himselfe in place,
  Did wonder much at her celestiall sight:
  Oft had he seene her faire, but never so faire dight.

Spenser's Una, rather, on the whole a sweet and pathetic figure than an august God-sent lady, is yet not wholly without strength, for she has some power to rebuke as well as to comfort, which is shown when (canto 9) she snatches out of her knight's hand "the cursed knife" which the Red Cross had, at the urging of Despair, lifted to destroy himself:

And threw it to the ground, enraged rife,
  And to him said, Fie, fie, faint harted knight,
What meanest thou by this reproachful strife?
  Is this the battell, which thou vauntst to fight
  With that fire mouthed dragon, horrible and bright?
  Come, come away, fraile, feeble, fleshly wight,
Ne let vaine words bewitch thy manly hart.

But truth as Spenser conceived of it is not our truth. His is a truth that, going in company with the Knight of Holiness, makes no attempt to keep him out of the wood of error, but simply enjoys the beauty around her, as they together "joy to heare the birdes sweet harmony, . . . and praise the trees so straight and hy." She, the Lady of Truth, no more than he, the Knight of Holiness, can find the path to return:

Led with delight, they thus beguile the way,
  Untill the blustring storme is overblowne;
When weening to returne, whence they did stray,
  They cannot find that path, which first was showne,
  But wander to and fro in wayes unknowne,
Furthest from end then, when they nearest weene,
  That makes them doubt their wits be not their owne:
So many pathes, so many turnings seene,
That which of them to take in diverse doubt they beene.

At last they come to a hollow cave, amid the thickest woods. Even then Una can only warn him to withhold his stroke till he has made further trial. Then she tells him that she better knows the peril of the place than he, and bids him beware, after informing him that this is Errour's den, a monster vile, whom God and man does hate.

Neither does Una see through Archimago's wiles, but is helplessly separated from her defender. Does not this, to a Catholic, inevitably suggest the hopeless uncertainty of Protestantism? Is not truth, to the Protestant, at least largely the creation of his own mind? How else could we be told of such and such a one that he

beat out his belief; that he found a religion that was comprehensive enough for him? As truth cannot even swerve, much less fail, the confusion by which Una is made to enter the Wood of Error is quite inexplicable on any hypothesis than that of the entire subjectivity of truth, as conceived of by a post-Reformation poet.

In the introduction of the old story of the taming of the lion we have the witness to the truth of the Catholic doctrine of virginity. The passage is so lovely that no amount of repetition can ever dull or stale it to our ears. And we may also find in it an unintended parable of the might of our Mother's purity to tame and subdue the untamed and the unsubdued, and to use the power of the strong:

One day nigh wearie of the yrksome way,
From her unhastie beast she did alight,
And on the grasse her dainty limbs did lay
In secret shadow, far from all mens sight:
From her faire head her fillet she undight,
And laid her stole aside. Her angels face,
As the great eye of heaven shyned bright,
And made a sunshine in the shadie place;
Did never mortal eye behold such heavenly grace.

It fortuned out of the thickest wood
A ramping lyon rushed suddainly,
Hunting full greedy after salvage blood;
Soone as the royall virgin he did spy,
With gaping mouth at her ran greedily,
To have att once devourd her tender corse:
But to the pray when as he drew more ny,
His bloody rage aswaged with remorse,
And with the sight amazd, forgat his furious forse.

In stead thereof he kist her wearie feet,
And lickt her lilly hands with fawning tong,
As he her wronged innocence did weet.
O how can beautie maister the most strong,
And simple truth subdue avenging wrong!
Whose yielded pride and proud submission,
Still dreading death, when she had marked long,
Her hart gan melt in great compassion,
And drizling teares did shed for pure affection.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

The lyon would not leave her desolate,
But with her went along, as a strong gard
Of her chast person, and a faithful mate
Of her sad troubles and misfortunes hard:
Still when she slept, he kept both watch and ward,
And when she wakt, he waited diligent,
With humble service to her will prepard:
From her faire eyes he tooke commandement,
And ever by her lookes conceived her intent.

How fine is the description of the arrival of Kirkrapine at the "cottage small" of Blindheart and Abject (for so we may render the names of Corcoca and Abessa), where Una and her lion have taken shelter:

Now when Aldeboran was mounted hie
Above the shinie Casseiopeias chaire,
And all in deadly sleepe did drowned lie,
One knocked at the dore, and in would fare;
He knocked fast, and often curst, and sware,
That readie entrance was not at his call:
For on his backe a heavy load he bare
Of nightly stelths, and pillage severall,

Which he had got abroad by purchase criminall.
He was, to weete, a stout and sturdy thiefe,
Wont to rob churches of their ornaments,
And poore mens boxes of their due reliefe,
Which given was to them for good intents;
The holy saints of their rich vestments
He did disrobe, when all men carlesse slept;
And spoild the priests of their habiliments.

How significant is that spoiling of the holy saints of their rich vestments!

And when the lion fiercely encounters this robber and presses him down under his lordly foot, is it possible to imagine that the poet really meant by the lion His Majesty Henry VIII.?

Are we not given a very parable of Catholicity in the three brothers, Sansfoy, Sansloy and Sansjoy, and even in the significant order in which they appear? Without the faith, given over to lawlessness, bereft of joy.

It is after Duessa has guided the Knight to the House of Pride that we come to the Catholic teaching of Spenser concerning sin. The group of the deadly sins meets us, at whose head is the sin of Pride, the sin most protean of all, as our poet knew; the sin that turns to the noble a side different from that which she turns to the ignoble or the weak or the sensual. Spenser represents Pride in various forms, but, in the canto in which we have all the sins that kill the soul, Pride appears as Lucifera, throned in state, disdaining earth, sitting high. So a still greater than Spenser represented him who is in himself all sin and the very fountain thereof. Lucifera is the usurping queen, with neither rightful kingdom nor heritage of rightful sovereignty; nor is she a law-maker nor a ruler by law. She is Sansloy, or rather includes in herself all that is signified by Sansloy.

The House of Pride is a goodly building, led to by a broad highway. Here we see at once by the application of our Lord's words the identification of pride with destruction; nor could the unity of sin, if I may use such a phrase, be more clearly and powerfully denoted than by this grouping of Lucifera and her six terrible postillions, the evil wizards who uphold her kingdom with their counsels bad. There she sits in her great coach, "drawne of six unequall beasts, on which her six sage counsellors did ryde." Each of them rides an animal partaking of or symbolizing his own nature. Thus, Sloth, who leads, is on a sluggish ass; Gluttony, upon a swine, and so forth. In the description of Envy there is an interesting evidence of Catholic feeling as opposed to Antinomianism:

And who with gratious bread the hungry feeds,
His almes for want of faith he doth accuse.

In the various aspects in which Spenser shows us the sin of pride,

he never exhibits a trace of that sympathy with, or at least tenderness in condemning pride, as if indeed it were, like Milton's Fame, the last infirmity of noble minds. Spenser does not look upon sin as mere negation of goodness, but as the terribly active principle which it took the death of the Son of God to break.

It is perhaps in the tenth canto of the "Faerie Queene" that we find the strongest evidence of the Catholic spirit of Spenser. And here I may say that when I had almost finished my paper I came across this passage in Aubrey de Vere's essay on "The Two Chief Schools of English Poetry," which expresses what I had long felt. "We can nowhere meet an exposition of the Christian religion in its completeness and proportions, doctrinal, devotional and practical, more searching, while so brief, than exists in the tenth canto of his (Spenser's) first book (of the 'Faerie Queene'), describing the visit of the Redcross Knight to the House of Holiness."

That Spenser's soul was far from being at odds with the Great Mother; that he was not, indeed, a willing alien from her courts, can here be most plainly seen.

The Redcross Knight has fallen after manifold temptations, after much struggle, indeed; but, separated from Una (and this is significant), he cannot attain to anything like a complete conquest. He has escaped from the power of the pride of luxury and worldliness and falls under that of Orgoglio, who perhaps represents the pride of power, thus escaping one form of pride to fall by another. Delivered by Arthur, whom Una brings to his rescue, the Redcross is overcome by despair, that despair which is, after all, but another form of pride. As we have seen, it is Una who delivers him from this foe. It is she who leads him to the House of Holiness, which is opened to them by Humility, in contrast to the "gentle husher," Vanity, of the House of Pride. Una requests of Fidelia, or Faith, to instruct the Knight, and, accordingly, he is taught and brought to deep contrition. His agony is such that Una comes to Cælia, the mistress of the House of Holiness; comes in her perplexity to her who surely is a truer type of Holy Church than Una, as her very name indicates, for she is the kingdom of heaven. Cælia sends for a "leach," or doctor, "the which has great insight in that disease of grieved conscience, and well could cure the same." Who can be intended here other than the spiritual healer, the priest of God? What is it but the Sacrament of Penance that is described?

> Who, coming to that soule diseased knight,
> Could hardly him intreat to tell his grief:
> Which knowne, and all that noyd his heavie spright
> Well searcht, eftsoones he gan apply relief
> Of salves and med'cines, which had passing prief;
> And thereto added words of wondrous might.

What can be meant by this but the confession, so difficult to make,

so wisely assisted by the skilled confessor, who gives the penitent medicine indeed of surpassing excellence and brings him to his right mind? [By which to ease he him recured (recovered) brief.] But there is yet more to come. The words of wondrous might are to be pronounced in their awful sweetness: *Absolvo te in nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti.*

The satisfaction has yet to be made, and no light penance is laid upon the pardoned one. The body is arrayed in sackcloth and ashes, and "dieted with fasting every day;" and his prayers go up early and late; and "bitter Penance" disciplines him with a whip of iron, and the smart of salt water bathes the body, and all for the healing of the soul. He is led to Una then, who puts him under the care of Charissa (Charity). Charity instructs him "in everie good behest of love and righteousness" and well doing, and teaches him the ready path to heaven. Mercy is called upon to guide "his weaker, wandering steps," and she goes with him, tenderly helping him and doing away with the hindrances in his way, until they come to the holy hospital, or hostel, wherein dwell the Seven Beadmen, who are the Seven Corporal Works of Mercy.

The first of them, that eldest was, and best,
  Of all the house had charge and governement,
As guardian and steward of the rest:
  His office was to give entertainement
  And lodging unto all that came and went;
Not unto such, as could him feast againe,
  And double quite for that he on them spent,
But such as want of harbour did constraine:
Those for Gods sake his dewty was to entertaine.

The second was the almner of the place,
  His office was the hungry for to feed,
And thirsty give to drinke, a worke of grace:
  He feard not once himselfe to be in neede,
  Ne car'd to hoord for those whom he did breede:
The grace of God he layd up still in stor,
  Whiche as a stocke he left unto his seede;
He had enough, what need him care for more?
And had he lesse, yet some he would give to the pore.

The third had of their wardrobe custody,
  In which were not rich tyres, nor garments gay,
The plumes of pride, and wimges of vanity,
  But clothes meet to keep keene cold away,
  And naked nature seemely to aray;
With which bare wretched wights he dayly clad,
  The images of God in earthly clay;
And if that no spare clothes to give he had,
His owne coate he would cut, and it distribute glad.

The fourth appointed by his office was
  Poore prisoners to relieve with gratious ayd,
And captives to relieve with price of bras
  From Turkes and Sarazins, which them had stayd;
  And though they faulty were, yet well he wayd,
That God to us forgiveth every howre
  Much more than that, why they in bands were layd;
And he that harrowd hell with heavie stowre,
The faulty soules from thence brought to his heavenly bowre.

The fifth had charge sick persons to attend,
  And to comfort those, in point of death which lay;

For them most needeth comfort in the end,
When sin, and hell, and death do most dismay
The feeble soule departing hence away,
All is but lost, that living we bestow,
If not well ended at our dying day.
O man have mind of that last bitter throw;
For as the tree does fall, so lyes it ever low.

The sixt had charge of them now being dead,
In seemely sort their corses to engrave,
And deck with dainty flowres their bridall bed,
That to their heavenly spouse both sweet and brave
They might appeare, when he their soules shall save.
The wondrous workmanship of Gods owne mould,
Whose face he made all beastes to feare, and gave
All in his hand, even dead we hinour should.
Ah, dearest God me graunt, I dead be not defould.

The seventh, now after death and buriall done,
Had charge the tender orphans of the dead
And widows ayd, least they should be undone:
In face of judgment he their right would plead,
Ne ought the powre of mighty men did dread
In their defence, nor would for gold or fee
Be wonne their rightfull causes downe to tread.
And, when they stood in most necessities,
He did supply their want, and gave them ever free.

In verse 39 there is a clear allusion to the story of Martin the catechumen, who clothed the Lord.

In verse 40 the ransom of captives from Turkes and Saracins refers to a custom which it had not been left to the "reformers" to inaugurate. Had not the Christian world long since known of the founding of the Order of Our Lady of Mercy and of the work of its holy son, St. Raymond Nonnatus?

The forty-first verse is very noticeable as expressing the Catholic doctrine of "Bona Mors." Some years ago at a meeting of the Browning Society an Anglican clergyman, in speaking of the poem "Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came," found "an intrinsic contrast between the English or Protestant ideal and the Catholic, as expressed in these two poems (this poem and "The Dream of Gerontius"), speaking slightingly of the Catholic ideal, as shown in Newman's poem. The Hon. Roden Noel, who was chairman on this occasion, himself a poet, though not a Catholic, spoke for the Catholic view taken by Cardinal Newman as inculcating a wise passiveness and humility in face of the mystery of death. Spenser, at all events, thought in the atmosphere of the faith on this subject.

May we not, indeed, say that, in some ways at least, Catholicity is in Spenser no mere picturesque setting, as in the work of some moderns, but an integral part of his thought, and, consequently, of its expression? That we do find in this poet very definite Catholic teaching on certain points I think there can be no doubt. To the old faith he owes some at least of his strength, some at least of his sweetness. He owes it directly, as in the instances which I have given. Indirectly his debt is greater still; for the Catholic Church

is the mother of all Christian art, plastic or poetic. This separated son of hers simply cannot help himself. He has had to accept what has been given him; accept it as we accept light and air and all the influences that go to the making of man. And so Spenser has had to accept the influence of the Church involuntarily as well as of free will.

If he girds at her, may we not pity the child who knows not his mother?

He tells of a springing well whose silver flood could restore health to the sick and life to the dead. He tells of a goodly tree by God's hand planted whence ever flowed a stream of sovran balm, giving life and long health and the healing of deadly wounds. Surely drops of that water had touched his brow with their vitalizing grace; surely he knew something of the healing of that precious balm.

E. Hickey.

Note.—It will easily be seen that I have left a very large portion of Spenser's work unsurveyed from my point of view. As Chaucer says,

> **I have, God wot, a large feeld to eere,**
> **And wayke ben the oxen in my plow.**

There is, indeed, a large field—larger even than seems at first sight. I shall be more than glad if I have at least opened a furrow for some one whose plow is drawn by oxen less weak than mine.

GOD'S HAPPINESS AND OURS.

AS FAR as it is possible, through the ideas we have of Him, to know God, we apply to Him certain names, and in order to express the infinity of His characteristics, we emphasize them with the help of some affixes, and we say: The Most High, the Almighty God. But there is an attribute of God of which, perhaps, we do not think enough, at least directly, although indirectly and in relation with us we make much of it. I mean *happiness.* God is to be our happiness. Why? Because He is His own happiness first, and, moreover, because He is in Himself all happy. It may not be, perhaps, a useless and fruitless task for us to contemplate this attribute both with regard to God and to ourselves; it is a theological contemplation, both high and beautiful, as well as a very practical meditation in our present day, when some thinkers go so far as to dream of a destiny for man in which neither a personal God nor a permanent possession of personality should find a place,

as if immortality meant nothing but our survival in the memory of others as long as they remember us, or as long as they themselves exist.

I.

In the first place, we must approach our subject from a metaphysical point of view. These three terms, *happiness, goodness, being,* are intimately connected one with another, and we shall deal first with the last two.

According to the very old definition, goodness is what all desire; evidently not in the sense that something cannot possibly be good except it be universally desired, but in this, that nothing can be desired unless it be good; or, to put it briefly, the object of all desires is goodness. So far this definition seems to be merely nominal; there are desires, in fact, and these desires tend to something, and this something we call good and goodness. But what is it? We can arrive at the answer by studying the very object of the desire itself. What is it that every being desires? Its own perfection; that is to say, according to the very etymology of the term, its perfect development; and to that end every being has a tendency, an "appetitus," for this latter word well expresses both the claims advanced for the possession of any element of perfection and the steps taken to grasp it. Every being abounds in beginnings which have a tendency to complete perfection. The seeds and germs are animated by a motion of development into the complete plant or animal of which they are the living principles. The bud is impelled to grow up and unfold into the radiant and perfumed flower. All its lifelong the animal seeks after the satisfaction of its desires. And what is man's pursuit after truth and morality except a means of attaining to a perfect intellectual and moral being? This, then, is the general law: Every being desires its own perfection; that is to say, desires the complement of those elements which its nature demands.

We can sum up our conclusions by a series of propositions. Goodness is the object of desire; desire implies incompleteness; incompleteness and imperfection are correlative terms; therefore, desire caused by incompleteness has for its object perfection; perfection is complete development, or existence in its fullest sense. Thus we arrive at the identification of these two terms, goodness and being. Goodness is the object of desire; it is desired because it is perfection; it is perfection because it is being.[1]

Let us now consider God and try to apply to Him the notions we have just defined. The correct idea of God's goodness may be expressed in the following short definition: The goodness of God

[1] Sum. Theol., 1a., Q. 5.

is in the very measure of His being. But what is He? If we apply the three well-known methods or "ways of *causality, negation, eminency,*" we may conclude at once: By the first, that, as He is the first Cause of all things, He must be all things; by the second, we modify the inaccuracy of the foregoing assertion and say that He cannot be all things as they are; by the third, we sum up the former results and arrive at the conclusion that He is all things eminently, that is to say, in a higher mode of being. He is *perfect,* as the first Cause of all perfections.

But this very word "perfect" must change its ordinary meaning when applied to God, as St. Gregory says: "In halting speech, as far as our weakness permits, we proclaim the high things of God; the Unmade cannot be said to be made up." We can, however, use the word with a corrective: God is made up, He is the sum total of perfection, but without succession, without acquisition, without addition, at once, by His very nature, from eternity. He is all-perfect, that is to say, He has all the perfections which are scattered abroad through this world, but He has them unsullied by the conjunction of earthly imperfections. Further, He does not possess them in a composite manner, because all that is in Him is blended together in the utmost simplicity and oneness. Furthermore, not only is He the sum total of all the perfections in which creatures share, which belong to Him as their centre and cause, but He has all possible perfections because there is no cause of Himself, because He is self-existent, because He *is*.[2] And under that name God presented Himself to Moses: "I am, who am." This appellation ranks first amongst those ascribed to God because it embraces all others in its unity; even as being embraces everything in itself. It is peculiarly applicable to God, because He is "the infinite and unbounded Ocean of Substance," to quote the far-reaching words of St. John Damascene.[3]

God is, and therefore is good, and the characters of His goodness coincide with the characters of His being. And how infinitely does the divine goodness tower above that of poor created beings. In our being, which is a limited essence called out of nothing, we have the first degree of our perfection and goodness; but how imperfect and how dependent for its progress is it upon the powers and tendencies within us and upon other things without. And, when by those three steps we have reached some stage of goodness, or even the highest at which our nature may aim, then, as we had to attain it by the law of progress, immediately our further efforts are arrested by the law of decay. How deeply did St. Augustine feel it, and how

[2] Sum. Theol., 1a., Q. 4.
[3] Sum. Theol., 1a., Q. 13, art. 11.

pathetic are his words: "Whithersoever the soul of man turns itself, unless towards Thee, it is rivetted upon sorrows; yea, though it is rivetted upon things beautiful. . . . They rise and set, and by rising they begin, as it were, to be; they grow that they may be perfected; and perfected, they wax old and wither; and all grow not old, but all wither. So, then, when they rise and tend to be, the more quickly they grow that they may be, so much the more they haste not to be. This is the law of them."[4] But it is not so with God. His essence is one with His existence, and so is not this or that way of being, but Being itself; there are no powers surrounding it of increasing His goodness, since His goodness, like His being, is infinite, and there are outside Him no other things from which He could get any increase; and, lastly, as there is no beginning nor progress, there is no decay and no end in God, the King of Eternity.[5]

As God is goodness because He is being, so is He happiness because He is goodness. We need not here conclude from the fact that there is happiness in creatures that it exists also in their Creator; it is enough to know that in Him there is goodness; the conclusion, therefore, that there is consequently happiness is evident to any one who knows what happiness means, which is "nothing else than the perfect good of an intellectual being, capable, as such, of knowing its sufficiency in the good which it possesses. . . . Both these conditions belong to God in the most excellent form. Therefore happiness supremely belongs to God."[6] He is the Most-Happy God. What is in the ontological order a want of being and perfection is, in the psychological order, a desire and a suffering, when such want is felt by consciousness. On the other hand, what is satisfaction of this want, and consequently of this desire, is pleasure, and, in a higher degree, happiness. So numerous and commonplace would be the examples that it is better to omit them and to form our opinion, on the ground of evidence, *that* in God there is supreme happiness.

But when we try to find out and to describe *what* is divine happiness, once more we encounter the same difficulty—to know the unknowable, to utter the unutterable. Here also lie open before us some ways of imperfect knowledge as a path at the foot of a lofty Sinaï, leading to its summit, which disappears amidst a cloud of dazzling light. By the way of causality, we ascend from creatures to God; and we conclude that "every earthly shadow of happiness, however small it may be, existed before, perfectly, in the divine

[4] Confess., Book IV., Ch. X.
[5] Sum. Theol., 1a., Q. 6, art. 3.
[6] Sum. Theol., 1a., Q. 26, art. 1.

happiness." And if we try to analyze and reckon up all these shadows of happiness which are to be found around us, we shall draw, with human colors, a very faint picture of the divine happiness. As for the happiness of contemplation, God has the continuous, most certain and perfect insight of Himself and all things. As for that of action, He has the government, not of one man, of one city, of one kingdom, but of the whole universe. As for that which men dream of finding in pleasure, riches, power, dignity and glory, God has His pleasure in the most excellent enjoyment of Himself and all good, without any mixture of evil; He has His riches in the perfect sufficiency which any wealth could promise; He has His power in His infinite might; His dignity rests in the headship and government of all things; He has His glory in the admiration of all creatures, according to the measure of their knowledge."[7]

But we must, at this point, apply the method of negation to correct the imperfections of such a picture. Happiness represents for us, and is defined accordingly, the union and accumulation of all good things. They are in God, indeed, but not by way of composition, but of simplicity, because, as we have said before in speaking of perfections, that which is composite in many creatures preëxists in the one God in simplicity and unity. We also represent happiness as the reward of virtue, but that is not essential to happiness; it is a mere fact that happens to those who deserve and acquire their happiness, just as to be generated happens to those who begin to be. But as God has His being without having been born, so He has His happiness without any previous merit, the contrary implying that there could be a time when He had neither happiness nor being.[8]

Lastly, by the way of eminency, our mind soars upwards to God Himself and sings to Him: "O, God, we know that Thou art the Most Happy God, but what is the nature of Thy happiness we do not know, as we are likewise ignorant of Thy very being. We know that all happiness in the world created by Thee must needs be in Thee most perfectly; but we know also that there must be in Thee a happiness of Thy own, although we cannot even fix our eyes upon that Inaccessible Light in which Thou contemplatest Thyself and lovest Thyself, not alone, yet not many, One and Three, in the unspeakableness of Thy eternal ecstasy."

II.

God's happiness is in Himself, but where is our happiness? The general answer is simple: Without God or in God. First of all

[7] Sum. Theol., 1a., Q. 26, art 4. Sum. c. Gent. lib. I. c. 102.
[8] Sum. Theol., 1a., Q. 26, art. 1, ad 1 et 2.

that there must be some is a conclusion which seems to spring out of the very depths of our nature. Naturally we all aspire towards our well-being and perfection, but where is happiness to be sought and found? Many things, indeed, can give us happiness, and therefore be pursued as definite ends of our activity; but what things can give us perfect happiness, and therefore be pursued as the end above and beyond all others, as our ultimate end?

Will it be riches, "which seem to supply whatever men can desire?" They can be, at most, an instrument for purchasing happiness which they do not contain in themselves. Will it be honor, glory, power? These three are insufficient, for one may have them and be at the same time perfectly unhappy. They remain, as it were, outside us. The first two are only signs, sometimes very deceptive ones, of some eminence and perfection, and the third may be an instrument of good or evil for him who possesses it. Will it be pleasure? That, indeed, is more closely connected with our very being, but though our body is part of ourselves, it is not our better self, our very self. Our intellectual soul is in some way infinite compared with that portion of matter to which it is united; the welfare of our body must be of little consequence compared with the welfare of our soul, much less can it be our perfect good and happiness. We are compound of a body and a soul, but the former is for the latter, and it would be an abuse to make the soul nothing more than the purveyor of our body. Not so, but as we naturally prefer our body to all external things, so we ought to prefer our soul to our body.

Therefore, if there is any true happiness at all for us, it is to be found in our soul. But our soul is not self-sufficient; it has powers of knowledge and powers of love. On what, then, can it exercise these powers to give us perfection and happiness? Moreover, these powers of ours are great, immeasurably great; they go beyond all material and concrete things to their general ideas and laws, beyond all particular perfections and beauties to their ideal and type; beyond this world, with its order, magnitude, splendor, being, to the One above, the principle and cause of such order, magnitude, splendor and being.

Are we not stranded between a double view of happiness equally unsatisfactory? On the one hand, a kind of happiness too low and too little; on the other hand, a kind of happiness too high and too unattainable. Yea, all earthly happiness is too little or at least too brief, as it has "an answer of death." So far hedonism is wrong and pessimism is right. Yea, if there is happiness at all for us, perfect happiness, I mean, worth being pursued as equal to our very being, it must be from God and in God, in whom we can have the accumulation of all good through our union with Him, who is the

universal spring of all good; but is such ideal happiness attainable, and which are right—the optimists of hope or the pessimists of despair?[9]

Why has God created us? This is indeed the question. To fulfill what end? This question is implied in the more general one: Why has God created at all? That God had a reason and an end in creating is beyond dispute; to act for an end is the law of all agents; they must act determinately for this or that end, for from an indetermined cause nothing would follow. Much more is it the law of intelligent causes, as we experience in ourselves in the deliberation of our intelligence and the choice of our will, and much more is it so in the Supreme Intelligence.

Now, what is the end of God's actions? Here appears the difference between God, the Infinite and Uncreated, and the finite and created beings. The latter may act in order to transmit to others something of their being, perfection and goodness; but as they are perfectible as well as in some degree perfect, they endeavor to gain for themselves something at the same time; thus they act as by a law of exchange, of action and reaction, intending together to give of their goodness and to add something to it.

It is not and cannot be so with God. On the one hand, God is solitary, in the sense that before creation there was no other being at all besides Himself; and on the other hand, He is fully self-sufficient. These terms, granted as they must be, the question supplies the answer. For what end did God create? For Himself, because nothing was but Himself. He is the First Cause in the order of finality as well as in the order of efficiency. Everything comes from God, and in some way or other everything must return to God, just as the ocean is the primary cause of all waters, from which they rise up and are condensed into clouds, float in the air and then fall down in flakes of snow upon the lofty white-headed mountains; at their feet the rivers spring forth and carry the waters back to the place of their birth.

God has, therefore, created all things for Himself. As He is the Cause, so is He the End of all things. But we must rightly understand how God is such an end. It is not as a result that is to be obtained by the composition of all things, as some modern pantheists have maintained (for their theory is that God's perfection is in process of completion), but as something already existing and which is to be reached by every being according to its own nature and in its own way. It is not as if all things struggled to obtain some good for God, as soldiers fight to obtain victory for their King. No, God is not the end of all things in the sense that He may acquire anything

[9] Sum. Theol., 1a., 2ae., Qq. 2 et 3.

through them, but rather as something to be acquired by them. He is not in want of anything, but, on the contrary, He bestows His gifts with unsparing hand from His inexhaustible treasury. When the earth turns up to the sun its side which had been hidden from it during the night, the sun itself remains unchanged and simply lavishes upon it some of the bright and warming rays of its glorious crown. As a consequence redounding to the glory of our God, He is the only truly and infinitely generous One, as He is the only One truly and infinitely rich, in whom is no lack and therefore no want; He gives, but does not receive.[10]

So, then, God has created all beings for Himself, that is to say, that they may reach, acquire, possess His own goodness. But we ought to explain immediately such an assertion by recalling that every being is all that it is by and from God, as an emanation, a participation, a reproduction and truly something of the goodness of God. Thus we may say both that everything is good by the Divine goodness, and that everything is good by its own goodness; the one and the other affirmation not being contradictory, since everything has in itself a goodness inherent in itself, which is really its own and on account of which it may be called good; and since, also, the goodness of everything comes entirely from God's goodness. So that we may say that there is one goodness of all, and, at the same time, that there is more than one. It is just the same with the good as with being. Plato's theory of Separate Ideas is true for once. There is something real separated from this material world which is first being and good by its own essence and from which every other thing holds its being and goodness.[11]

As a consequence, God's goodness appears to us in a twofold aspect—in the world and in Himself. In the world it is nothing more than His goodness, or, as we have explained, a shadow of His goodness; but in Himself it is His goodness unfolding into His happiness. Now, all created beings, every one according to its own nature, desire God, since they cannot but desire good, and there is nothing good except by the goodness of God spread all through this world by creation. The rational creature has an immense and twofold privilege, first by his nature and secondly by the grace of God—viz., the power of rising up to God Himself, *"Homo est capax Dei,"* man has a capacity for God, that is, he can know and love God Himself. The supernatural order consists essentially of God's own self in Himself, beyond the natural order of beings and laws created by God, and in such a superior order we have our place, since we are called by God to enjoy with Him life eternal. We can participate

[10] Sum. Theol., 1a., Q. 44, art. 4.
[11] Sum. Theol., 1a., Q. 6, art. 4.

in the divine goodness, as it is in itself, through our acts of knowing and loving God. And therefore God is preëminently the end towards which the rational creature moves, desiring the divine goodness itself, of which the irrational creature desires an image only.

So God's goodness appears to us in three degrees—the supreme degree, as perfectly possessed by God Himself, who is His own goodness and happiness; the second degree, as capable of being possessed by us, not as an integral part of our being, but as so known and loved by us that we may be said to take our share in the goodness and happiness of God; the third degree, as it may be possessed not in itself, but through the medium of all the good things created by God and presented here below in and to all creatures. Thus other beings may be said to have been made in some way for the goodness of God; *we* are made for the very happiness of God.[12]

We hold by faith that we have to find our happiness in God, and this belief is entirely consistent with the superior instinct of our nature, when it becomes conscious of itself and takes cognizance of the vanity of created things and of itself among them. Unto what will that happiness be like? As we have tried to represent to ourselves God's happiness through our human ideas of earthly happiness, so we may try to picture our happiness.

We must not too much despise created things; it would be a mistake. They are insufficient, indeed, as our ultimate end, but they are good and can certainly bestow a certain amount of happiness upon us. But, moreover, all that they do and can do in this respect we are sure to find in God, since every kind of goodness and perfection found in various creatures is gathered totally and as one in their Creator as in the source of all goodness. Thus, if we can draw happiness from the brooks, with what rapture shall we drink from the very source, which is a boundless and fathomless ocean!

Thus all goodness will be found in God by us, and therefore all our desires satisfied and our happiness fulfilled. Our desire as intellectual beings of knowing the truth will be satisfied by seeing all truths together in the very light of the First Cause and last explanation of them all. Our desire as moral beings of ruling over ourselves and ordaining everything within us according to reason and right conscience will be abundantly satisfied by a clear perception of and intense devotion to the Eternal Law, beyond all question of deficiency. Our desire of honor will be gratified by our elevation to the supreme dignity of union with God and of a share in His eternal Kingship. God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived, will crown our desire of praise and glory by bestowing those same marks upon us. We shall receive the fullness of riches in the possession of One

[12] Sec. II. Sent., dist. 1, Q. 2, art. 2.

who comprehends in the most complete and perfect degree all that is good. With what depth and with what rapture will not such a One be beloved by us! Although such a happiness is beyond the reach of our senses, our body itself will share in it; happiness is for the whole man, but beginning in his superior and immortal, and overflowing upon his inferior and material part. Our body here below darkens and materializes the soul, but hereafter our soul will enlighten and spiritualize our very body, as the night begins at the foot of the mountains and climbs up to their peaks, and as the morning sun touches their peaks first and creeps along their sides to enwrap them in a robe of light.[13]

When we have thus tried to express with the elements of earthly happiness the heavenly one, we must confess that it is nothing more than a mere drawing from life, which is powerless to give the relief, the colors, the expression, the very life of the original. The heavenly happiness will be all we can conceive, yet not like, but infinitely superior to it. Our belief outdistances our knowledge of it. "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance." (Ps. xv., 11.) "Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man what things God hath prepared for them that love Him."(I. Cor. ii., 9.) These two words express our faith and our humility. Let these two virtues serve as wings to carry us up to God's happiness, which is also to be ours, through His infinite goodness, forever and ever.

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[13] Sum., Contra Gent., Lib. III., cap. 63.

THE FRENCH ECCLESIASTICAL REVOLUTION.

III.

THE Court of Cassation on May 17, pronouncing upon the Ministerial appeal against the judgment in the case of Abbé Jouin (see page 297 of this Review), upheld the ruling and phraseology that is so awkward for all legislating blocards who, as I contend, voted in 1905 or executed in 1906 and this year unconstitutional enactments. The Appeal Court strikes out from the text of the important judgment merely this first ground (*motif*) alleged by the Correctional Tribunal for its verdict: "Attenuating circumstances are found in the fact that defendant's personal feelings of

a praiseworthy character are attacked by certain of the consequences following from the law he resisted." But the Appeal Court refused to interfere with the statement alleged by the tribunal as their second ground (*motif*), thus: "The (separation) law of December 9, 1905, appears an excessive (*exorbitante*) law of exception to our common law, inasmuch as it creates an offense special to ministers of worship, although, under this very law, they have become ordinary citizens." The Court of Cassation then declares that in the sentence thus translated, the expression "excessive law of exception to our common law" (*loi d'exception exorbitante du droit commun*) "must be construed in the sense commonly given it in jurisprudence." This is a crushing legal defeat for Governments and Chambers.

Cardinal Richard on the 19th of May informed the Parisian parish priests a new diocesan regulation instituted councillors to assist them in temporal parochial administration. The Archbishop said: "It is traditional that representatives of the Christian people participate, under pastoral authority, in managing the resources available for maintaining divine worship. The task of the clergy is thus lightened while their responsibility is more securely protected." These parish councillors will be nominated by the Archbishop on presentation of names selected by the curés. They are to incur no financial or legal liability, the curé only remaining responsible for all acts of parochial temporal administration. A similar organization is to be created for the *denier du culte,* or worship-penny fund.

On the 27th and two following days was held, at the Institut Catholique, the third diocesan congress of Paris under the presidency either of the coadjutor, Mgr. Amette, or the vicar general, Mgr. Odelin. The *séances*—morning, afternoon and evening each day—were all crowded. The pressing need for dividing most of the existing parishes, whose average population is 37,000, a few counting nearly 100,000, a figure unexampled in history, and for organizing new ones, was shown.

The delegate from Lyons assured the congress what should be decided upon there would have immense influence in other dioceses, where details of Parisian organizations were awaited impatiently as types to be followed. Throughout France strongly organized Catholic union was desired. A letter read from Cardinal Merry del Val recommended creation of parochial committees consisting of selected Catholics as starting points for more extended organizations.

The type foreshadowed, then, by the Holy Father is the parochial committee. Mgr. Odelin said the end in view should be a provincial grouping of parochial and diocesan committees, with finally a national federation. There should be in France a vast popular Catholic union like the German Volkverein, founded by Windthorst, which

had been so fruitful in good results. Mgr. Amette explained that the Vatican desired a creation of committees having limited numbers of councillors, composed of proved Catholics, who should direct the movement and group around each their adherents, each committee to be the centre of more extended Catholic groupings. Papers were read, questions discussed upon the following subjects: Popular dispensaries, workmen's dwellings, coöperative societies, savings banks, popular Catholic clubs, reading rooms, music halls, cafés, etcetera, the new Sunday rest law, systematized conferences, mutual help societies for the laity, similar associations for ecclesiastics (of which there are none yet in Paris, but several in the provinces, in the Dioceses of Rheims, Grenoble, Amiens, Soissons and Digne), the social duty of Catholics, the religious press and on Catholic clubs. On the last matter the Abbé Fonssagrives, chaplain of the Luxembourg (Paris) Catholic Club, founded shortly after the last German war by M. Beluze, with the aims of opposing by Catholic action the free-thought action of the "Teaching League," and preparing for creation of Catholic universities, stated their club organized between 120 and 130 conferences yearly, so that during his twenty-one years' tenure of office he had held 2,485, and each conferencier (or lecturer) was usually asked to repeat his address five or six times in Paris or provinces. The club had started long ago (and had soon been followed in this by the Jesuit Fathers, the Catholic Institute and others) a conference for practice in public speaking, the "Ozanam Conference," which had supplied and will, it is hoped, long continue to supply a large number of devoted orators to the Church, skillfully equipped for oratorical tournaments in public controversial gatherings. The Abbé Thellier de Poucheville read a paper advocating the use in conferences in churches of luminous wall projections of great Gospel scenes, of grand historical events during the score of centuries of Catholicity, offering as they do such inexhaustible resources for these illustrations, the good effect of which upon popular incredulity cannot be overestimated. "Our duty," concluded the speaker, "is to contribute by such images to the Christian education of the French people. Several parish priests corroborated the abbé's views. At St. Nicolas du Chardonnet, at St. Margaret's, at Aubervilliers, at the Sévres parish church conferences with these luminous projections have given unhoped for results. The Abbé Pelez de Cordova said he had formed a service for supplying the *clichés* that quickly became important and extensive. He is now creating one for cinemotography.

While this congress, which was an unprecedented success, progressed the Cardinal Archbishop presided over an assemblage at the Catholic Institute of twenty-eight Bishops—one-third of the French

episcopate—protectors of that institution, whose rector, Mgr. Baudrillart, read a report concerning the course of studies and the mental attitude he had to deal with now; the new chairs to be founded, in particular those of Christian origins and patristic theology; the history of religions, the reorganization of the faculty of philosophy and the urgency for sending students there, the question of the faculty of law and the financial situation. During the ensuing discussion it was settled the spirit of the faculty of philosophy should more and more conform, as desired by the Pope, to the sound philosophical tradition bequeathed by St. Thomas and the schoolmen.

For founding the two new chairs (one of which, history of religions, will be occupied by a series of lecturers) the Holy Father presented Mgr. Baudrillart at Rome with $20,000, and in a letter to the Bishops-protectors of 6 May, 1907, His Holiness declared: "It is easy to perceive that under the existing circumstances, so unfortunate for France, what is above all else in great danger is her youth, withdrawn in large measure from tutelage of the Church and driven in crowds into public colleges and huge lyceums seemingly made expressly for the purpose of uprooting religious sentiment from souls. In regard to philosophy we ask you never to allow in your seminaries relaxation in observing the rules laid down with such foresight by our predecessor in his encyclical 'Æterni Patris.' This is a point of utmost importance for maintaining and protecting the faith. It is certainly for you as well as for us very painful to witness the publication that proceeds from clerical ranks, particularly from the young clergy, of novelties in thinking full of danger and of errors about the very foundations of Catholic doctrine." The Bishops decided to send more students to the institute, particularly such as were destined for professorial duty in their seminaries; and, further, to constitute a new seminary in Paris, whence the courses of the institute could be followed by the seminarists, but that the courses of philosophy at the Sorbonne (State University) should not be followed before securing adequate sound scholastic formation of their minds. Finally their Lordships decided on forbidding ecclesiastics within their respective dioceses to contribute to the Abbé Loisy's *Historical and Literary Review*.[1]

In the same last week of May during four days there were morning and afternoon crowded *séances* in the conference hall of the Institut Catholique of the Joan of Arc Federation, presided by

[1] The Holy Father has desired the French episcopate to take the initiative by themselves condemning, as they are entitled to do, works dangerous for faith, instead of submitting them to the Congregation of the Index, whose labors will thus be lightened. The writers condemned can, of course, appeal to Rome.

Mgr. Foucault, Bishop of St. Dié, assisted at the two first by Mgr. Baudrillart and at all by the secretary general of this ladies' association, Mademoiselle Maugeret, who in her annual report announced the federation to be a work of both union and studies, with the further end of joining in the protests against attacks on the memory of Joan. Papers were read describing a large number of good works undertaken by various ladies, many of high rank, most of them "in society," such as patronages, free dispensaries, hospital visiting, Sunday lectures, protection of work girls, assistance by procuring work. Madame de Prat has founded and presides over an association for the latter purpose at Fontainebleau, which acts as intermediary between employers and employés. To carry out the business properly she has become a traveling agent for her association and regularly calls at the large Paris shops on behalf of her *protegées,* a fact disclosed to the meeting by the secretary and acclaimed enthusiastically. A discussion concerning methods to be pursued by ladies willing to imitate Madame de Prat followed. The Bishop advocated a coöperative form of guild by workers in the same line; the secretary general (and other ladies) preferred workers and employers should be syndically united: "Union must necessarily be created against the consumer, who is the chief exploiter, always anxious to buy in the cheapest market; whereas, if employer and employed are agreed together, prices can be fixed uniformly and wages can be raised to a reasonable figure. The solution of the social problem lies in a rise of wage for the female worker."

The Countess of St. Laurent, herself founder and president of a vast Catholic association at Lyons—League of Frenchwomen—in an address lofty in thought and style, declared that league to be the apostle of the royalty of the Sacred Heart, its principal social mission being to bring the various social classes to act together, for which effort a complete success has ensued. "We must," she said, "defend religion, not in the name of liberty, but because it is essentially divine," a formula provoking impassioned applause. The Countess went on to urge the need for propagating a good press, insisting upon the influence wielded by the daily paper. The press above all else can do good, wherefore the good journals should be unweariedly, widely distributed. "Resistance is the true Catholic watchword to-day."[2] Madame Danielou gave some particulars of the Catholic Normal School for ladies founded at 90 Rue de Rennes, Paris, in October, 1906, by herself and Madlle. Desrey, which is patronized by the Cardinal Archbishop and the professors of the Institut Cath-

[2] Madame Boursier read a report upon the work styled "The Press for All" that, founded in 1903, distributes free fifty thousand journals daily, and subscribes besides for another fifty thousand daily.

olique. Madame Danielou, herself aggregated to the University, prepares female professors to obtain the diplomas now required by law for the secondary instruction of girls above thirteen in all schools and colleges, and she successfully appealed to the well-to-do for aid in a work intending to save "free instruction" from the Freemason. Two-thirds of her pupils have already passed. This institution is a complement to the Institut Catholique.

Admiral de Cuverville expressed the warm thanks of the navy to the federation for protesting against the suppression of naval chaplains (recorded on page 280), and gave a touching account of the situation now created by an anti-Christian ministry for sick seamen. Countess Lecointre spoke eloquently about divorce on the stage, and the Catholic journalist, M. Maurice Talmeyr, discoursed admirably upon morality; demonstrating the immorality so fast increasing and disgracing Parisian streets under sundry forms results from a deliberate plan, settled long beforehand, and tenaciously prosecuted by Freemasonry during generations. In support of this assertion (that would, of course, have been received with a smile of pity by the ordinary American and British Mason), he read these passages from a secret circular of the High Italian Lodges dated in 1838: "To destroy Catholicism woman must be suppressed; but, since she cannot be, let her be, instead, corrupted. . . . Let us popularize vice among the masses; make hearts vicious and you will have no more Catholicism." The lecturer declared the actual *régime* in power sought to induce a return to the bestial customs of paganism. Speeches were made by the presiding Bishop and M. Théry on the indissolubility of marriage vows and on divorce, which subject the working class speaker, Madame Gouthéraud, treated in simple language, without formalities, with an air of extreme timidity, but with perfect sincerity and natural eloquence, reading her paper on "Children in the Divorce."

The Bishop, much moved, rose, saying he saluted respectfully the gray hairs of this daughter of the people who had so excellently demonstrated by simple reasoning from the heart, but with not less power than M. Théry, the thesis of that orator, who had shown the State, being unable to confer a legitimate marriage, could not dissolve one. An ovation was accorded to Madame Gouthéraud, unable to restrain her tears, who was warmly embraced by many of the ladies round her.

These *séances* gave to those present as auditors "the impression of a vast renaissance of Christian works distributed over French territory under the impetus of generous and devoted souls—renaissance of ideas, renaissance of actions, provincial works, comparisons of a syndical with a corporate *régime,* dispensary work, the work of

the good press, national resurrection through a female apostolate, popular and prison libraries, books for the blind, divorce questions, combat against vice. Such was the extensive programme, while all these matters were handled with a good sense, a good will and especially with that devotedness of spirit which is woman's sublime characteristic." (H. de Rauville.)

On the last evening in the same week, under the presidency of the Abbé Coubé, at the Paris Winter Circus was held a crowded meeting of the "League for Resistance by French Catholics," organized by Messrs. Paul and Guy de Cassagnac and the Deputy M. Jules Delahage. The abbé pointed out that wherever Catholic groups resisted government gave way, wherefore to organize resistance was a duty. M. Paul de Cassagnac affirmed "the day is nearing when armed legions will rise in defense of religion, country and freedom." M. Guy, urging resistance, blamed his brother Catholics for their far too slender aid to officers and others who made sacrifices for the sake of religion. He said: "Only one situation has been offered our league; it was by a Jewess Baroness requiring a secretary decorated with the Legion of Honor ribbon!" Sketching Messieurs Clemenceau and Briand, he styled them "worthy successors to the great bandits of the Revolution."

The first reflection provoked by these various highly necessary, most admirable, ecclesiastical and lay programmes announced for the future is that the whole of the popular undertakings, and of the reforms decided upon, and also these resolutions to resist revolutionary bandits to the last extremity ought to have, might have, been adopted and practiced a decade ago. About that time has expired since I read in an anti-clerical journal a smart article comparing its adversaries to a party contemplating an arduous journey, and, after much debate as to whither and by what route, at last setting out in company for the railway station, only to find there *ils out mangué le train*—they had lost the train. It certainly is "never too late to mend" *good material* as an abstract proposition. Let us then hope the French Catholics will persevere, "with a strong pull, a long pull and a pull all together," until the destroyed edifice is solidly restored; but delays are dangerous. It is right to say there is a settled conviction among the most intellectual and cultured as well as fervent of the religious expulsed and sheltered in England that the worst events will come to pass; that blood will be shed in torrents before peace can return to their country, whose sins against Love and Light are so heinous and obstinate.

Assistance at magnificent Corpus Christi processions in all Paris churches was numerically greater than in former years. At Saumur the Masonic Mayor refused to authorize them in the streets; never-

theless, 8,000 persons at least formed one that was not interfered with by a strong body of gendarmes and troops from the cavalry school, directed by a special commissary with several police officers, sent "to preserve order," from Angers. But at Tourcoing, a manufacturing town near Lille, whose radical Socialist Mayor, the Deputy M. Drou, had likewise forbidden them, an assembly of 2,000 from all the parishes in front of the principal church sung hymns and liturgical chants in protest until a body of fifty mounted gendarmes arrived and charged them. Several persons were wounded and twenty-five arrested, including the curé. The Correctional Tribunal, Lille, punished several of these "manifestants" by sentences of imprisonment for from two to eight days, and Sub-Lieutenant Bodin, of the reserve forces, was referred for punishment to a court-martial for words he addressed to the gendarmes. On the other hand, two days previously the Council of War of the Eleventh Corps at Nantes acquitted Lieutenant Couesdic by six again one vote (one of its members is a Jew), his offense being the observation to a commercial traveler at the window of the hotel where they both were staying on the 4th of May: "The band of ruffians! What dirty work they are doing!" The lieutenant defended himself by saying: "I do not want to shirk responsibility for these words, said in a private conversation and not addressed to those executing such work. As a Catholic and a religious man I expressed what I felt, and it was my right, as it was every other man's right, to say what I did to testify indignation at the expulsion from their homes of those Ursulines." The annual pilgrimage to the immense Church of Our Lady of Hope at St. Brieuc, closing the month of May, ended with a grand procession through the streets, decorated with flags and brilliantly illuminated. Two Bishops assisted, several thousand pilgrims arriving in special trains. This has no doubt incited the watchful Cabinet to try and hinder people from going to the grand Breton annual festival at St. Anne d'Auray (see page 179) by requiring the Western and Orleans Railway Companies to notify organizers of this year's pilgrimages they must state numbers and apply for the usual fifty per cent. reduction in prices five weeks in advance—a requirement amounting practically to interdiction. At Tours on June 2 M. Flourens, Liberal ex-Minister, and M. Guyot de Villeneuve, Deputy, addressed a meeting of 2,000 persons under the auspices of the departmental committee of "Popular Liberal Action." The sterility of parliamentary and ministerial proceedings, their "incoherence," the mischievous rôle of Freemasonry were denounced. "Catholics must be organized, prepared for action, be practical, have confidence in the future of the country and remember that twice—in 1885 and 1898—universal suffrage nearly gave them

a majority. The one question to-day is, will our France of history, the country the world has hitherto known and admired, will that France continue to exist, or will she make place and give way before a new entity proscribing private property, substituting for Christian monotheism the Masonic paganism now stifling her national genius beneath international cosmopolitanism?" M. Flourens proceeded to contrast the sinister influence of Freemasonry, encouraging the revolt of the Commune in presence of the foreign army with the devotedness to France in her hours of trial of the Holy See, and its aid towards furthering and consolidating the foundation of the republic by rallying round it partisans of fallen dynasties.

On the festival of Saints Peter and Paul in the Salle Wagram, Paris, at a meeting of 10,000 convened by the "Action Francaise Association," founded a year ago, to present him with a gold bust medallion of himself costing the subscribers $7,000, General Mercier, War Minister in the Dreyfus days,[3] in a speech starting with the maxim, "Do your duty, happen what may," attributed to the Dreyfus campaign "the condition of anarchy and dissolution of the moment, the measures tending to uproot religion and ruin magistrature and army, those three pillars of a nation's stability and security. The watchword of true Frenchmen should be, "Jewish and Masonic power must be destroyed." It seems to the writer so important a gathering of opponents to the Bloc may fittingly be recorded here. But unquestionably appropriate is notice of the significant fact that a grandiose white marble statue (carved out of one enormous block) of "The Eagle of Meaux" was about the same time erected in that city, of which Bossuet was Bishop.

The great orator is represented standing draped with a mantle, the right hand pointing to heaven. At his feet are grouped the personages whose virtues he celebrated in the popularly famed funeral orations—the least able and learned of all his manifold discourses and literary works,[4] in my humble opinion, and I have carefully read every one of his thirteen score sermons, some of which are, I think, only equaled by St. Anselm's "Cur Deus Homo."

This monument to the Christian mystic who genius formed, as

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[3] The rehabilitated Dreyfus has now retired from the army, probably as the result of mess boycotting.

[4] The reason of this odd fact is, not want of discrimination, but because so few care or are able to form opinions. It is easier to follow the crowd and the "good" form of the day. The five funeral sermons are read as school exercises, but who for two generations passed has cared to read a long sermon, were it preached by an angel? My own debt to good sermons is incalculable.

[5] The ashes of that wretched corrupter are to be officially removed to the Pantheon in October. Ministry of Fine Arts (save the mark!) has not yet settled where his statue shall be erected.

the bestial, Masonic and cremated Zola[5] deformed and disgraced, the modern French language, is the work of the sculptor Ernest Dubois and was exhibited this season at the Paris Salon of French artists.

M. Briand, who had shortly before decided the church properties of St. George's parish, in Lyons (see page 270), should be transferred to the schismatic worship association—in violation of the principle laid down in the separation law that "general rules regulating exercise of public worship in each religious body must be respected"—early in May circularized the prefects concerning protests from Mayors against prefectoral decisions in regard to grants of presbyteries such as are related in the note on page 272. This circular says: "The legislator's intention when prescribing your intervention by the law of January 2, 1907, was, emphatically, to insure execution of the (separation) law of December 9, 1905, by avoiding the contracting of any lease on such low terms as would manifestly make it take the character of a subsidy, indirectly, to worship. But your right of approval thus conferred should be exercised with constant care to leave to the municipalities that liberty of action on this subject which in principle belongs to them. I am at your disposal always for giving any useful hints in cases where you may find yourself faced by practical difficulties that you may consider especially delicate to deal with." In other and plainer words, "do all you can to injure and as little as possible to help religion." To stimulate such action, this Minister of Public Instruction, Worships and Fine Arts a month afterwards addressed the prefects again as to the measures they must take "in cases where municipalities persist in a manifest spirit of resistance to law to allow the parish clergy to occupy gratis and without a lease the ancient presbyteries disaffected by the law of January 2, 1907, and that are now communal freeholds. Such a situation cannot be prolonged, contrary as it is to the principles of the new legislation forbidding any direct or indirect subvention in favor of public worship, and prejudicial to the good management of communal interests. It is your duty to address to such municipalities observations calculated to make them respect legal enactments. If your observations are unheeded, you will have to seek what powers are available for your recourse to. In particular you will examine the feasibility of using your powers of controlling the communal budget; whether it would not be an opportune occasion for disallowing credits asked for expenses not absolutely necessary. Those facultative credits might be disallowed to the extent corresponding to the rent that could be obtained for the presbytery if let. Or you might add to the declared receipts, as though *overlooked* by the municipal council, such a sum as you consider represents the rent obtainable for the presbytery

were it let. When, in special cases, municipalities instead of thus eluding their legal obligations, do their best to fulfill them as promptly and as easily for you as they can—then consider how best you can lend them support of your authority."

Within ten days from publication of these instructions a large number of communes in the Jura resolved to pay no direct taxes if the circular should be enforced in the department.

The murder at Aubervilliers, a Parisian industrial suburb, on Sunday evening, June 2, on which day the Corpus Christi procession took place at the small neighboring village of Dugny, of Hippolyte Debroise, excited much emotional interest and sincere widely spread sympathy in France. A party of some 200 youths and children from the patronage at 38 Rue des Epinettes, accompanied by two priests, the Abbés Firmery and Vitu, its directors, had been to Dugny for the afternoon function, and returning, some in vehicles, others in bicycles, others on foot, the group, nearing the patronage about six o'clock, was attacked by a dozen young ruffians from Aubervilliers and Bourget, in ambush at the roadside, who fired a shower of bullets from the revolvers wherewith several were armed. The Abbé Firmery received three balls, one in the thigh, penetrating deeply, and was in hospital for a fortnight. A lad was struck on the hand, but the young Debroise, of Aubervilliers, in his twentieth year, fatally wounded in the chest by two bullets, threw up his arms and fell. Conveyed to the Lariboisiere hospital and confessing to a priest on the way, he expired there at 11 that night. Three lads (all of them mechanics), from sixteen to eighteen years old, were arrested for the crime, each denying he fired the fatal shot, but the youngest averred he had aimed at the Abbé Firmery. The circular issued by the committee of the Association of Catholic Students at the Luxembourg Club, Paris, appealing for attendance of comrades at the funeral, says: "Hippolyte Debroise has just been assassinated in hatred of our common faith. He belonged to one of those patronages so willingly aided by Catholic students, and where they pass fraternally several hours a week with young workmen and employés. We doubt not Paris Catholics will make a point of attending the funeral of this first[6] victim of anti-clerical education."

Hippolyte, youngest of three sons, was apprenticed; the elder is a military engineer; their father is a hackney coachman, and the family, much respected at Aubervilliers, have lived in the same house there since 1893. The central committee of the League for Resistance of French Catholics, founded by the brothers De Cassagnac and M.

[6] At the inventory takings last year there were two other victims slain, both, like Hippolyte, sons of workmen or artisans—namely, Ghysel and André Regis—but, "Sanquis martyrorum Semen ecclesiæ est."

Delahaye, undertook the arrangements and expenses of the funeral on June 6 (octave of Corpus Christi), the religious functions being celebrated at the young martyr's parish Church of St. Michael, Batignolles. The ceremonies attracted 10,000 followers of the bier, whereof nearly one-third were delegates from various bodies in the city and country, such as 150 Parisian patronages, numerous seminaries, great associations, as Popular Liberal Action, Catholic Association of French Youth, with their president and chaplain, Union of Free Workmen, the Catholic Action, the French Action, French Anti-Masonic League, Catholic Committee for Religious Defense, French Patriots, besides many others. The funeral car was followed by 300 members of Hippolyte's patronage, with their sub-director, Abbé Vittu; then came the family, next groups of Deputies, municipal councillors and Parisian notabilities, including M. Legrand, president of the Royalist committee of the seventeenth arrondissement, with his committee, M. Fresnay, Senator; M. Jacques Piou,[7] MM. Xavier and Amédeè Reille, M. Jules Delahaye, M. Groussau, M. Castelnau, M. Pugliesi-Conti, Gaston Méry and the brothers De Cassagnac, General Jacquey, Colonels de Ramel and d'Allemagne and a delegation representing the Patriotic French League composed of the Baroness Reille, Viscountess de Montrichard, Viscountess de Wall, Madlle. Gervais and M. Leon Clement. Inside the church 3,000 people were packed. More than twice as many remained outside. Six tricolor flags surrounded the catafalque, one of them in the white division bearing a Sacred Heart image, these flags after the sermon being carried before the patronage deputations through the streets in the re-formed *cortège* to the Batignolles Cemetery.

The ceremonies were presided by the Coadjutor Mgr. Amette, assisted by Mgr. Fages, archdeacon, who received the body at the porch and accompanied it to the entry of the choir, where "De Profundis" in plain chant produced grandly solemn effect.

The ritual over, Mgr. Amette mounted the pulpit steps and delivered a funeral oration that provoked no little applause and affected many present to tears. "The spectacle before our eyes," said His Grace, "is more moving than any words can be, yet I cannot silence the interior voices within all hearts in presence of this manifestation, at once so grandiose and so sorrowful. Why this immense, unusual concourse of clergy and faithful around the blood-stained remains of an humble child of the people? Why these elected from city, town and country? Why all these directors of good works, these crowds of pastors and ecclesiastics? Why did His Eminence the venerated

[7] Deputy, founder and president of the great "Popular Liberal Action," and Parliamentary leader of French Catholics.

Cardinal Richard desire me to represent him here? For if he has not come himself, it was on account of age and infirmities. Ah! what brings us round this coffin is, in the first place, sentiments of pity for this child, for these weeping parents; but we desired also to bear protest against an odious crime and to affirm our attachment to the cause for which Hippolyte Debroise died—the grandest cause in this world, the cause of faith, of God. For his faith, for his God, did Hippolyte die, returning joyously from a religious festival. . . . It was the priest they sought, it was the *Soutane* they aimed at, and because he was close to it was the poor youth struck. . . . Disciples of the forgiving God as we are, we still are entitled to say to those who daily by word and pen excite the populace against the Church—this is your work! We mourn for them more than for this martyr of twenty years. . . . This blood will be fruitful in results for our two mothers, Holy Church and France. If it be true there must be innocent victims to insure triumph of just causes, let us implore our Lord to render this blood prolific of good for the Church of Paris, the Church of France!"

M. Henri de Rauville declares no fair idea could be given of the tone, the sympathetically communicative emotion of the orator, whose words evoked profound emotion and also irrepressible enthusiastic applause, reminding him of the axiom "the spoken word is a living, the written is a dead, word," and he estimated the numbers of people at the cemetery to have risen to 12,000. During the whole way there were sympathetic crowds on both sides of the roads, and, getting foothold upon a boundary stone, he could see the great extent of the *cortège* from the Barrier along the whole Avenue Clichy to its junction with the Avenue St. Ouen, "floral crowns and palms like a clear, light cloud floating over a sombre stream and pointing heavenwards in a burst of hope and consolation." The Abbé Fonssagrives, chaplain of the Luxembourg Catholic Club—whose paper read at the congress has already been summarized—received, before the parish church was left, a telegram from 900 inhabitants of Rheims "saluting young Hippolyte Debroise, fallen on the field of honor," and recording their recognition of "the cowardly assassination as the fruit of Masonic teaching." The defile from church to cemetery lasted one and one-half hours. There were many police, gendarmes armed with muskets, and near the Barrier Clichy was a reserve force of mounted guards; but no disorder occurred.

M. Gaston Méry, who was a spectator of many pagan funerals of eminent Masons, as Victor Hugo, President Carnot, Zola, declares he never experienced anything like the sentiments evoked by these harmonious, simple Christian obsequies. "No banal gossiping between carless 'mourners' waiting arrival of the corpse. An un-

usual, surprising, dignified bearing testifying the sincerity of general emotion. An atmosphere of melancholy rather than of mourning. Perhaps in that Church of St. Michael, without a history as yet, invincible, resolutions were born from whence shall proceed the merciful revolution that shall restore our France."

The Catholic Union has initiated a subscription for a monument to Hippolyte Debroise at Bourget on the spot where he was slain. The Cardinal Archbishop has sanctioned another, initiated by the Abbé Baston, curé of St. Michael's, for subscriptions from French patronages for erecting a monument in memoriam at the Batignolles Cemetery. The two subscription lists are distinct and do not clash. As to the murderous gang, it is unlikely any serious consequences to them will result. The three ruffians arrested had the artful effrontery to avow they only intended to kill a priest. "Killing is no murder" in such a case. M. Guy de Cassagnac, in the *Autorité*, asks: "After firing at a curé, is not one sure to end one's days in the skin of a bourgeois blocard? Where are the assassins of Mgr. Darboy, President Bonjean, Abbé Deguerry, Father Ollivaint? Where are the assassins of Generals Lecomte and Clement Thomas (when the actual Premier, Clemenceau, was Mayor of Montmartre and close by while they were shot)? Where are the assassins of Colonel Henry, of the heroic Morès, of Syveton? Never, in Rome under the Cæsars, in Italy during the Middle Ages was political assassination exalted, as with us to-day, to the rank of a principle of government. These Apaches from below, of sixteen years old, are merely the products of Apaches above, the gray-haired Apaches of political life." If the language is exaggerated, the thought is sound and strictly logical.

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[8] In the spring of this year the freethinkers associated in the republic of lamented Garcia Moreno voted unanimously a programme as follows, realization of which they demanded from their National Assembly:

1. Sequestration of all mainmorte properties.
2. Secularization of cemeteries.
3. Suppression of noviciates.
4. Abolition of exterior ceremonies in public worship.
5. New law of police for public worship.

The Socialist journal of Charleroi (Belgium), praising this programme, proceeded to say that as most Ecuadorian Deputies are freethinkers, these resolutions will surely become laws. "Yet a few years ago the Jesuits reigned and constituted an actual theocraty in this Republic." What would the Charleroi journal say did Belgian Catholics talk of closing the Temple of Science (so called) and prohibiting Socialist manifestations? But to close noviciates and suppress processions of Catholics seems to it a natural proceeding. However, the great majority of Belgians think differently. In their land of liberty would-be oppressors of compatriots are ill received, and could not withstand general indignation. Belgian Catholics, unlike their brethren in the land the illustrious Garcia Moreno graced but yesterday, will never, like them, be reduced to slavery, whatever may hapen to Frenchmen.

One of the fellow-coachmen with Debroise the father years ago said to him: "You are wrong to send your sons to the Patronage. It is out of fashion now. I let my boys do as they like. You will see the neighbors will not think well of you or your boys." But, says Bebroise père, "his sons have turned out badly, and he is in despair about them now. As to us, we have lived in this neighborhood twenty years. I am proud of my sons, of the dead one as of the two living; and I find in this calamity how well we are thought of by all honest folks."

Excepting possibly the Masonic Republic of repudiating Ecuador,[8] I believe in every country outside France, statesmen, whether Catholic or Protestant, recognize that the Catholic patronage is a school of good and loyal citizens, which ought to be fostered by wise rulers. Under Clemenceau and his Bloc these admirable institutions are proscribed and ruined. Numerous examples of this are forthcoming. The freehold patronage of St. Joseph at Lorient, confiscated along with the property of St. Louis' Church, was in June handed over to the municipality; and Canon Duparc, protesting against such spoliation and forbidding the Catholic public, on pain of incurring the rigors of ecclesiastical law, to take part in the adjudication, is prosecuted for "interference with the freedom of public auction." In the Code Napoleon any act of life can be found to be criminal.

For many years there has been carried on at 126 Boulevard Montparnasse, Paris, a Catholic workman's club directed by Brothers of St. Vincent of Paul. The liquidator of that congregation's properties, M. Menage (about whom more will hereafter be said), included therein the club properties and sold them this summer for $60,000. Now, the club belonged to a civil society legally constituted long before the spoliation laws were voted; but the tribunal of first instance and the Court of Appeal have decided the civil society was a mere blind. If, writes the club's director, Abbé Piché, "if this property belonged to religious devoted to interests of children of the people, of workmen, of those earning bread by sweat of the brow, it was a sacred patrimony successive governments should have endowed and protected; if it belonged to a civil society legally formed before 1901, no just law can hinder religious from uniting with laymen to found such a society, a thing so just and reasonable, indeed, that lawyers, consulted before its foundation, would not foresee as possible such an aberration from the sense of justice in French laws; if, finally, this property be (and facts prove it is) the fruit of subscriptions by poor and rich, of laborious begging by its owners, of charity sermons and charitable bazar sales, I ask myself, by what right then, in spite of all, government confiscates and sells it, and the first comer installs himself as lawful owner of it, had he even

paid a million of francs for this property?" So will every just, impartial man say who studies this matter. Those who acquire this property for money are profiting by stolen goods, as they must have learned from the reception accorded them by the young men at the club, which has been carried on for upwards of half a century and is despoiled of all its property through simple anti-religious hate. Hundreds of workmen, thus robbed, expelled from their own house and obliged to find another, a thing not easily done nor to be done at all without important capital! The Abbé Piché has indignantly memorialized President Fallières, suggesting to the Freemason head of the State that the chapel in his Elysée Palace, which he never uses, might be generously given to the despoiled club!

Not content with depriving youth of their homes as well as of proper instruction, government now attacks infants. A crèche receiving daily fifty babes at 27 Chaussée d'Autin, Paris, directed by Sisters of Charity, received on July 11 notice of "expulsion" within the ensuing week.

The *Official Journal* on July 5 published a list of eighty-one schools conducted by religious in Paris and in ten departments, from north to south, from east to west, that, by two decrees of the Premier M. Clemenceau, dated 2 July, are to be closed on September 1. The Christian Brothers, the Daughters of Charity (S. V. P.), the Ladies of the Sacred Heart, Ursulines and Sisters of St. Joseph are the principal congregations concerned, but there are also many smaller congregations.

Upon this wholesale proceeding Cardinal Coullié, Archbishop of Lyons, addressed to the Christian Brothers and the religious ladies to be dispersed this letter: "The hecatomb will soon be completed which is destroying our scholastic establishments, the primary, superior and professional schools. Responding to the admirable initiative of Cardinal Fesch (a century ago), our populations, inspired by faith, called into the diocese a considerable number of the sons of St. John-Baptist de la Salle. Thanks to their direction and to the generosities of the faithful, numerous schools flourished prosperously. Generations of children and young girls were trained to respect God and His laws, in parental veneration, and to love their country. We were proud of this regiment of 900 Christian Brothers spread through the parishes of the diocese and fighting the good fight in the simplicity of a life of poverty and the heroism of hidden self-devotedness. We are now vainly seeking successors and asking ourselves to whom we shall entrust the work? Our grief is great, for it ought to be thoroughly made known the disaster consequent on your removal effects social and religious ruin both; and they who do not shrink from taking the responsibility of measures so grave

inflict a cruel wound upon France as well as the Church. Notwithstanding our grief and anxieties, we say to you, take courage, dearest Brothers! You will return to France. The tempest sweeping over our beloved land cannot last always; an hour shall come when the plain good sense that characterizes the Franks shall resume its rights."

A week previously Mgr. Henry, Bishop of the adjoining Diocese of Grenoble, presiding at St. Laurent du Pont (near the former Carthusian monastery), a congress of the association for insuring school neutrality, said: "No one can charge me since I came to the diocese with lacking a conciliatory spirit. Without sacrificing essential principle, I have labored to the best of my power at the pacification of minds, in respect for our institutions and for opinions of others; for I imagined there was room in my country for a tolerant republic sheltering all her children under one flag. Such a republic has not been given us; we still await its advent to salute it respectfully. But the proceedings of our government are taking us back to the worst Cæsarism, and we will have none of such Cæsarism." Every American republican will applaud these sentiments from a Bishop who does not mince matters.

At the Vatican there seems to be complete sympathy with the views of the French episcopate that continuance of the oppressive situation is dangerous; that the present "camping" in churches must completely cease, and as soon as possible; that the ministerial instructions about presbyteries inaugurate a fresh campaign against Catholicism, and that a strenuous, legal resistance without violence or provocations will tend to create a national movement against exceptional "laws" and against violations of the text of those very "laws."

The Prefects of Meuse and Puy-de-Dome lately attempted, contrary to provisions of the separation act, to foist schismatics upon the parishes of Besson and St. Hilaire. M. Aubert, Prefect of the Meuse, required the Mayor of Besson to insist by force that the schismatic curé of Culey[9] should baptize a child in Besson parish church, "a building affected to free exercise of public worship." The Mayor refused, resigned office and the parish priests shut the doors on the would-be intruders.

A phrase of the ex-Minister Rouvier, an anti-clerical, is continually quoted now: "France is dissolving." Words that may be paraphrased by our so familiar line from "In Memoriam,"

> The old order changeth, giving place to new!

which naturally remind one here of an opinion recorded in the Gospel, "The old is better." Evolution is a natural, necessary pro-

[9] See page 180.

cess—from excellent to excelsior, from bad to worse—and Rouvier, as an old man of business, must feel the fruit absolutely proves what the tree really is that has produced a result he deplores. An undefined sense of this is rising in the minds of Frenchmen, a conviction there is something *radically* wrong, or the state of the country could not be what it is. We Catholics have been assured by Vicars of Christ that our good "God has made the nations curable;" accordingly we know France is not, as thinkers uninfluenced by divine faith may fancy, incurable; but that her salvation and restoration can, indeed must, proceed from renaissance of faith to begin with. In the meantime, assuredly, France dissolves.

The national finances are in so unsatisfactory a condition that the cost of the persecution, government extravagance in a multitude of matters and heavy expenses incurred as result of ministerial incapacity,[10] are attracting attention, assisting active and passive resisters of the Masonic tyrants. A milliard of francs, or two hundred millions of dollars, were promised half a dozen years ago by the late Waldeck-Rousseau as proceeds of seizure of properties of congregations to be suppressed, and that sum would, he assured the world, be available for working class old age pensions. Up to now government have received nothing;[11] but instead have advanced to the various liquidators one and one-quarter millions of dollars, and disclosures of distribution of much plunder, not to the people, but to political supporters, are made from week to week. Meantime the one and one-quarter millions of dollars have had to be provided in budgets. Three hundred thousand dollars are asked now to convert the seized St. Sulpice Seminary into a picture gallery and the seized archbishopric into a Ministry of Labor adequate to the wants of M. Viviani, the lights extinguisher. Two ministerial colleagues ask $55,000 for installing steam heating; $120,000 are asked for alterations to the opera house.

However, on July 11, a day before their session closed, the reporter

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[10] M. Aynard, Progressist Deputy, at a banquet in the Rhône department on July 7, pronounced the gathering to be a manifestation in support of electoral liberty. It is, he said, "the abandonment during a certain number of recent years by the Republic of liberty that has misdirected our whole policy. There remains only the liberty which is license to disorder. Of electoral liberty not a vestige is left. Our actual policy it is hard to define. I should say it was an 'incoherence,' if the word had not been used so much by every one. It is a negative policy, sterile in every point, obeying no ruling idea and based on private interests. For years we have had but a single policy, the anti-religious policy."

[11] The property at Limoges of Sisters of the Incarnate Word was sold for $1,064. Expenses of liquidation, including State taxes, amounted to $541. The liquidator awarded $520 to himself for his labors, and $3 remain at disposal of the Sisters. At St. Etienne a final balance settled two and a half years ago of $891 is not yet paid over.

of the Senatorial Financial Commission, M. Poincaré, Senator, ex-Minister, candidate for and probable successor to the post still occupied by M. Clemenceau, made it known that for the first time during a quarter of a century the commission had decided to withdraw from discussion that session and to throw over until October or November all the "supplementary credits" asked for by Ministers, and voted by the Chamber of Deputies, amounting to no less than eight and one-half millions of dollars, on the alleged ground that large total of items had been submitted to the Senate too late for serious examination and discussion of the details.

M. Poincaré, who is no friend to the Church, had, exactly a fortnight previously, delivered, at a banquet of the Federation of retailers, a discourse very like to a ministerial programme. Among its principal passages are what follows: "At this troubled epoch the duty of politicians is rather to listen than to speak. One main cause of existing disquiet is, in my opinion, that Senators and Deputies are too much unaccustomed to hear the country's voice. They live wrapped up in themselves in a factitious world whose frontiers are the Luxembourg Palace Gardens and the Pont de la Concorde, in an atmosphere so rarefied that the image of every object is refracted and altered, more and more gradually isolated, instead of keeping in continuous touch with the nation they represent. They regard themselves as holders of sovereignty, gifted with a magical faculty to dispense to the people all sorts of material satisfaction and human joys. . . . When one carefully examines current signs of spontaneous anarchy one is painfully struck by their analogy with those admirably described by Taine in his pages concerning the eve of the Revolution—power slipping away from hands whose mission was to keep it from the hands of the masses; evil instincts profiting by disorder to enjoy free course; soldiers betraying passwords and refusing their service; lastly, as Taine says, 'a building whose main beams have bent, successive and multiplying cracks in all the minor supports and crossbeams.' Changed morals and still more changed methods are wanted. In their daily exercise of the legislative mandate Senators and Deputies keep on snatching at rent morsels of executive power, interfering in nominations to this position or that office, dictating their capricious wishes to public administrations, imperiously exacting what favors they think they can obtain for their electors' profit or that of friends or relations, reserving the right of indignantly protesting against the like favors claimed by opponents. There must be a change of morals and of methods, too, in the country, which, intoxicated by promises and nurtured on illusions by well nigh all political parties, shall otherwise soon unlearn her essential traditions and the permanent conditions of national

grandeur. . . . Let us not hypocritically call 'humanitarian' weaknesses of character, calm egotisms, blind desires for peace and quiet. A nation cannot be vigorous and resisting without a spirit of devotedness, abnegation and sacrifice. Let us talk a little less of our rights, a little more of our duties; let us unite our efforts to maintain or revive conscience in our restless country."

Fine words, brave words, true words, yet the orator regaining power would be (as he was before) a servant of Freemasonry. Unfortunately, to quote the anti-clerical, semi-official *Matin,* the Paris daily newspaper with the largest influential circulation, from an article by its principal leader writer, M. Lauzanne, on June 19, entitled "It is Cracking:" "For a quarter of a century France has been governed by phrases alone. Little of the ancient edifice (of government) remains standing. Those two foundation stones called authority and discipline are daily more and more crumbling away. There still are left some vestiges of *amour-propre;* Ministers remember they ought to be severe on those who show want of respect for themselves, but they forget to be severe on law-breakers. It is cracking; the worst cracks are at the top. A general mocking and sneering is splitting up the whole house. They who are administered are ridiculing functionaries, who, in turn, slight their chiefs, while these snub Cabinet Ministers. Everywhere shocks are weakening the walls. The front itself now and then trembles. To avert complete wreck of the whole concern we have words from the government, speeches from the government, phrases from the government."

The blocard journal *Le Radical,* in a leader signed by M. Paul Leconte, discussing M. Rouvier's pithy sentence, says it "has created much emotion on account of the character of its author, who does not put words together for the pleasure of doing so, who only speaks about things he understands. His opinion, so disquieting because it comes from him, had in view only the state of things resulting from the manifold antagonisms disclosed by agitation among functionaries, by the outrageous claims and manifestations of syndicated bodies, by the excesses committed in private strikes anticipating the universal strike, by the increasing propensity everybody begins to remark, to consider private interests before the public interest. Every one else clearly saw we are in a great social and moral crisis, characterized by the daily growing and evident weakening of the sentiments of discipline, modesty, civic abnegation, that are the real forces of States, especially of popular States, where the break which, whatever may be done, is always absolutely, indispensably necessary, is placed, not in the more or less brutal hands of one man, but in the reason, mind and heart of all. Every other spectator's eye perceived we have reached a point where the violence of unbounded

appetites generally dominates sense of principles, where desire to enjoy universally conquers antiquated honorable convictions. But this outcry of Rouvier is already a month old; it is then ancient history, it no longer corresponds to actual reality. However pessimist it may have seemed last month, it has become almost an euphemism in presence of events now preparing, confronted by enormities now close at hand. We are, most probably, about to see what was seen by our fathers of the convention and the committee of public safety. This is no dream, no romancing; it is reality; it is the very last cry of actuality."

M. de Boisandré observes upon these two articles: "This frightful situation, so perilous for France and for themselves, is their own work, the work of Rouvier and Clemenceau both; the collective work of the whole band of unscrupulous politicians who have during thirty years been preparing this 'dissolution;' it is their joint complicity in the poisoning of a country, but yesterday so robust and healthy, realizing the consequences of which complicity they can now only utter terrified howlings."

The Parliamentary session begun in November 5 last ended on Friday afternoon, July 12, the very last work done being the voting of a little bill (opposed by the Right, who were not allowed speech) to make things still more pleasant for divorced persons who remarry. The characteristic of this session is legislative barrenness. It is shown on page 273 how the Cabinet ecclesiastical programme has been stultified by its propounders themselves. The other important measures promised on November 5 in the Premier's declaration to Parliament were: 1. Law to suppress military councils of war. "The discussion of this project is inopportune now," declared M. Clemenceau a fortnight before close of the session, and, by aid of the Right (who deem it always inopportune), he obtained a majority of 93 against proceeding then with that bill. 2. Law to abolish capital punishment. Murders are increasing so fast that the French respectable public everywhere have protested against this reform, through municipalities, departmental councils and otherwise, the general feeling being that of Alphonse Karr, "let assassins begin first;" nor has government therefore ventured to introduce the promised project. President Fallières, however, as make-weight in favor of Apaches, has, within seven months, annulled the death sentences of no less than twenty-eight assassins, and it is notorious French juries can be induced to give such verdicts only when the most inhuman monsters are the principals concerned. 3. Law for working class old age pensions. Of this nothing whatever has been heard since the 6th of November. 4. Law for such a taxation of incomes as should lighten the burdens of voters who toil and sweat,

but increase those pressing on capitalists' shoulders. This philanthropic project has been introduced and discussed at some length in the Chambers, at very great length elsewhere; indeed, has been pulled to pieces and dissected, to universal disgust of all classes excepting the voters of the proletariat, too ignorant to comprehend such matters. The Senate (where M. Poincaré has explained its effects) will certainly never vote it. 5. Law to authorize the State to "purchase," in short to confiscate, the Western Railway. All the Councils General of the departments served by this line are opposed to the scheme, as are all the Deputies for places in the territory it traverses, excepting one or two, and the owners of the railway. The Senate will not hear of it. Accordingly that project likewise hangs fire. 6. Law to assist the French wine producers, "so cruelly tried and so urgently needing now legislation to rigorously repress the frauds" from which the Viticulture suffers, said Clemenceau in his declaration on November 5. No project whatever was produced until after the southern demonstrations and strike against taxation in mid-June; then a scheme was laid before Parliament, and after lengthy discussions a measure was finally voted twenty-four hours before the session closed that is universally held by the vineyard proprietors and dealers practically interested to be quite futile. "After nearly ten months of almost dictatorial power, Clemenceau appears not only odious, inspiring horror on account of the blood shed (at Narbonne), but impotent; a man thoroughly incapable, unfit for government or for realizing the useful and fruitful." (E. Drumont.)

Some reader of this paper will here say to himself: "The agony is piled up too high; there surely must be a good deal of exaggeration. If the situation is truly pictured, why did not the Chamber vote want of confidence, and so get rid of the Ministry of mismanagement and misery?" My reply to this is twofold. *a.* The Cabinet majority in the Chamber of 350 votes on February 19, when their ecclesiastical procedure was impugned, had fallen to 67 on June 28, when the question concerned a proposed parliamentary inquiry by a committee of twenty-two Deputies into the events in Southern France, that was moved for by M. Paul Meunier (Socialist-Radical), yet refused by M. Clemenceau, who a few hours previously said he would agree to it. 256 votes recorded for and 323 against show there were practically no abstentions from this final trial of strength, 591 being the total elected last year. *b.* M. Clemenceau, inventor of the Bloc, shortly after the meeting of this first Parliament, in which he is for the first time a Prime Minister as well as Chief Blocard, insured himself a sufficient majority under any circumstances short of utter revolution by arranging that a project of law

should be, without any public notice, sprung upon both Chamber and Senate in their houses on the same day increasing the parliamentary salaries of Deputies and Senators from $1,800 to $3,000. The measure passed each house without any debate within half an hour, and has added a million dollars or so to the yearly budget; but to a Chamber half whose members are impecunious (a reasonable estimate, seeing that during their first month of session against a third of them detainers of their salaries were lodged with the Treasurer by their creditors), their salary is a boon that will not be let go for any immaterial consideration. A subsequent decision of a higher court that creditors are not entitled to seize or lodge detainers against more than $1,000 yearly of these representatives' salaries has put each Deputy—half being men of straw elected by single straws—into the happy position of seeing his private indebtedness automatically, without trouble to himself, reduced by the State to the extent of $1,000 annually and of also receiving from the State for himself twice that sum annually, besides getting free railway passes from New Year's Day to next New Year's Eve, as well as free lunches, drinks, smokes, teas, besides numerous banquets, etcetera, during the whole session, and other rewards of virtue alluded to in M. Poincaré's criticisms hereinbefore cited. The Bloc can always hunt with the hounds and still content the hare when dissatisfied. The party whips can arrange votes to serve both ends.

Hence the government is strong enough, happen what may, short of a revolution or a general strike against the tax gatherer, to stop where they find themselves, hoisted far above the noisy crowd, for three more years if they choose. As to dissensions among the motley blocards, Ministers know they can be stayed at any time by treating them as a huntsman treats a pack of ravenous hounds. There are church properties seized producing $100,000,000 yearly still to be distributed among their yelping supporters. Under the anti-clerical flag all quarrels can be stilled and a solid Bloc formed at any moment. This happy after thought perhaps decided M. Briand *not* yet to introduce, as he suddenly, to general amazement, announced on July 1 he would do at once, an ecclesiastical law No. 5 for distributing immediately those stolen goods under a project the details of which were published officially in that week. It is useless to give them here.

The Masonic family in office, however, have several lugubrious skeletons in their cupboards on which doors cannot be shut. First of all, in that hot-bed of heresy and revolution, the Sunny South, there is the Viticulture agitation, long brewing, inaugurated on May 12 by a meeting at Beziers of 100,000, followed by four others, at Perpignan on the 19th of 180,000, on the 26th at Carcassonne of

250,000, on the 2d of June at Nimes of 300,000, and on June 9th at Montpellier of fully 600,000 manifesters, who decided upon a general strike throughout four departments against all direct taxation and the resignation of their offices by all Mayors and municipalities—about half of which bodies, to the number of over 500, have resigned and adhered to their resignations. Into the economic causes and the practicable remedies for this well founded popular movement this is not the place, nor are the government demagogues and their supporters qualified to deal with such arduous problems, as the parliamentary course followed during the final four weeks of the session conclusively shows. But 50,000 troops are quartered in the large disaffected district, blood has been shed, public edifices have been destroyed, the original leaders are in prison, misery prevails, great costs are accruing to the State, no solution is in view, though civil disorganization reigns in cities and communes. The Southern Deputies are mainly anti-clerical and blocards, so the district reaps what it has always sown.

"It is an ill wind that blows nobody good." From these events resulted a gain for religion in Besse, a commune near Toulon, whose anti-clerical municipality resigning in sympathy with the movement, the Bishop of Fréjus at once raised the interdict with which the parish had been stricken, the offices are again celebrated and the curé has retaken possession of his presbytery. Elsewhere, there being no civil functionaries at closed *mairies,* many marriages have been celebrated in church without previous "civil marriage," as required by law. But for so marrying a lady and gentleman of rank, Mgr. de Beauséjour, Bishop of Carcassonne, had to appear on July 16 before the correctional tribunal in that city and was fined ten dollars.

A respected Catholic tradesman in Perpignan keeps a grocer's shop there and sells petroleum, of course, to all comers for the article. The rioters in that city, who, among other Anarchist exploits, set fire to the prefecture, bought some petroleum for that purpose at Faget's shop. Faget happens to be a Royalist as well as a practicing Catholic, wherefore officialdom tried to discover a plot or to concoct one. Pending any proof Faget and his shop boy were arrested and imprisoned. After spending three weeks in jail, Faget[12] was confronted on July 12 by the Magistrate, M. Mouret, with his accuser, who turned out to be his fellow-prisoner, fifteen years of age. The lad said in open court to the Magistrate: "I declare that you, Mr. Judge, promised to release me very quickly, and that my father was with you at the time, assuring me you would do so if I would say what you would tell me to say."

[12] Still in prison as I write.

Most ungainly Cabinet skeletons are, anti-militarism and its consequent military mutiny. In several regiments there have this summer been serious revolts. The One Hundredth Line, the Second and Seventh Engineers, Twelfth Infantry, Seventeenth Infantry, Eleventh Line, Fifty-eighth Line, Twenty-fourth Colonial, Eighty-sixth Line and Twentieth Dragoons, all in the South, are those concerned. M. Clemenceau stated to the Chamber on June 21: "So soon as it became a question of a military pacification of the South, I learned—but did not know before—that the system (introduced by the late War Minister André) of regional recruiting had produced in the garrisons of the Southern departments a spirit which did not allow discipline to be maintained. The colonels wrote: 'I cannot answer for my men.' The generals said: 'If you send a regiment to replace one here I cannot answer for my men not marching against those who may be sent to replace them!'" The War Minister, Picquart, was as ignorant as the Premier of the state of things!

The worst mutiny was that of nearly half the Seventeenth Infantry stationed at Agde. Four hundred soldiers broke from barracks about midnight on June 20, blew doors and gates open, took from the magazine 200 cartridges each and, bayonets fixed, marched for Beziers (thirteen miles distant), where they arrived at six in the morning of the 21st and were enthusiastically received by enormous crowds of the populace, who supplied them with rations and wine (not given to French troops by the State). Late in the day General Bailloud boldly trusted himself among them, harangued them, urged their return to duty, promised them free pardon if they did submit then and there, obtaining their submission on the spot. Marching back to Agde they were disarmed, ordered off to Gap, court-martialed there and transported with all haste to a naval seaport, whence they were shipped to Gaisa, in Tunis, and will spend the summer in what government assert is "an oasis" in that torrid land, as punishment for their grave mutiny. The inquiry into their motives and so forth began in Gap was continued at Gaisa, where "a certain depression, due to their transportation so far away from home and to the total absence of distractions has succeeded the excitement of the outburst caused by their contact in Agde with a populace at fever heat. They regret their culpable behavior, but were deceived into believing there was to be a general military rising in the Southern region."

Such is the official information published, dated Tunis, July 16. M. Clemenceau refused to ratify General Bailloud's pledge of full pardon. The general before approaching the mutineers telephoned M. Clemenceau, some four hundred miles away, for necessary authority, and received it by telephone, but the Premier denies hold-

ing any such conversation. Who did "speak" through the instrument has not appeared, nor does it much matter. M. Clemenceau had told the Deputies of his party on June 12: "In the One Hundredth Regiment there are officers who go to Mass, who are responsible for the insubordination of their soldiers; an inquiry has been opened upon their attitude!" But insubordination is not confined to the army in the South. From a multitude of places at every point of the compass the public hear of unpleasant incidents. M. Jules Delahaye told the Senate on the 9th of July: "The chief cause of disorder in France is the present Ministry. The example of breach of discipline was given our soldiers by the War Minister. The real culprits are on the ministerial benches."

Prosecutions of twelve anti-militarists out of twenty-one whose names appeared at the foot of placards and posters headed "To Soldiers," that two months previously were widely distributed in street and barrack (though promptly torn down by the police), were conducted in the Paris Assize Court on June 24 and 25. All the prisoners were acquitted. The remaining nine the police could not find.

During the night of April 23, a week prior to the annual May 1 demonstrations, the objectionable poster was placarded by the International Anti-Militarist Association. Among other things it asked "workers in factory or field" whether they would any longer "consent to become defenders of the well-fed portly *bourgeoisie* who take from you freedom to-day and will take the fruit of your labor to-morrow. The prevailing effervescence allows one to suppose that to-morrow may be the day of the Grand Strike, prelude of the Revolution. If that day come, comrades, do not hesitate. Society exists thanks only to you; help us, will you not, to demolish it? Imitating clericals, you will refuse to obey the orders given you; if it must be so, be still more energetic; show by a yet more finished attitude that you know no monitor but conscience for your obedience. Oppressed in barracks to-day, you will be oppressed to-morrow in the factory unless you avail of events to return into the ranks of the revolted and take part with us in fighting parasites and cheats. . . . If called upon to interfere in strikes, comrades, do not hesitate; with your rifles held aloft, break your ranks!"

The twelve prisoners arrested and tried were made up of three printers, two jewelers, two house painters, a blacksmith, a fitter, a cabinetmaker, a waiter, a handy man of a café. All entered the court in the best spirits. Before the trial actually began M. Jacques Bonzou, one of the advocates defending them, rose and asked that Messieurs Clemenceau, Briand and Guyot-Dessaigne (Minister of Justice, and whose coat has been repeatedly turned) should be cited

as witnesses on the grounds that "the accused are prosecuted for a crime of opinion, and it is essential justice should know whether the accusers ever changed or varied their own opinions, or whether they ever themselves propagated the precise theories concerning the attitude of a republican army towards the proletariate that are to-day submitted to the jury." M. Bonzou said he desired to ask these questions:

Of M. Guyot-Dessaigne: "Were you not Attorney General (Procureur) of the Empire? In exercising those functions, how many Republicans did you cause to be condemned by your advocacy?"

Of M. Briand: "Have you not, as lecturer, journalist, barrister, even as Deputy, counselled revolutionary violence, advising the opposing legal violence by arms and inciting soldiers to mutiny when ordered to fire on the people?"

Of M. Clemenceau: "Did you not start in active politics by sharing as Mayor of Montmartre in the events of 1871? (Year of the Commune.) Were you not mixed up with the massacre of the two generals (in the Rue des Rosiers that year)? In 1878 did you not demand amnesty for Blanqui? In 1898 did not you attack the army side by side with Zola?"

Some applause and disturbance in the court, quelled by the police, ensued, and one of the prisoners exclaimed: "Briand and Clemenceau were my teachers. The doctrines I am prosecuted for here I learnt from them. Did they not formerly continually preach violence?"

The demand of their counsel was refused and the trial began. One of the accused, in course of his interrogatory by the Presiding Judge, asked: "Did not M. Clemenceau in his 'Mêlée Sociale' write more violent phrases than our poster contains? A manifesto quite as violent as ours is signed by fifty Deputies of the unified Socialist group. They were not prosecuted. Yet we have spent two months in prison. Is this because all the republican jails are too small for all of our opinions?" The waiter, a lad of nineteen, said during his interrogatory: "The soldiers in the South have set a good example. Those who fired on the crowd are criminals. But the greatest criminals are those who ordered them to fire. It is Clemenceau, Briand and Guyot-Dessaigne who ought to be guillotined."

M. Albert Willm, one of the defending advocates, urged and read a letter of M. Briand *as Minister* protesting against prosecuting the signatories (not of this but) of the first anti-militarist appeal, and another advocate, M. Chesné, read newspaper articles by Clemenceau as journalist, contradictory of the acts of Clemenceau Minister. M. Bonzou in a final summary of the defense congratulated the Magistrature on having taken down from the prætorium the image of

Christ, "for it beheld too rascally procedures" there!

The jury had twenty-four questions submitted to them, and in forty-five minutes returned with a negative to all. The acquittal was received with applause from friends and relatives of the accused in court and with cries of "Vive the Red Flag!" The verdict may seem strange, so shortly following the mutinies at Béziers, Avignon, Agde and Lurzac,[13] and it astonished the legal world in the Palace of Justice, where, by nearly every barrister, a severe sentence was anticipated. But says a competent critic and auditor: "The jury by acquitting the disciples condemned their masters. The verdict is a stinger in the face for masters in socialism and anti-militarism, MM. Briand and Clemenceau, whose articles and speeches read to the jurors contained tenfold what the incriminated poster (that was immediately torn down) contained, bearing the signatures of their twelve feeble followers, prosecuted for pale reflections of teachings by "arrived Ministers of State."

J. F. Boyd.

Plymouth, England.

[13] On July 17, in the Twenty-fourth Colonial Regiment, quartered at Perpignan, a serious mutiny of three hundred soldiers led to their breaking out of the caserne and atacking civilians in the street, with whom they had quarrelled, with fixed bayonets, according to the *Temps* correspondent, though the official version minimizes the occurrence into a small soldiers' row.

A RECENT INDICTMENT OF IRISH ECCLESIASTICAL POLICY.

NOTWITHSTANDING the force and vitality of Burke's law, that "You cannot frame an indictment against a whole nation," the number of writers in the public press who attempt such a task is legion. Indiscriminate generalization is, indeed, the besetting sin of this period of restless typewriting activity. International hatred, interstate antipathy, class animosity, commercial rabies are all being sedulously nourished all over the civilized globe by the propagation of the deadly poison of the half-truth and the attribution of special wrong to whole communities, the class being held accountable for the sin of the individual. This is one of the most depressing symptoms of our age. We have only to look at the columns of the daily press to become aware of the mischievous effects of generalizing. Strikes and boycotts, frightful crimes of violence often being the deadly accompaniment, abound. The name of the capitalist enrages the labor union; the labor union is regarded by the capitalist as far more deadly in its influence than the upas tree. It is a reading age—at least more newspapers are

read now than ever before—and this fact does not bring the enlightenment that would abate class animosities, but rather adds to the inflammatory condition, since newspapers are printed rather to sell than to propagate a love of the verities of human existence.

It is an old form of iniquity. The Carthaginians were perfidious, in Roman eyes, hence they should be eliminated from a social system which would poison a Hannibal and starve a Jugurtha in a dark hole. The Greeks are liars; the Franks are foresworn, argued the followers of Mahomet, as an excuse for sweeping Greek and Frank from power and existence. When Henry II. sought for an excuse to seize the territory and government of Ireland he employed the Welshman Giraldus to report upon the character of the people and to use the half-truth method in the cunning task. Nothing could be more successful. The Irish at large were painted as a half-civilized people relapsing into barbarism. After having been for some centuries the light of the world, this was the very irony of cruel fate; and it was completely successful. But the race of Giraldus still flourishes, after the lapse of nigh eight centuries—and, to make it worse, they rank not as Welshmen, but as Irishmen.

One signing himself "A Catholic Irishman" recently was accorded nearly two columns of space in the New York *Evening Post* for a powerful arraignment of the Catholic population of Ireland, episcopal, clerical and lay. Clericalism he blamed, to put it briefly, for the whole unhappy condition of Ireland in the past—*i. e.*, since the "Reformation" period—as well as in the present. The bill of indictment was framed without the least qualification. Mr. Darrow, summing up the case for the defense in the Western Miners' cases, was not a whit more severe than this "Catholic Irishman" in his fulminations against the Irish Bishops and clergy and his contempt for the flocks whom, according to him, they drive to their ruin. Now, the *Evening Post* is a paper of high standing—not quite so high now, perhaps, as when Mr. Lawrence E. Godkin was editor; therefore the unexpected attack may work some mischief by reason of the prejudice it cannot fail to inflame. Had Mr. Godkin been alive, it is safe to say that the letter would not have found a place, or else, if it did, that some of its propositions would not have been suffered to pass unchallenged, since the editor had a good knowledge of the state of affairs in Ireland, and since his father, the Rev. W. Godkin, an Episcopal clergyman, had been one of the commissioners selected to wind up the fiscal affairs of the Irish Disestablished Church—an institution for whose destruction the Irish Catholic Bishops and clergy are held responsible by the correspondent of the *Evening Post*. The Rev. M. Godkin knew well how utterly ridiculous and unfounded was such a charge, since, having been for many years

the Dublin correspondent of the London *Times*, he was intimately acquainted with everything that transpired in Irish national affairs during his period. He knew well that ever since the "battle of Carrickshock" and the passage of the Tithes Relief Act there had been no agitation whatever against the Irish Protestant Church, or the Irish branch of the Established Church, as it was officially known, because there was an end of the system of levying on farmers' stock and shopkeepers' stores for tithes and "ministers' money," since the responsibility for these taxes had been transferred to the landlords. These quietly added it to the tenants' rent, thereby avoiding odium and turmoil and enabling the Protestant clergy to pretend that there was no longer any tithe grievance to sustain the hostility of the Irish people to the "Establishment."

For the purposes of the writer's argument, it was necessary to show that there was really no grievance to the Irish Catholics in the maintenance of a Protestant Establishment—no substantial grievance, that is; only a sentimental one—in a country almost wholly Catholic. But in a country like this, where there is no difficulty about moving a house or even a church fabric bodily from one locality to another, such a literary feat as this line of argument demanded was a mere bagatelle. A little boldness in preliminary statement was nearly all that the enterprise required. The half-truth, like the cantilever principle, was serviceable to bridge the big gap between fact and fancy. So the writer wrote these sentences:

"The Irish Protestants being in a minority, of course their church was 'the church of a minority.' Like the lay holders of land in Ireland, the clerical holders traced back their endowments to the seizures of property which marked the politico-religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This was enough for a cry that the church of the minority must be disendowed, and about thirty million of dollars were accordingly scooped up by the English Treasury in order to benefit Ireland. It so happened that the property of the Protestant Church had never been taken from the Irish at all, but was almost exclusively composed of the fat abbeys and prebends erected by the English Catholic Kings on the necks of the Irish clans during the four-century domination of Roman London over Celtic Ireland. But this little fact was never mentioned by the priestly orators of Maynooth and the priestly parliamentarians of Westminster."

This is certainly heroic treatment of an awkward historical dilemma. For whether it was by English Kings or by Irish Kings that the churches in Ireland were built, it was certainly the Irish clans who furnished the ground and the materials and at least the unskilled labor. Every principal ecclesiastical edifice in Ireland was

built before the coming of the English. We have yet to learn what English Catholic King built a cathedral in Ireland. Those in Dublin, Armagh, Cork, Limerick, Cashel and other cities were centuries old before Cambrensis was sent over to make out his fantastic report. O'Neills and O'Donnells in the North and O'Briens in the South had erected most of the great ecclesiastical buildings either prior to or during the English invasion. The Protestants seized the best of these in the time of the Tudor tyrants. The cathedral churches founded in the sixth century by the Irish Kings Laogare, Oiliol-Molt and Lugha VII., and which existed down to the time of the Abbé McGeoghegan, were Ardmach (or Armagh), Ossory, Emly, Ardagh, Elphin, Killala, Clogher, Kildare, Down and Connor. Subsequently there were built the cathedrals of Cork (St. Finn Barr's), Limerick, Cashel, Sligo, Tuam, Thurles, Ferns, St. Patrick's, Dublin; the Holy Trinity, or Christ Church, Dublin; Cloyne, Clones, Kilkenny—to enumerate only the principal ones. Many splendid abbeys, priories and conventual establishments were also founded in Ireland centuries before the English made their appearance, by pious Irish Kings and chieftians. A diligent search through Irish history fails to show any great cathedrals, abbeys or monasteries which were the foundation of English Catholic Kings, as asserted by the "Catholic Irishman." Even in Dublin, the seat of English government, the two cathedrals, St. Patrick's and Christ Church (otherwise called the Cathedral of the Holy Trinity) were erected originally respectively, by the saint whose name it bears, by the help of the native princes and people whom he baptized there, and by a Danish prince who ruled in Dublin during the period of Danish occupation in Leinster. The cathedral of Emly was founded, even before St. Patrick's advent, by one of his predecessors, St. Ailbe; and that of Cork by one of his disciples, St. Finn Barr, who brought Christianity to the natives of the Southern capital and the surrounding territory of the McCarty clans. The cathedral of Cashel was founded by the monarch, Aongus, whom Ailbe converted and baptized in the place adjacent to the famous rock called Gowlinvale (corrupted into Golden Vale). The primatial diocese of Ardmach was the first in which Patrick began the erection of a cathedral; and the last was probably the diocese of Dercon, in the country of the Dalréida. The old historians declare that during his apostolate in Ireland he built, or caused to be built, three hundred and sixty-five churches. The ground for these was given freely by the owners of the soil. The first mention of a religious foundation by an Englishman in Ireland was that of the Priory of Kilmainham for the Knights Templars, by Richard Strongbow, Earl of Pembroke. A few years later the Monastery of Thomascourt, in Cork, was founded by the

first English viceroy, William Fitz-Adelm. Hugh de Lacey, the succeeding viceroy, founded two small chapels or priories for the Augustinians in the County Louth. The ruffian nobleman, John de Courey, founded several other houses for the same order—for, like most of the robber nobles of his time, he alternated fits of piety with fits of ferocious savagery; and Hervey de Monte Morisco (or Montmorris), in order to expiate the crimes of pillaging other churches in Ireland, in the course of his career of conquest, or robbery, founded the Abbey of Dunbrody, in Wexford. Philip de Wigorne, another viceroy, founded a priory for Benedictines in Tipperary after he had plundered the clergy of Armagh! The young prince John, in the midst of his debaucheries and petty guerillas in Ireland, found leisure to give another example of this peculiar versatility by building the priory of St. John the Evangelist, for Benedictines, at Waterford. A few other religious houses were founded by the English invaders; also the abbey of Little Tinterne, in Wexford, by William Marshall, Earl of Pembroke; the abbey of the River of God, Westmeath, was founded by the Daltons, and a priory for Augustinians at Tristernach, in the same county, by Geoffry de Constantin; the priory of SS. Peter and Paul in Wexford, founded by the Roches of Fermoy, also for Augustinians, and the priory of St. John the Baptist at Naas, County Kildare, founded by the English lord of the soil. The Roches of Fermoy also founded the abbey called "De Castro Dei," in County Cork, and Richard and Adam De Hereford founded the priory called the "Scala Cœli," in County Kildare; in the same county Miles Fitzhenry founded a priory, and Thomas, the seneschal of Leinster, founded another in County Kilkenny. Near Finn, in County Meath, Simon Rochford, Bishop of Meath, founded a priory. These priories were all for members of the Augustinian order. There were abbeys for Cistercians also at Owny, in County Limerick; at Douske, in County Kilkenny, and at Beaubec, in Meath—founded respectively by Theobald Fitzwalter, founder of the Butler family; William Marshall, Earl of Pembroke, and Walter De Lacey. Richard Tuite, lord of Granard, founded an abbey for Bernardins of Clairvaux, near Granard, and Danish settlers founded the priory of St. Catherine, in the neighborhood of Waterford city. About the thirteenth century the Dominicans and the Franciscans came to help the Augustinians and the Cistercians in the religious work in Ireland. The Talbots, the Prendergasts, the Fitzmaurices, the Barrys, the Graces, the Walshes, the Butlers, the Dillons, the De Burgos and other Anglo-Norman settlers, founded many religious houses at a later period of the same epoch; but side by side with the names of these foreign founders we find those of the old Irish lords of the soil, the McCartys, the O'Reillys, the O'Briens, the O'Kennedys, the

O'Donnells, the O'Neills, the O'Flaherty's, the O'Haras, the MacNamaras all through the period of activity in religious settlement in Ireland prior to the Tudor *régime*. It was about this period that the Carmelites went to take part in the religious work of the country, and the Butlers and Dillons erected several houses for their accommodation. But a diligent search into the genesis of all these foundations fails to show that English settlers were more conspicuous for their liberality (at the expense of the Irish people) than the Irish lords of the soil of that period proved themselves to have been, or that they had any claim whatever to place against that of the Irish founders, whose zeal in erecting edifices for the worship of God and the training of students for the divine service had been constantly manifested during the six centuries previous to the Anglo-Norman invasion. There is not one syllable in Irish history to justify the belief that English Catholic Kings erected cathedrals in Ireland at any time. But there is plenty of evidence to show that the agents and dependents of such Kings frequently pillaged, burnt down and destroyed such cathedrals—as in the cases of Armagh and Cashel notably—and left the people to repair the injury as best they could.

So much for the false assertion that the Catholic Kings of England had founded fat abbeys and prebends on the necks of the Irish clans. As for the accompanying pretense that the real property of the Protestant Church had never been taken from the people of Ireland, it ought to be sufficient to ask where, if such were really the case, did that property come from? That property, when capitalized, sufficed to pay lump sum commutations or annual stipends to between three and four thousand rectors, incumbents and curates—many of whom performed the manœuvre popularly described as "commuting, compounding and cutting"—that is, taking flight to England or some other place where living was inexpensive and amusement cheap. After paying off this army of claimants in full, the capitalized wealth of this innocent ecclesiastical importation afforded a surplus of twelve or thirteen million pounds, which Mr. Gladstone got put safely away in order to meet future distress in Ireland, or other "national emergency," as he declared. A large portion of this surplus still remains in the English treasury, after various grants in relief of distress, fishery grants and other bonuses, have been, from time to time, paid out of it. So that from its ability to meet all these demands, the huge amount of value which the original fund represented may be vaguely estimated. Every iota of this had been forcibly plundered from the Irish Catholic chiefs and people—for the chief and the people held the land as the tribe or clan, under the old Brehon law. Hence the attempt to show that the Established Church in Ireland represented no wrong inflicted

upon the Catholics of Ireland is certainly bold. But there is more still. As a consequence of Disestablishment, the writer says:

"Hundreds of Protestant ecclesiastical families, all resident employers of labor and consumers of local commodities, had to quit Ireland. Hundreds of places of Protestant worship were closed. Thousands of Irish Protestant families, deprived of the facilities for the exercise of their religion, tended every day to follow their pastors. Thousands of Irish Catholic employés of all kinds wandered to America for want of employment in their own land. That no element of grim jocosity should be wanting, while the clerical party were 'saving' these thirty million dollars of ecclesiastical funds as above mentioned, Ireland was being overtaxed by the Westminster Parliament to the tune of fifteen million dollars a year, as has been formally admitted by a committee of the House of Commons! That is to say, every pair of years, the English Government took out of Ireland the full equivalent of all that was stolen from the Irish Protestant Church under the lying pretense of an imaginary restitution."

It is difficult to believe that the foregoing was intended as serious writing, or, if so, that the writer possessed any reliable knowledge of the subject which he had in hand. There was no exodus of Protestant families on such a scale as he pictures, nor any such wholesale shutting up of churches. What really took place was something very different. Prior to the passing of the Act of Disestablishment a commission had gone into the question of plural holdings and superfluous churches, and found many glaring abuses. It found that in a large number of cases rectors had been charging the State—that is, the Irish taxpayers—for the services of curates for "chapels of ease," whereas they themselves performed the duties which these curates were supposed to perform, and drew the double salary, the curate being usually, or at least very frequently, a myth. Many of the "chapels of ease" had no need of the services of a curate, inasmuch as the "congregation" was limited to the verger or bell ringer and family, as in the case of the Dean of St. Patrick's and his "dearly beloved Roger." As soon as the fact that the government really intended to act on the report was made known, the pluralists took steps to man the depleted ranks of the Church. They advertised in the *Daily Express* and other "loyal" Protestant organs for clerical help, and they induced the Dublin University authorities (it was generally believed) to permit such modifications in the divinity examinations as would enable them to rush through a sufficient number of students to fill the gaps still left. When the battalions were complete the State was asked to pay for the whole corps. A large number of the new arrivals took advantage of the

golden opportunity, and summarily "commuted, compounded and cut;" so glaringly eager to do so that even some of the organs of dethroned Ascendency held them up to ridicule and denounced the operation which led up to the exodus as a public scandal.

But these exhibitions of fiscal wisdom were not by any means the only incidents that lent to Disestablishment the lightening touch of judicial comedy. In several instances the holders of benefices who claimed "compensation for disturbance" were placed in an awkward predicament. They held their benefices on false pretenses. A striking case in point was that of the obsolete Church of St. Nicholas Within, in Dublin. This church was founded as the result of a bequest made by a pious merchant, the condition being that one day in every year a Mass be celebrated for his spiritual benefit, after his demise. The holder of this benefice, at the time of Disestablishment, was the Rev. Tresham Dames Gregg, an aggressive polemical divine and writer. The church had long fallen into desuetude and disrepair. It had no congregation and no roof—only a portion of one sufficient to shelter the Rev. Mr. Gregg when he went through a sort of service one day in each year, in order to entitle him to draw his salary as minister. That service he did not attempt to show to be the Mass, as stipulated in the bequest, nor any sort of prayer for the testator's soul, but something that seemed to satisfy the Rev. Mr. Gregg's conscience as beneficiary. He contrived to have a couple of persons present as witnesses. For this ludicrous travesty of fulfillment he drew the handsome salary of four hundred pounds a year, and on this he claimed capitalization. The claim aroused some caustic and irreverent comment, but some substantial recognition was given it. Memory now fails to recall to what amount, but it was no trifle. The benefice of St. Audoen's Church, also in Dublin, was of similar foundation, but the edifice had a congregation and is still in practical use. What the incumbent did, as a substitute for the stipulated religious service was not very clearly explained.

In an obscure by-way of old Dublin, called Ormond Gate, may be found a memorial of the means employed in old times to implement defective title, in like cases. The original name of the place was Gormund's Gate. It had, by process of looseness in pronunciation, become transformed into Ormond Gate. Gormund was a mythical personage, invented by a resourceful lawyer of Elizabeth's time, to make good her claim to the confiscated estates of Shane O'Neill, Gormund being represented as a common ancestor of the Tudors and the O'Neills, a prince who had plenty of lands at his disposal. There never existed any such personage. But the myth answered all the purposes for which it was invented, and Elizabeth got the title she needed. So with the gentlemen who claimed compensation for the

curtailment of services which they had never rendered, and never could render, by reason of their creed pronouncing such services to be "damnable and idolatrous," and therefore illegal as a matter of course.

It is in the last degree unjust to the Irish hierarchy and clergy of that time to lay the responsibility for the obliteration of the State Church at their doors. They wanted nothing but the right of the people to live in peace, and since the tithe wars were terminated by the intervention of Parliament, this desideratum was an accomplished fact. Catholic and Protestant lived everywhere, save in Ulster, on the most amicable terms, the best of friends and neighbors in very many places. When Mr. Gladstone began his agitation for Disestablishment he sprang a surprise upon the whole of the people, Irish as well as British. The daring of the Fenian leaders, and the widespread disaffection in Ireland as a consequence of their propaganda, had thoroughly alarmed him. He began to seek for the causes of the discontent and disloyalty, and he looked in the wrong direction. The Irish sought for independence, but this palpable aim and object he either did not see or pretended not to see. He thought by removing grievances he might succeed in allaying discontent. The inquiry into the position of the Established Church which preceded formal legislative action was begun by Sir John Gray, a Protestant, proprietor of the leading Irish Liberal newspaper. Neither the Irish Bishops nor the Irish people asked for Disestablishment. Mr. Gladstone began it of his own volition. What the Bishops asked for most insistently—namely, facilities for the higher education of their people—he refused to give; what the people asked for, to the point of armed insurrection—namely, the restoration of their native Parliament—he at the same time ignored. When the Church was swept away the Protestants proved how dependent was their loyalty on material advantage by forming a Home Rule Union and inviting the Catholics to join them in seeking for a restoration of the right stolen from them by Parliament. Mr. Gladstone, years afterwards, in explaining in Parliament his reasons for introducing his famous Home Rule Bill, laid the responsibility for the rape of the Irish Legislature on the shoulders of William Pitt squarely and unequivocally. Now, here comes this anonymous "Catholic Irishman" denying that imputation by the Prime Minister who was the best-read historian of his day and who had all the State papers relating to the transaction ready to his hand. He puts the charge in the form of an inverted syllogism, thus:

"The Catholics passed the Act of Union."

This is the conclusion; then come the premises:

"In the first place, the whole of the present dependence of Ireland

upon England, the whole of its reduction to provincialism under the heel of Unionism, was the work, not of the Irish Protestants, but of the Irish Catholics, headed by their venerable Archbishops and Bishops, all in a row. The Irish Protestants, in fact, formed the patriot party, who never could have been overthrown by the corruption or the menaces of Pitt and Castlereagh, but for the 120,000 Catholic electors, recently enfranchised by the Irish Protestant Parliament, who followed like sheep their venerable pastors to vote for the destruction of the Irish Legislature. There is no longer an historical secret about the motives which led Archbishop Troy and Archbishop O'Reilly, and their four and twenty mitred coadjutors, to do the work of Mr. Pitt. It was as notorious that there was a market for venerable prelates in Upper Castle Yard as that there was a market for fat farm stock at Ballinasloe."

This neat capsule of historical medicine, made to be swallowed without a question by the unprepared reader, depends for its efficacy altogether upon the capsule covering. If any one be curious enough to go behind that and examine the component ingredients thus conveniently lumped, he will discover that Protestant authorities alone may be relied on to confute the audacious indictment. To begin with one of the most eminent—Sir Jonah Barrington. He was a member of the Irish Parliament for many years, and voted against the government when the question of union was first broached as well as when it was carried. He knew every man who voted for it, and the golden arguments that had converted him to the views of Castlereagh. He knew also all the loyal antagonists of the mournful scheme. He was familiar with what passed in Parliament, before the public eye, as well as with everything that transpired among the gossipers at the club houses and in the drawing rooms of Dublin society. In his invaluable work on "The Rise and Fall of the Irish Nation," he lays the blame, primarily, for the destruction of the Irish Parliament on Henry Grattan. Of course, he holds Grattan in intention blameless, but his action, in withdrawing from Parliament because of his quarrels with his rival Flood, he considers to have been the beginning of the process of destruction. These quarrels resulted in a conflict between the Volunteers and the Irish Parliament; the government in London was delighted with the turn things had taken, and fomented and encouraged the break by every vile art of the rich and unscrupulous debaucher of conscience and honor. Pitt laid his plans deeply. He would never again permit the formation of an armed force that could defy England's usurped authority in Ireland; the plan for the dispersion of the Volunteers was laid simultaneously with one for the fomenting of an insurrection of the unarmed and untrained peasantry as an excuse for thrusting on the country the

overwhelming armed forces of the British Crown. Referring to the withdrawal of Grattan and Curran from Parliament, in the belief that Parliament had then become powerless to resist English force and fraud, Barrington observes that: "Never was any step more indiscreet, more ill-timed, or to themselves more injurious; that the cause of Ireland should lose two such advocates, at the very moment she most required them, was truly unfortunate. Mr. Grattan returned to Parliament when too late; Mr. Curran never; and his fine talents were lost to himself and his country forever."

As for the Machiavellian plan conceived by Mr. Pitt, Barrington summarizes in one crisp passage the leading features of the scheme and the methods employed by the arch-conspirator to insure its success. The country, under the Viceroyalty of Lord Westmoreland, had been for some years at peace. This did not suit the game of Pitt; so he sent emissaries from Dublin to Ulster to inaugurate a war of religion by starting the Orange Society. Then he allowed the formation of the Society of United Irishmen and the free passage of agents of the French Revolution, or men pledged to its principles throughout the country. Barrington says:

"His (Westmoreland's) recall, and the appointment and deposition of Lord Fitzwilliam, his successor, within three months, completed the train which Mr. Pitt had laid for the explosion. Having divided the country and obtained the means of packing the (Irish) Parliament through the Place Bill, he suffered some men to disseminate the French revolutionary mania; and . . . encouraged others to raise their loyalty into the region of madness."

By the simple artifice of bracketing the clergy and laity of Ireland together under the common term "Clericals," the anonymous assailant of both as traitors to their country produces, or seeks to produce, the impression that they invariably coöperated in policy and means of effecting political or religious ends. It is a transparent trick. An equal patriotism has warmed clergy and laity in Ireland, from the days of Columbkille down to this present time. But they each see their duty differently. The Bishops and clergy have the heavy responsibility of guarding their flocks from their two deadly enemies —crime and English provocation to crime. They beheld then the working of the fearful double-action engine of the plotting Minister. They saw their flocks being goaded into rebellion by means of the cruelty of the Orange yeomanry. They beheld the skies lit up with the glare of burning chapels and cottages, night after night, and thousands of people driven from their homes by Peep o'Day Boys, Hearts of Steel Boys and other anti-Catholic secret organizations. They knew, on the other hand, that the agents of the revolutionary movement were moving amongst the peasantry, getting them to

enroll themselves in the unarmed army and playing the game of the arch-enemies of their religion and their nationality. Were they to behold these infamies and remain supine under the awful knowledge? If they did they would be false indeed to God and country.

With the cold-blooded malice of the primeval serpent the government, while the storm of horrors it had let loose raged over the country, had its agents moving among the hierarchy and clergy showing how it was in their power to mitigate so fearful a situation, or prevent a recurrence of it, by using all their influence in favor of the mooted project of a Parliamentary Union. Promises of a measure of Catholic emancipation were made without qualification by the secret emissaries; the same promises were implied in the public speech made by Mr. Pitt in Parliament when introducing the ominous measure. But if some Irish prelates were impelled by the horror of the situation in their country and the prospect of a removal of the causes of bloodshed in the future, will that fact justify any conscientious writer in charging them with venality?

Barrington gives the names of all the representatives who were bribed to sell their country in his Black List. There is not a Catholic name in that list, because no Catholic sat, or could sit, in the Parliament which was solicited to betray the country.

It is a base charge that the Irish prelates sought a market or had a market in Dublin Castle. It is a fact that Lord Cornwallis offered them, through Dr. Troy, Catholic emancipation if they coöperated for the restoration of peace in Ireland. The text of the document is reproduced in John Mitchel's "History of Ireland." But at that time of bloodshed and horror, when men, wild with fear for the fate of the whole population, or maddened with daily outrages that might well excuse a saint for taking up a sword, what influence could any one prelate or priest hope to exert for peace beyond the limits of his own immediate locality? Until the measures which Lord Cornwallis was deputed to carry out had done their work—until the Rebellion was crushed in blood, that is to say—the words of the peacemaker must fall on heedless ears.

But if the Irish Bishops and clergy of that day, acting without any prompting or promises of Viceroy or Prime Minister, did take action to preserve the people from destruction, would not the circumstances have fully justified them? The horrors of the French Revolution were fresh in the public mind. Could they look calmly on the prospect of a repetition of such horrors on Irish soil? They were the official representatives of the Church whose altars were turned to stages for lewdness, whose temples were profaned by bacchanal orgies, whose priests and holy women were driven as sheep to the shambles. Mr. Pitt's French revolutionary agents were lead-

ing up to the preparation for such an orgie, while his Orange auxiliaries were making a recourse to such agents and their programme the only hope of the desperate Catholic peasantry. Truly no shepherds were ever placed in so direful a dilemma—or flock in such pitiable strait. Neither Barrington nor Mitchel—leaving out of sight such rabid historians as Musgrave and Maxwell—is qualified to pass judgment on the action of the Irish hierarchy and clergy at the heartrending hour of a nation's agony. It would take a judgment and a pen like Sienkiwicz's to convey a comparative idea of the working of that "impression of horror" which the earlier English generals were sent over to create by the savagery of their troops, and Cornwallis to utilize before allaying, as the great means to Pitt's great end.

On this subject volumes might easily be written, but this is neither the place nor the time for extended disquisition. It is enough to say that the pastors of the Irish people acted for the best. If they were deceived—as indeed they were—by English Ministers and Viceroys, theirs is not the blame. Let us now turn to the charge of traitorism in so far as it applies to the Catholic laity. Mr. Goldwin Smith is the only historian of weight that has undertaken to show that the Irish Catholic population was, as a whole, indifferent about the efforts to abolish the Irish Parliament and substitute the discarded rule of a British one. He asserts it, but seems to think his assertion to be sufficient. This is not the case by any means. We have the testimony of contemporaries and eye-witnesses of what really occurred, to refute his assertions.

In the first place, the people of Dublin, Protestants as well as Catholics, took the keenest interest in the debates which followed the development of the Union plot. They assembled in the streets leading to the Houses of Parliament, night after night, and by their cheers or their groans and hisses manifested their sentiments as the various champions of the Irish or English side passed into or out of the porticos. They burned Clare and Castlereagh in effigy on side streets. They attacked Clare's carriage and would have hanged him to a lamp-post, as he drove home one night, were it not for the timely arrival of troops. Armed soldiers kept them at bay, all through the closing days and nights of the struggle. The mob was with difficulty kept from storming the Chambers, at one period. At length, to drive terror into the people's breasts, the military authorities ordered a massacre—for martial law was still the rule—in the streets of Dublin. This was done during the closing hours of the great struggle. Without an instant's warning, troops were ordered out from the old Custom House. They took their stand on Essex bridge, and fired straight into the crowds assembled in Capel street,

killing many innocent and helpless people, including women and children.

In the provinces a similar system of terrorism was resorted to to prevent the circulation of petitions against the Union among Catholics. Sir Lawrence Parsons, member for Birr, told in Parliament how the freeholders and inhabitants of the locality had been prevented from holding a meeting to protest against the proposed Union by the military commander of the district, Major Rogers, who actually sent out a force with artillery to fire on the protesters if they dared to assemble. Many similar acts of terrorism are testified to by Barrington. In the metropolis itself the audacious game of intimidation was tried, but the effort was abandoned, on second thought, by Lord Clare, as being a little too daring a stretch of military despotism, with Parliament sitting in the very same street—for the place of meeting was the Royal Exchange, which is only a few hundred yards distant from "the old House on College-green." The opposition to Union was intense. Those who composed it were the substantial trading class, the artisan class, both Catholic and Protestant, and a very large proportion of the professional classes. The meeting was, on sober thought, allowed to take place, and the leading spokesman at it was Daniel O'Connell, a young barrister who was afterwards to play a great part in the effort to undo the evil of the shameful transaction against which he then lifted up a potent voice. His speech on that occasion seems happily anticipatory of some such calumnies as those now flung out by the anonymous calumniator in the *Evening Post*. A few sentences from that remarkable fore-answer will give one an idea of its apposite force and point. The distinguished speaker said, inter alia:

"Every Union pamphlet, every Union speech imprudently put forth the Catholic name as sanctioning a measure which would annihilate the name of the country, and there was none to refute the calumny. In the speeches and pamphlets of Anti-Unionists, it was rather admitted than denied, and, at length, the Catholics themselves were obliged to break through a resolution which they had formed, in order to guard against misrepresentation, for the purpose of repelling this worst of misrepresentations. To refute a calumny directed against them, as a sect, they were obliged to come forward as a sect, and in the face of their country to disavow the base conduct imputed to them and to declare that the assertion of their being favorably inclined to the measure of a legislative incorporation with Great Britain was a slander the most vile; a libel the most false, scandalous and wicked,that ever was directed against the character of an individual or a people. It is my sentiment, and I am satisfied it is the sentiment not only of every gentleman who now hears me,

but of the Catholic people of Ireland, that if our opposition to this injurious, insulting and hated measure of Union were to draw upon us the revival of the Penal Laws, we would boldly meet a proscription and oppression which would be the testimonies of our virtue, and sooner throw ourselves once more on the mercy of our Protestant brethren than give our assent to the political murder of our country; yes, I know—I do know, that although exclusive advantages *may be ambiguously held forth to the Irish Catholic,* to seduce him from the sacred duty which he owes his country; I know that the Catholics of Ireland still remember that they have a country, and that they will never accept of any advantages as a *sect* which would debase and destroy them as a *people.*"

It is sufficient to add that while the petitions in favor of the Union were signed by nearly every felon in the Irish jails, on promise of pardon, every means to prevent petitions against it were used by the terrorizing government. But all this industry was futile. It is believed that the signatures *contra* ran up to over a million, while the numbers on the Union side were comparatively few. However, it is, at this period, not easy to get at the true facts on this point. But in O'Connell's speeches on Repeal the numbers in opposition, despite the pressure exerted to keep them low, was a point frequently emphasized. The broad fact stands out that the "Catholics" did not contrive or assent to the Union. The action of a few individuals is not a condemnation of the general body.

Another national crime charged against the Irish "Clericals" by this anonymous accuser is the destruction of Ireland's agriculture. It is put in this form:

"This was done by O'Connell's alliance with the English free-traders, who, for purposes of their own, wanted the free import of foreign corn. In spite of the opposition of the Irish landlords to a measure which must turn the corn lands of Ireland into ranches for sheep and bullocks, but who were unable to oppose O'Connellism since the disfranchisement of the rural democracy, the free import of corn was voted by triumphant majorities of English Whigs and Irish Clericals, and the venerable prelates in this manner presented a universal notice to quit against four-fifths of the farmers of Ireland."

It is straining an argument, surely, to hold any political leader responsible for all the effects of the policies for which he struggles. O'Connell was no prophet; he could not possibly have foreseen the effects that either the policy of Free Trade or the reduction of the elective franchise in Ireland would be likely to produce on the agricultural or political condition of the country in after years. Free Trade was a fiercely debated economical novelty in Great Britain—

none ever more fiercely. The lowering of the franchise was an experiment, indulged in for the purpose of achieving certain results in the way of giving the Liberator a number of followers upon whom he could depend to help him in carrying out his programme of Irish reform, civil and religious. It ought not to be forgotten that it was not very far back in history that the Irish Volunteers demanded Free Trade, with the notice of the demand suspended significantly from the muzzles of cannon on College-green. The agricultural resources of the American Continent were at that time little dreamed of, either by Irishmen or Englishmen. The competition of an immense country, where rent is practically unknown, with one where rack-rents were the rule, could never have been thought possible at the time when the debates over Free Trade and Catholic Emancipation were strenuous. We can all be very wise after the event. It was that competition that cut down rents in Ireland and started so many millions to cross the ocean and brought on the Land League and the Land Courts and all the machinery, in popular organization and legal procedure, which has been set in motion during the past thirty years in Ireland. Neither Bishops, nor clergy, nor laity, as Catholics, have had anything to do with these results; they were but helpless participants in a mighty economic movement as silent and as irresistible as that of a glacier.

But there is one fact that cannot be lost sight of, in the review of the many conflicting circumstances that brought about the downfall of the Irish Parliament. This fact is that it was not so much a religious antagonism that insured its ruin as a commercial policy. It was that cry of Ireland, "Free Trade, or else—" that aroused Pitt. The Irish Protestant Parliament had taken advantage of Britain's weakness to enforce a show of fair play for Irish indutries, after the laborious efforts of the English traders, with the help of William of Orange, to crush them out of existence. England's impudent claim to be the "predominant partner" had been successfully resisted, and England's supremacy in Irish trade legislation was at stake when the Volunteers came forward with the demand for Free Trade spoken by adamantine lips. It was a case of neck or nothing with the greedy predominant party, as it has ever since been down to the forcing of the war on the Transvaal.

Although O'Connell at one time protested, in his own characteristic way, against the *Times* italicizing some passages in his addresses, saying that he "did not speak in italics," John Mitchell disregarded the objection in reproducing the speech from which the extracts we have quoted are taken. Had O'Connell thought that italics would be employed, he doubtless would have been more careful to distinguish between "a sect" and a portion of the one true Church Universal.

But in the swift current of oratorical passion the most circumspect are sometimes hurried past their usual mental landmarks and lay themselves open to the charge of inconsistency in the use of definitive terms. There was soon to arise a controversy which was to prove that O'Connell was as keen on the claims of the Church to be more than a sect as he was on the bounds that were to be set on those claims when the national and ordinal rights of the Irish hierarchy, and the national and civic rights of the Irish laity were at stake. This controversy was the famous one known as that of the Veto. Those cavillers who, judging the attitude of the Irish Bishops toward foreign domination by the isolated action of a few prelates and peers during the insurrectional troubles, pronounce them to be habitually false to their country's national claims, must be covered with confusion when they discover how determined was the resistance of another generation of prelates, priests and laity to not merely the arrogant pretensions of England, but even the wishes of the Pope himself, acting through his representative, who sought to gain the friendship of the British Government by sacrificing the rights of the Irish priesthood in the selection of their Bishops.

A prisoner of Napoleon's, Pope Pius VII. was compelled to intrust the conduct of the most important business of the Church to the management of a representative, Monsignor Quarantotti. This dignitary undertook negotiations with the British Government, whereby in return for certain concessions to the Papacy the privilege of veto in the selection of Irish Bishops was to be accorded the British monarch. The idea originated, it may be thought, with Lord Castlereagh, who proposed it, as a condition of Catholic emancipation to the board of Maynooth College, composed of ten of the Irish prelates, including the Primates of Armagh and Dublin, Drs. O'Reilly and Troy. But the proposal was scouted by the majority of the Bishops at a meeting in National Synod, nine years later, in plain and unmistakable resolutions to the effect that "the Roman Catholic prelates pledge themselves to adhere to the rules by which they have hitherto been uniformly guided" in relation to the election of Bishops. These resolutions were signed by twenty-three of the Bishops, and dissented from by three others who had been assenting parties at the Maynooth Board meeting in 1799. Edmund Burke, a Protestant, was strongly opposed to the concession of the veto; so was Daniel O'Connell. The struggle over the question continued for several years, but in the end the determination of clergy and laity prevailed, and Monsignor Quarantotti retired from the contest a wiser and a sadder man.

More recently the Irish Bishops have proved on more than one memorable occasion that they are no King's men or Castle men, but

men of the people, by refusing educational measures offered for their acceptance which would give the British Government control of Irish education. They were the means, it may be here stated, of having the quietus given Mr. Birrell's simulacrum of an Irish Council Bill, because of its offensive provision debarring the Irish clergy from a voice in the National Council, so-called. They have profited well by past lessons in English perfidy and will certainly never sell their birthright for England's mess of pottage.

There are several other counts in the patchwork indictment of the anonymous accuser to whom this influential New York publication gave the hospitality of its columns. They are all of the same shallow character—mere rhetorical fustian such as one might expect to hear from the rear end of a peddler's wagon on a side street on a Saturday night, when working people have a leisure hour and their spirit of philosophic inquiry is roused or lulled, as the case may be, by the flow of something that stimulates to loquacity that may pass muster for logical oratory. The method of "lumping" facts so as to substantiate loose theories founded on rank prejudice may do for such followers of Demosthenes. But the scholar and the historian will not be satisfied with the pestle-and-mortar method of historical debate. Men and motives must be sorted and classified, and an intelligent line of study be constructed. In the long centuries of struggle through which Catholic Ireland has passed, her religious guides have been powerless to dictate the conditions of the country's fate, but they could at least uphold untarnished the faith that was handed down to them, for the salvation of the people. This was a higher duty than the proving of the truth of any commercial theory, or any other material consideration whatsoever, even though the one thing may have a most intimate bearing on the other. They could only seek for the maintenance of a great principle, leaving the material effects of its assertion to the disposition of an All-seeing Providence.

John J. O'Shea.

Philadelphia.

THE NEW SYLLABUS.

Sacrae Romanae et Universalis Inquisitionis.

DECRETUM.

LAMENTABILI sane exitu aetas nostra freni impatiens in rerum summis rationibus indagandis ita nova non raro sequitur ut, dimissa humani generis quasi haereditate, in errores incidat gravissimos. Qui errores longe erunt perniciosiores, si de disciplinis agitur sacris, si de Sacra Scriptura interpretanda, si de fidei praecipuis mysteriis. Dolendum autem vehementer inveniri etiam inter catholicos non ita paucos scriptores qui, praetergressi fines a patribus ac ab ipsa Sancta Ecclesia statutos, altioris intelligentiae specie et historicae considerationis nomine, eum dogmatum progressum quaerunt qui, reipsa, eorum corruptela est.

Ne vero huius generis errores, qui quotidie inter fideles sparguntur, in eorum animis radices figant ac fidei sinceritatem corrumpant, placuit SSmo D. N. Pio divina providentia PP. X. ut per hoc Sacrae Romanae et Universalis Inquisitionis officium ii qui inter eos praecipui essent, notarentur et reprobarentur.

Quare, instituto diligentissimo examine, praehabitoque RR. DD. Consultorum voto, Emi ac Rmi Dni Cardinales, in rebus fidei et morum Inquisitores Generales, propositiones quae sequuntur reprobandas ac proscribendas esse indicarunt, prouti hoc generali Decreto reprobantur ac proscribuntur:

I. Ecclesiastica lex quae praescribit subiicere praeviae censurae libros Divinas respicientes Scripturas, ad cultores critices aut exegeseos scientificae librorum Veteris et Novi Testamenti non extenditur.

II. Ecclesiae interpretatio Sacrorum Librorum non est quidem spernenda, subiacet tamen accuratiori exegetarum iudicio et correctioni.

III. Ex iudiciis et censuris ecclesiasticis contra liberam et cultiorem exegesim latis colligi potest fidem ab Ecclesia propositam contradicere historiae, et dogmata catholica cum verioribus christianae religionis originibus componi reipsa non posse.

IV. Magisterium Ecclesiae ne per dogmaticas quidem definitiones genuinum Sacrarum Scripturarum sensum determinare potest.

V. Quum in deposito fidei veritates tantum revelatae contineantur, nullo sub respectu ad Ecclesiam pertinet iudicium ferre de assertionibus disciplinarum humanarum.

VI. In definiendis veritatibus ita collaborant discens et docens Ecclesia, ut docenti Ecclesiae nihil supersit nisi communes discentis opinationes sancire.

VII. Ecclesia, cum proscribit errores, nequit a fidelibus exigere ullum internum assensum, quo iudicia a se edita complectantur.

VIII. Ab omni culpa immunes existimandi sunt qui reprobationes a Sacra Congregatione Indicis aliisve Sacris Romanis Congregationibus latas nihili pendunt.

IX. Nimiam simplicitatem aut ignorantiam prae se ferunt qui Deum credunt vere esse Scripturae Sacrae auctorem.

X. Inspiratio librorum Veteris Testamenti in eo constitut quod scriptores israelitae religiosas doctrinas sub peculiari quodam aspectu, gentibus parum noto aut ignoto, tradiderunt.

XI. Inspiratio divina non ita ad totam Scripturam Sacram extenditur, ut omnes et singulas eius partes ab omni errore praemuniat.

XII. Exegeta, si velit utiliter studiis biblicis incumbere, in primis quamlibet praeconceptam opinionem de supernaturali origine Scripturae Sacrae seponere debet, eamque non aliter interpretari quam cetera documenta mere humana.

XIII. Parabolas evangelicas ipsimet Evangelistae ac christiani secundae et tertiae generationis artificiose digesserunt, atque ita rationem dederunt exigui fructus praedicationis Christi apud iudaeos.

XIV. In pluribus narrationibus non tam quae vera sunt Evangelistae retulerunt, quam quae lectoribus, etsi falsa, censuerunt magis proficua.

XV. Evangelia usque ad definitum constitutumque canonem continuis additionibus et correctionibus aucta fuerunt; in ipsis proinde doctrinae Christi non remansit nisi tenue et incertum vestigium.

XVI. Narrationes loannis non sunt proprie historia, sed mystica Evangelii contemplatio; sermones, in eius evangelio contenti, sunt meditationes theologicae circa mysterium salutis historica veritate destitutae.

XVII. Quartum Evangelium miracula exaggeravit non tantum ut extraordinaria magis apparerent, sed etiam ut aptiora fierent ad significandum opus et gloriam Verbit Incarnati.

XVIII. Ioannes sibi vindicat quidem rationem testis de Christo; re tamen vera non est nisi eximius testis vitae christianae, seu vitae Christi in Ecclesia, exeunte primo saeculo.

XIX. Heterodoxi exegetae fidelius expresserunt sensum verum Scripturarum quam exegetae catholici.

XX. Revelatio nihil aliud esse potuit quam acquisita ab homine suae ad Deum relationis conscientia.

XXI. Revelatio, objectum fidei catholicae constituens, non fuit cum Apostolis completa.

XXII. Dogmata quae Ecclesia perhibet tamquam revelata, non sunt veritates e coelo delapsae, sed sunt interpretatio quaedam

factorum religiosorum quam humana mens laborioso conatu sibi comparavit.

XXIII. Existere potest et reipsa existit oppositio inter facta quae in Sacra Scriptura narrantur eisque innixa Ecclesiae dogmata; ita ut criticus tamquam falsa reiicere possit facta quae Ecclesia tamquam certissima credit.

XXIV. Reprobandus non est exegeta qui praemissas adstruit, ex quibus sequitur dogmata hitorice falsa aut dubia esse, dummodo dogmata ipsa directe non neget.

XXV. Assensus fidei ultimo innititur in congerie probabilitatum.

XXVI. Dogmata fidei retinenda sunt tantummodo iuxta sensum practicum, idest tanquam norma praeceptiva agendi, non vero tanquam norma credendi.

XXVII. Divinitas Iesu Christi ex Evangeliis non probatur; sed est dogma quod conscientia christiana e notione Messiae deduxit.

XXVIII. Iesus, quum ministerium suum exercebat, non in eum finem loquebatur ut doceret se esse Messiam, neque eius miracula eo spectabant ut id demonstraret.

XXIX. Concedere licet Christum quem exhibet historia, multo inferiorem esse Christo qui est obiectum fidei.

XXX. In omnibus textibus evangelicis nomen *Filius Dei* aequivalet tantum nomini *Messias,* minime vero significat Christum esse verum et naturalem Dei Filium.

XXXI. Doctrina de Christo quam tradunt Paulus, Ioannes et Concilia Nicaenum, Ephesinum, Chalcedonense, non est ea quam Iesus docuit, sed quam de Iesu concepit conscientia christiana.

XXXII. Conciliari nequit sensus naturalis textuum evangelicorum cum eo quod nostri theologi docent de conscientia et scientia infallibili Iesu Christi.

XXXIII. Evidens est cuique qui praeconceptis non ducitur opinionibus, Iesum aut errorem de proximo messianico adventu fuisse professum, aut maiorem partem ipsius doctrinae in Evangeliis Synopticis contentae authenticitate carere.

XXXIV. Criticus nequit asserere Christo scientiam nullo circumscriptam limite nisi facta hypothesi, quae historice haud concipi potest quaeque sensui morali repugnat, nempe Christum uti hominem habuisse scientiam Dei et nihilominus noluisse notitiam tot rerum communicare cum discipulis ac posteritate.

XXXV. Christus non semper habuit conscientiam suae dignitatis messianicae.

XXXVI. Resurrectio Salvatoris non est proprie factum ordinis historici, sed factum ordinis mere supernaturalis, nec demonstratum nec demonstrabile quod conscientia christiana sensim ex aliis derivavit.

XXXVII. Fides in resurrectionem Christi ab initio fuit non tam de facto ipso resurrectionis, quam de vita Christi immortali apud Deum.

XXXVIII. Doctrina de morte piaculari Christi non est evangelica sed tantum paulina.

XXXIX. Opiniones de origine sacramentorum, quibus Patres Tridentini imbuti erant quaeque in eorum canones dogmaticos procul dubio influxum habuerunt, longe distant ab iis quae nunc penes historicos rei christianae indigatores merito obtinent.

XL. Sacramenta ortum habuerunt ex eo quod Apostoli eorumque successores ideam aliquam et intentionem Christi suadentibus et moventibus circumstantiis et eventibus, interpretati sunt.

XLI. Sacramenta eo tantum spectant ut in mentem hominis revocent praesentiam Creatoris semper beneficam.

XLII. Communitas christiana necessitatem baptismi induxit, adoptans illum tamquam ritum necessarium, eique professionis christianae obligationes adnectens.

XLIII. Usus conferendi baptismum infantibus evolutio fuit disciplinaris, quae una ex causis extitit ut sacramentum resolveretur in duo, in baptismum scilicet et poenitentiam.

XLIV. Nihil probat ritum sacramenti confirmationis usurpatum fuisse ab Apostolis: formalis autem distinctio duorum sacramentorum, baptismi scilicet et confirmationis, haud spectat ad historiam christianismi primitivi.

XLV. Non omnia, quae narrat Paulus de institutione Eucharistiae (I. Cor. xi., 23-25), historice sunt sumenda.

XLVI. Non adfuit in primitiva Ecclesia conceptus de christiano peccatore auctoritate Ecclesiae reconciliatio, sed Ecclesia nonnisi admodum lente huiusmodi conceptui assuevit. Imo etiam postquam poenitentia tanquam Ecclesiae institutio agnita fuit, non appelabatur sacramenti nomine, eo quod haberetur uti sacramentum probrosum.

XLVII. Verba Domini: *Accipite Spiritum Sanctum; quorum remiseritis peccata, remittuntur eis, et quorum retinueritis, retenta sunt* (Io. xx., 22 et 23) minime referuntur ad sacramentum poenitentiae, quidquid Patribus Tridentinis asserere placuit.

XLVIII. Iacobus in sua epistola (vers. 14 et 15) non intendit promulgare aliquod sacramentum Christi, sed commendare pium aliquod sacramentum Christi, sed commendare pium aliquem morem, et si in hoc more forte cernit medium aliquod gratiae, id non accipit eo rigore, quo acceperunt theologi qui notionem et numerum sacramentorum statuerunt.

XLIX. Coena christiana paullatim indolem actionis liturgicae assumente, hi, qui Coenae praesse consueverant, characterem sacerdotalem acquisiverunt.

L. Seniores qui in christianorum coetibus invigilandi munere fungebantur, instituti sunt ab Apostolis presbyteri aut episcopi ad providendum necessariae crescentium communitatum ordinationi, non proprie ad perpetuandam missionem et potestatem Apostolicam.

LI. Matrimonium non potuit evadere sacramentum novae legis nisi serius in Ecclesia; siquidem ut matrimonium pro sacramento haberetur necesse erat ut praecederet plena doctrinae de gratia et sacramentis theologica explicatio.

LII. Alienum fuit a mente Christi Ecclesiam constituere veluti societatem super terram per longam saeculorum seriem duraturam; quin imo in mente Christi regnum coeli una cum fine mundi iamiam adventurum erat.

LIII. Constitutio organica Ecclesiae non est immutabilis; sed societas christiana perpetuae evolutioni aeque ac societas humana est obnoxia.

LIV. Dogmata, sacramenta, hierarchia, tum quod ad realitatem attinet, non sunt nisi intelligentiae christianae interpretationes evolutionesque quae exiguum germen in Evangelio latens externis incrementis auxerunt perfeceruntque.

LV. Simon Petrus ne suspicatus quidem unquam est sibi a Christo demandatum esse primatum in Ecclesia.

LVI. Ecclesia Romana non ex divinae providentiae ordinatione, sed ex mere politicis conditionibus caput omnium Ecclesiarum effecta est.

LVII. Ecclesia sese praebet scientiarum naturalium et theologicarum progressibus infensam.

LVIII. Veritas non est immutabilis plusquam ipse homo, quippe quae cum ipso, in ipso et per ipsum evolvitur.

LIX. Christus determinatum doctrinae corpus omnibus temporibus cunctisque hominibus applicabile non docuit, sed potius inchoavit motum quemdam religiosum diversis temporibus ac locis adaptatum vel adaptandum.

. . . . . .

LXI. Dici potest abseque paradoxo nullum Scripturae caput, a primo Genesis ad postremum Apocalypsis, continere doctrinam prorus identicam illi quam super eadem re tradit Ecclesia, et idcirco nullum Scripturae caput habere eumdem sensum pro critico ac pro theologo.

LXII. Praecipui articuli Symboli Apostolici non eamdem pro christianis primorum temporum significationem habebant quam habent pro christianis nostri temporis.

LXIII. Ecclesia sese praebet imparem ethicae evangelicae efficaciter tuendae, quia obstinate adhaeret immutabilibus doctrinis quae cum hodiernis progressibus componi nequeunt.

LXIV. Progressus scientiarum postulat ut reformentur conceptus doctrinae christianae de Deo, de Creatione, de Revelatione, de Persona Verbi Incarnati, de Redemptione.

LXV. Catholicismus hodiernus cum vera scientia componi nequit nisi transformetur in quemdam christianismum non dogmaticum, id est in protestantismum latum et liberalem.

Sequenti vero feria V. die 4 eiusdem mensis et anni, facta de his omnibus SSmo. D. N. Pio Pp. X. accurata relatione, Sanctitas Sua Decretum Emorum Patrum adprobavit et confirmavit, ac omnes et singulas supra recensitas propositiones ceu reprobatas ac proscriptas ab omnibus haberi mandavit.

PETRUS PALOMBELLI, *S. R. U. I. Notarius.*

DECREE OF THE HOLY ROMAN AND UNIVERSAL INQUISITION.

WITH truly lamentable results our age, intolerant of all check in its investigations of the ultimate causes of things, not infrequently follows what is new in such a way as to reject the legacy, as it were, of the human race and thus fall into the most grievous errors. These errors will be all the more pernicious when they affect sacred disciplines, the interpretation of the Sacred Scripture, the principal mysteries of the faith. It is to be greatly deplored that among Catholics also not a few writers are to be found who, crossing the boundaries fixed by the Fathers and by the Church herself, seek out, on the plea of higher intelligence and in the name of historical considerations, that progress of dogmas which is in reality the corruption of the same.

But lest errors of this kind, which are being daily spread among the faithful, should strike root in their minds and corrupt the purity of the faith, it has pleased His Holiness Pius X., by Divine Providence Pope, that the chief among them should be noted and condemned through the office of this Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition.

Wherefore, after a most diligent investigation, and after having taken the opinion of the reverend consultors, the Most Eminent and Reverend Lords Cardinals, the General Inquisitors in matters of faith and morals, decided that the following propositions are to be condemned and proscribed, as they are, by this general decree, condemned and proscribed:

1. The ecclesiastical law, which prescribes that books regarding the Divine Scriptures are subject to previous censorship, does not

extend to critical scholars or students of the scientific exegesis of the Old and New Testament.

2. The Church's interpretation of the Sacred Books is not indeed to be contemned, but it is subject to the more accurate judgment and to the correction of the exegetes.

3. From the ecclesiastical judgments and censures passed against free and more scientific (*cultiorem*) exegesis, it may be gathered that the faith proposed by the Church contradicts history and that the Catholic dogmas cannot really be reconciled with the true origins of the Christian religion.

4. The magisterium of the Church cannot, even through dogmatic definitions, determine the genuine sense of the Sacred Scriptures.

5. Since in the deposit of the faith only revealed truths are contained, under no respect does it appertain to the Church to pass judgment concerning the assertions of human sciences.

6. In defining truths the Church learning (*discens*) and the Church teaching (*docens*) collaborate in such a way that it only remains for the Church *docens* to sanction the opinions of the Church *discens*.

7. The Church, when it prescribes errors, cannot exact from the faithful any internal assent by which the judgments issued by it are embraced.

8. Those who treat as of no weight the condemnations passed by the Sacred Congregation of the Index or by the other Roman congregations are free from all blame.

9. Those who believe that God is really the author of the Sacred Scripture display excessive simplicity or ignorance.

10. The inspiration of the books of the Old Testament consists in the fact that the Israelite writers have handed down religious doctrines under a peculiar aspect, either little or not at all known to the Gentiles.

11. Divine inspiration is not to be so extended to the whole Sacred Scriptures that it renders its parts, all and single, immune from all error.

12. The exegete, if he wishes to apply himself usefully to Biblical studies, must first of all put aside all preconceived opinions concerning the supernatural origin of the Sacred Scripture, and interpret it not otherwise than other merely human documents.

13. The Evangelists themselves and the Christians of the second and third generation arranged (*digesserunt*) artificially the evangelical parables, and in this way gave an explanation of the scanty fruit of the preaching of Christ among the Jews.

14. In a great many narrations the Evangelists reported not so much things that are true as things which even though false they judged to be more profitable for their readers.

15. The Gospels until the time the canon was defined and constituted were increased by additions and corrections; hence in them there remained of the doctrine of Christ only a faint and uncertain trace.

16. The narrations of John are not properly history, but the mystical contemplation of the Gospel; the discourses contained in his Gospel are theological meditations, devoid of historical truth concerning the mystery of salvation.

17. The Fourth Gospel exaggerated miracles not only that the wonderful might stand out, but also that they might become more suitable for signifying the work and the glory of the Word Incarnate.

18. John claims for himself the quality of a witness concerning Christ; but in reality he is only a distinguished witness of the Christian life, or of the life of Christ in the Church, at the close of the first century.

19. Heterodox exegetes have expressed the true sense of the Scriptures more faithfully than Catholic exegetes.

20. Revelation could be nothing but the consciousness acquired by man of his relation with God.

21. Revelation, constituting the object of Catholic faith, was not completed with the Apostles.

22. The dogmas which the Church gives out as revealed are not truths which have fallen down from heaven, but are an interpretation of religious facts, which the human mind has acquired by laborious efforts.

23. Opposition may and actually does exist between the facts which are narrated in Scripture and the dogmas of the Church which rest on them; so that the critic may reject as false facts which the Church holds as most certain.

24. The exegete is not to be blamed for constructing premises from which it follows that the dogmas are historically false or doubtful, provided he does not directly deny the dogmas themselves.

25. The assent of faith rests ultimately on a mass of probabilities.

26. The dogmas of faith are to be held only according to their practical sense, that is, as preceptive norms of conduct, but not as norms of believing.

27. The Divinity of Jesus Christ is not proved from the Gospels; but is a dogma which the Christian conscience has derived from the notion of the Messias.

28. Jesus, while He was exercising His ministry, did not speak with the object of teaching that He was the Messias, nor did His miracles tend to prove this.

29. It is lawful to believe that the Christ of history is far inferior to the Christ who is the object of faith.

30. In all the evangelical texts the name *Son of God* is equivalent only to Messias, and does not at all signify that Christ is the true and natural Son of God.

31. The doctrine concerning Christ taught by Paul, John, the Councils of Nicea, Ephesus and Chalcedon, is not that which Jesus taught, but that which the Christian conscience conceived concerning Jesus.

32. It is not possible to reconcile the natural sense of the Gospel texts with the sense taught by our theologians concerning the conscience and the infallible knowledge of Jesus Christ.

33. It is evident to everybody who is not led by preconceived opinions that either Jesus professed an error concerning the immediate Messianic coming, or that the greater part of His doctrine as contained in the Gospels is destitute of authenticity.

34. The critic cannot ascribe to Christ a knowledge circumscribed by no limits excepts on a hypothesis which cannot be historically conceived, and which is repugnant to the moral sense, viz., that Christ as man had the knowledge of God and yet was unwilling to communicate the knowledge of a great many things to His disciples and to posterity.

35. Christ had not always the consciousness of His Messianic dignity.

36. The Resurrection of the Saviour is not properly a fact of the historical order, but a fact of merely supernatural order neither demonstrated nor demonstrable, which the Christian conscience gradually derived from other facts.

37. Faith in the Resurrection of Christ was in the beginning not so much in the fact itself of the Resurrection as in the immortal life of Christ with God.

38. The doctrine of the expiatory death of Christ is not Evangelical but Pauline.

39. The opinions concerning the origin of the sacraments with which the Fathers of Trent were imbued and which certainly influenced their dogmatic canons are very different from those which now rightly obtain among historians who examine into Christianity.

40. The sacraments had their origin in the fact that the Apostles and their successors, swayed and moved by circumstances and events, interpreted some idea and intention of Christ.

41. The sacraments are merely intended to bring before the mind of man the ever-beneficent presence of the Creator.

42. The Christian community imposed (*induxit*) the necessity of baptism, adopting it as a necessary rite, and adding to it the obligations of the Christian profession.

43. The practice of conferring baptism on infants was a discipli-

nary evolution, which became one of the causes why the sacrament was divided into two, viz., baptism and penance.

44. There is nothing to prove that the rite of the Sacrament of Confirmation was employed by the Apostles; but the formal distinction of the two sacraments, baptism and confirmation, does not belong to the history of primitive Christianity.

45. Not everything which Paul narrates concerning the institution of the Eucharist (I. Cor. xi., 23-25) is to be taken historically.

46. In the primitive Church the conception of the Christian sinner reconciled by the authority of the Church did not exist, but it was only very slowly that the Church accustomed itself to this conception. Nay, even after penance was recognized as an institution of the Church, it was not called a sacrament, for it would be held as an ignominious sacrament.

47. The words of the Lord: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins ye shall forgive they are forgiven them, and whose sins ye shall retain they are retained" (John xx., 22, 23) do not at all refer to the Sacrament of Penance, whatever the Fathers of Trent may have been pleased to say.

48. James in his Epistle (v., 14 and 15) did not intend to promulgate a sacrament of Christ, but to commend a pious custom, and if in this custom he happens to distinguish (*cernit*) a means of grace, it is not in that rigorous manner in which it was received by the theologians who laid down the notion and the number of the sacraments.

49. The Christian supper gradually assuming the nature of a liturgical action, those who were wont to preside at the supper acquired the sacerdotal character.

50. The elders who filled the office of watching over the gatherings of the faithful, were instituted by the Apostles as priests or Bishops to provide for the necessary ordering (*ordinationi*) of the increasing communities, not properly for perpetuating the Apostolic mission and power.

51. It is not possible that matrimony could have become a sacrament of the new law until later in the Church; for in order that matrimony should be held as a sacrament it was necessary that a full theological development (*explicatio*) of the doctrine of grace and the sacraments should first take place.

52. It was foreign to the mind of Christ to found a Church as a society which was to last on the earth for a long course of centuries; nay, in the mind of Christ the kingdom of heaven together with the end of the world was about to come immediately.

53. The organic constitution of the Church is not immutable; but Christian society like human society is subject to perpetual evolution.

54. Dogmas, sacraments, hierarchy, both as regards the notion of them and the reality, are but interpretations and evolutions of the Christian intelligence which by external increments have increased and perfected the little germ latent in the Gospel.

55. Simon Peter never even suspected that the primacy in the Church was entrusted to him by Christ.

56. The Roman Church became the head of all the churches not through the ordinance of Divine Providence, but through merely political conditions.

57. The Church has shown herself to be hostile to the progress of natural and theological sciences.

58. Truth is not any more immutable than man himself, since it is evolved with him, in him and through him.

59. Christ did not teach a determinate body of doctrine applicable to all times and to all men, but rather inaugurated a religious movement adapted or to be adapted for different times and places.

60. Christian doctrine in its origin was Judaic, but through successive evolutions became first Pauline, then Joannine and finally Hellenic and universal.

61. It may be said without paradox that there is no chapter of Scripture, from the first of Genesis to the last of the Apocalypse, which contains a doctrine absolutely identical with that which the Church teaches on the same matter, and that, therefore, no chapter in Scripture has the same sense for the critic and for the theologian.

62. The chief articles of the Apostolic Symbol had not for the Christians of the first ages the same sense that they have for the Christians of our time.

63. The Church shows itself unequal to the task of efficaciously maintaining evangelical ethics, because it obstinately adheres to immutable doctrines which cannot be reconciled with modern progress.

64. The progress of science requires a remodeling (*ut reformentur*) of the conceptions of Christian doctrine concerning God, Creation, Revelation, the Person of the Incarnate Word, Redemption.

65. Modern Catholicism cannot be reconciled with true science unless it be transformed into a non-dogmatic Christianity, that is, into a broad and liberal Protestantism.

And on the following Thursday, the fourth day of the same month and year, an accurate report of all this having been made to our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius X., His Holiness approved and confirmed the decree of the Most Eminent Fathers, and ordered that the propositions above enumerated, all and several, be held by all as condemned and proscribed.

PETER PALOMBELLI, Notary of the H. R. U. I.

Book Reviews

IRELAND UNDER ENGLISH RULE, Or, A Plea for the Plaintiff. By *Thomas Addis Emmet, M. D., LL. D.* Vol. I., xxv.+333 pp. Vol. II., iv.+358 pp. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. The Knickerbocker Press, 1903.

The volumes were reviewed in these pages on their appearance, but a supplementary notice will not be superfluous in view of the recent failure of the Irish Council Bill to satisfy the legitimate hopes and purposes of the people of Ireland. This failure merely accentuates the prophetic words of Dr. Emmet: "England has never yet undertaken to grant any apparent concession to Ireland without interpolating somewhere a saving clause which in application lessened the full benefit expected" (Vol. I., p. 13). After many years of struggle and of waiting, the Liberal party has once more regained power in the House of Commons, swept thither on the full tide of an enormous majority. At last, it was reasonably expected, the many pledges, hopes, promises, enticements held out to the Irish party in order to retain and increase their support of the Liberal ambitions and the Liberal candidates, would now receive their adequate fulfillment, or that at least such a decided measure of reform would be introduced into Parliament as would indicate very substantially the purpose of the English people to enter resolutely upon the path of reconstruction and rehabilitation of Ireland and its national aspirations. The Irish Council Bill was introduced by Mr. Birrell for this purpose. On the surface it did not appear satisfactory; but, with a seasoned patience which belies all the taunts of English tories and Orange traitors, to the effect that Irish statesmen were creatures of excitement and emotionalism, the bill was received by Mr. Redmond, the leader of the Irish Parliamentary party, with a quiet statement marked by reserves, indeed, but expressing the intention of taking its provisions into the most serious consideration and with the most favorable attitude of mind which the circumstances of the case would permit. A vast meeting of representatives of the Irish people scattered over the whole earth was held in Dublin, this present year, to express a common judgment of the acceptability or the non-acceptability of the measure. The closest consideration was bestowed upon it by men representing the judicial temper acquired by successful enterprise in all the lands of earth—men prominent in professional and commercial life. With a wonderful unanimity the measure was rejected. Why? Was not even a half loaf better than none? Assuredly—unless the half loaf were stone, and not bread. But is it conceivable that, at this late day, with the record (behind the bill) of pledge and conciliatory oratory by Liberal statesmen; with the

experience of the centuries, studied now as never before, of English misrule in Ireland; with a fuller knowledge of Irish character and its martyr-like tenacity of purpose, its supreme but practical idealism; with the whole world—so long a disgusted but helpless witness of English paltering, misapprehension, selfishness, obduracy—looking on; with the memories of Gladstone to cheer them on—is it possible that English statesmen would now offer once again a stone when the people asked for bread? A "concession" was attempted by the Council Bill. But a concession was never yet granted, says Dr. Emmet, prophetically, without an interpolation somewhere of "a saving clause which in application lessened the full benefit expected." We must amend Dr. Emmet's phrase summing up his deep study of Irish history, and make it plural—"saving clauses." A hasty glance, even, at the splendid arraignment which Dr. Emmet makes (he styles it merely a "Plea for the Plaintiff," but his earlier word, "Indictment," would have applied perfectly) of English misrule in Ireland, would lead us to expect some such miserable subterfuge as we find in the Irish Council Bill. This bill was intended as a "concession" to the hopes of Ireland. It pretended to give a limited measure of Home Rule. It therefore established an Irish Council to consist of eighty-two members elected by the people (here is a "concession") and twenty-four members appointed by the King for the first term and thereofter by the Lord Lieutenant (here is a "saving clause"), while the Under Secretary for Ireland was to be a member *ex-officio*. Now, looked at a little closely, what does this mean? The Lord Lieutenant appoints the twenty-four; if he were himself elected by the people and answerable for his official actions to the people, this would not mean much. But he is appointed by the King! In addition to this, he has the absolute power of veto; he appoints the chairmen of all committees; he is practically an absolute monarch, or the representative in Ireland of an absolute majority in the English Parliament. He can withdraw any measure proposed by the Council, even though presented with a unanimous concurrence of its members. Now, add to his twenty-four appointees the Orange members elected, and observe that a change of merely eight votes in the Council from the eighty-two elected members could blight the aspirations of a whole people. The Council bill confers these prerogatives on the Lord Lieutenant. A worthy concession, truly, to Ireland. But these are not the only saving clauses. The pampered, useless, highly salaried officialdom under which an already impoverished land has for so long been suffering must be carefully provided for. However the Council think to remove such an abuse, the official darlings of English patronage must not come to grief. If the Council should dismiss any of them, the

Lord Lieutenant may, at his option, pension them for life at any fancy figure he may elect. In this way there would be saddled upon the country the salaries both of those officials who would do satisfactory work and of those who should be dismissed for unsatisfactory work. But enough of this recent demonstration of the correctness of Dr. Emmet's historical conclusion; and now to his work itself.

It is a Plea for the Plaintiff, in the course of which the heart-rending story of Ireland is reviewed for seven centuries and a half, down, that is to say, to the Union with England in the last year of the eighteenth century. While it was essential for such a plea that its author should thus review the long history, the two volumes are by no means a history, but rather, like Palma's "Praelectiones" or Parson's "Studies in Church History," a series of monographs embodying a summary of the historical facts in certain epochs, together with a well-reasoned philosophical and judicial conclusion from those facts. Histories of Ireland, large and small, we have in sufficient number. We also have the brief but admirably conceived "plea for the plaintiff" contained in Charles Gavan Duffy's "Bird's-Eye View of Irish History," which is at once a history and a plea drawn from or based upon that history. Monographs well-nigh inumerable, also, we have on special epochs or special phases of that history. But what Dr. Emmet has attempted so successfully to accomplish in his extensive work is to present impartially the significant facts of Irish history, with something like those documentary illustrations which the French style *mémoires pour servir a l'histoire*, with analyses of the important controverted documents, and finally with inferences drawn from both facts and documents in support of his main thesis, which is a plea for the plaintiff, Ireland, or an indictment of the accused, England. This plea or indictment is very briefly and succinctly stated in the preface to Volume I. (10 pages), together with an account of the projected work as first conceived and executed by Dr. Emmet, of the rejection thereof by every (non-Irish and non-Catholic) publisher to whom he sent the work, of the amplification made possible during the five years which elapsed from that first rejection until the publication of the present work. The story thus told in the preface is very interesting and enlightening. Dr. Emmet wished to plead his cause, not before a Catholic or an Irish audience, where its value and correctness are already properly appreciated, but before the hostile, or indifferent, or ignorant public at large; and he therefore determined to seek a publisher representing such a public:

"The manuscript was submitted to several prominent American publishers and, while the writer was courteously treated, it was returned, with a single exception, without comment beyond the statement that the subject was not a desirable one. The exceptional com-

ment was to the effect that 'were the statements made in the work as authentic as those in the Bible, no publisher, with any thought to his future, would dare print such an array against England, when at that time the disposition of the people throughout the country was so friendly towards her.' "

To pity or plead for "the under dog" may be an attractive task; but it depends upon one's auditory whether or not it is a promising one. England is so well fortified by diplomacy, by literature, by so-called history, by commercial interests, by geographical prominence through her colonies in every part of the globe, and—last but not least—by social prestige, that a defense of Ireland is not (however grateful and gracious a task) a promising brief to hold. But it is vastly encouraging to find, in the course of the pleading of that brief, that public sentiment the world over is gradually but surely coming to the pleader's side, and that, even in England, its foremost men are either listening with interest or have become, in many cases, ardent champions of the plea. And works like that of Dr. Emmet will advance such a plea in those places where it should most of all be heard.

In the introduction Dr. Emmet notes the fact that "During the last four centuries Ireland has been in a chronic state of unrest and, previous to the late movement to gain by constitutional measures Home Rule for the country, scarcely ten consecutive years passed without a protest on the part of the people in the guise of some outbreak or disturbance." The reason for this is obvious—that "Ireland has never prospered under English rule," and that it was the consistent and determined purpose of England, throughout all the long period embraced by the author's inquiry, "that Ireland should *not* prosper, and that the labor of the people and the resources of the country should be utilized only so far as both could be used to the profit of the English people themselves." Not only was Ireland's perpetual protest illustrated by the various rebellions and plottings recorded in her history, but as well by the ominous fact that, as he remarks, "hundreds of thousands of the best men of Ireland have, in successive generations, either been driven into exile, fallen on the battlefield, suffered imprisonment until both body and mind had become shattered, or sacrificed their lives 'after due process of law'—and all this for the principle of self-government. In the struggle to gain control of the land and its form of government no sacrifice was considered too great, for Ireland is the only country in the world where the people have been deprived of both these rights." That England should have been able to carry on, for so many centuries, so forbidding a plan of campaign, a course so ruthless at once and so selfish, without encountering the united protest of humanity,

was largely due to her systematic repression of the true expository efforts of historians. She would not let the facts be properly stated. She suppressed evidence against her as well as suborned testimony in her favor. "It is a well-known fact that the circulation of works in Ireland written in Irish interests has been suppressed by persecution of the author or seizure, and generally such works were burned by the hangman. Moreover, the English Government has never been backward in having a suitable version published from time to time for the outside world, and has generally managed by some bribe, of title or position, to have it done as though on the authority of some individual. No writer has attempted to trace the persistent efforts made by the English Government in the past to keep her own people in ignorance of Irish affairs. That the Irish people should be kept in ignorance as far as possible and that the children in the national schools should not be taught the simplest fact in relation to the history of their own country may be good policy from the English standpoint. But to falsify Irish history and suppress the truth to the extent done through the influence of the English Government can never be justified." Dr. Emmet next refers to the notable absence of crime in Ireland and the splendid reverence a plaintiff still will have for the orderly processes of any equitable system of law, even when a judgment is passed against his claim.

The other interesting matter found in the introduction we shall pass over in order to sketch briefly the contents of the work. Chapter I. treats (30 pages) of the Irish language and the early civilization and the traditions of the Irish people. Chapter II. (25 pages) deals with "the alleged Bull to Henry II." The chapter is especially valuable for bringing into one place the text of the alleged bull (translated into English), together with the able comment of the Abbé MacGeoghegan on it; the passage from Lingard's history accepting it, by implication, as authentic; the alleged Bull of Alexander III. (English translation), affirming that of Adrian, with the comment thereupon of MacGeoghegan; the passage from Dr. Lanigan's "Ecclesiastical History of Ireland" accepting the authenticity of Adrian's bull; and, throughout all these quotations, the comment of Dr. Emmet himself. Lingard and Lanigan are for its authenticity; MacGoeghegan and Emmet against it. But, as the author properly states, "the literature on this subject is voluminous and cannot be condensed into reasonable limits, if an attempt be made to show that this Papal bull was a forgery." Dr. Emmet does not meet the question as to whether, even if the bull be a forgery, the donation may not nevertheless have been actually made by Adrian to Henry, as John of Salisbury (who does not mention the bull "Laudabiliter," but does refer to a "letter" of investiture, and also the "ring of gold"

wherewith the investiture might be made, both of which he declares he had received on his visit to Adrian)—and John is a highly credible witness when speaking of facts in which he played a part—declares. If the "Laudabiliter" be considered a forgery, it does not follow thence that the passage referring to the receipt by John of a "letter" (quite another thaing) and a ring is an interpolation by some other hand, as MacGeoghegan, together with "the learned" believes. A statement here of the opinions of historical authorities *pro* and *con* in respect of the genuineness of the "Laudabiliter" would have been additionally valuable in the chapter. Chapters III.-XV. (inclusive) deal with the confused story of oppression and resistance down to the passage of the Act of Union. The remaining chapters (XVI.-XX.) of Volume I. are more general in their scope, and give summarized views which historically include the century following the Union of 1800. Thus (page 274) we have a list of the various Coercion Acts passed in the interest of the landlord. It is an instructive as well as a saddening list. Also, such general questions are treated as "the government of Ireland for a century," "the true condition of Ulster, its morals and prosperity," "famines in Ireland," with their concomitant loss of life and emigration; and, finally, the unjust discrimination which Catholics have had to suffer even to the present day. In the second volume the twelve chapters also deal with general considerations, including "the financial relation of Ireland to England," the land question, the poverty of the Irish people, the Land League movement, the United Irish League and "what is to be accomplished by union of the Irish people." One of the great values of these treatments is found in the laborious and happy selection and quotation from prominent writers whose views are often merely stated in too summary a fashion. Dr. Emmet has made his work not merely a splendid Plea for the Plaintiff, but a plea well documented by worthy authorities, so that the two volumes constitute a considerable armamentarium for the accuser of the misrule of England in her sister island. For this reason the extensive appendix to Volume II. (pages 183-257) will be highly appreciated by the readers of the work. Following this (pages 259-328) is the diary of Thomas Addis Emmet while acting in Paris as the secret agent of the United Irishmen, May 30, 1803, to March 10, 1804. This is a reprint from "The Emmet Family, with Some Incidents Relating to Irish History," etc., which was privately printed in New York in 1898, and is here reproduced in view of the very limited circulation of the fuller work on "The Emmet Family," etc. More than a word of commendation should be passed on the very full bibliography (7 pages) and the scientifically elaborate index (31 pages).

The purpose of the great labor undertaken by Dr. Emmet, and too briefly indicated in this summary review notice, was not the vulgar one of stirring up racial hatred or of prolonging any centuried antipathies. The work has a less popular, a severer aim: "The object of the author has been to trace certain causes and effects and to show, what is self-evident in the abstract, that no result can be produced without an adequate cause. As the chief proposition it will be shown that Ireland has only prospered under English rule for a brief interval—when at least Irishmen managed Irish affairs, although these were conducted by a minority, with the added disadvantage that fully eight-tenths of the population of Ireland at that time were disfranchised on a religious test. The logical deduction then presents itself that Ireland has never prospered because of misrule on the part of the English Government." The indictment lies not against the English people—for no individuals are censured as such, and many Englishmen and English women are very amiable and just, and the author has no quarrel with them—but against the mistaken policies and points of view entertained by successive English Governments. Dr. Emmet's indictment appears even more justified by the recent abortive effort of English statesmanship in the puny offspring known as the Irish Council Bill, which alone, almost, would seem to be a compendium of that long story which so fully illustrates how impossible it is for the affairs of Ireland to be administered at Westminster or from Westminster. In brief, Dr. Emmet presents an unanswerable plea for Home Rule for Ireland.

HISTORY OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS IN NORTH AMERICA, COLONIAL AND FEDERAL. By *Thomas Hughes*, of the same society. Text Vol. I., "From the First Colonization Till 1645." Royal 8vo., pp. xiv.+656. With maps, facsimiles and exhaustive index. Cleveland, Ohio: The Burrows Brothers Company.

We find before us the beginning of a historic of great value. It has a twofold interest—it contains the history of the great sons of Ignatius in this country, and the history of this country in the great sons of Ignatius. Only those who have studied carefully the history of the society and the history of the country carefully and with the proper facilities know the important part which the Society of Jesus took in the work of colonization and civilization. The number of such persons is small. To many the will was wanting; to others the way. Many through prejudice, indolence or ignorance would not or could not see; others had not the means. Even so-called historians closed their eyes, sometimes wilfully, to the full truth when Catholic churchmen led the way, or else they passed over the most

important events in which they were prominently concerned in a manner out of all proportion to the occasion.

In recent years a healthy change has gradually been made, but only by the publication of works dealing specifically with the part which Catholic churchmen took in the formation of this country. We have such a work in the "Jesuit Relations," which the Burrows Brothers Company brought out so splendidly a few years ago, and we have another example in the work before us from the same enterprising publishers. The book is intensely interesting as well as highly informing. It is edited by a man who is enthusiastic, zealous and scholarly, and who brings to his work an equipment which guarantees the best results.

The present volume describes the first era of North American religious history, after the colonization of Newfoundland, Virginia, New England and Maryland. The central subject is the work and progress of the Jesuit missionaries who accompanied the Maryland pilgrims to St. Mary's City in 1633. The history continues till 1645. The volume of documents, which is to follow, gives the text of originals in Jesuit and other archives, whence the whole body of this volume is derived. These originals comprise the correspondence of the Jesuit General in Rome, drawn from his own autographic register, letters of Papal envoys and others in the Vatican and Propaganda, and other documents of the time in the Jesuit archives of Europe and America.

The publishers expect to have the second volume ready in the spring of 1908.

It was intended originally to complete the work in two volumes, but that intention has already been changed, and now it is impossible to say how many volumes the work will demand. The readiness of the makers of the book to extend it to completeness speaks well for its ultimate value. It will be of the highest value not only to students and historians, but to all intelligent readers, and especially to those who are particularly interested in the America of the seventeenth century.

GESCHICHTE DER PAEPSTE seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters. Mit Benutzung des päpstlichen Geheim-Archives und vieler anderer Archive, bearbeitet von *Ludwig Pastor*, k. k. Hofrat, v. o. Professor der Geschichte an der Universität zu Insbruck und Direktor des oesterreichischen historischen Instituts zu Rom. Vierter Band. Geschichte der Päpste im Zeitalter der Renaissance und der Glaubensspaltung von der Wahl Leos X. bis zum Tode Klemens' VII. (1513-1534). Zweite Abteilung: Adrian VI. und Klemens VII. Erste bis vierte Auflage. (XLVIII. u. 800.) Freiburg, 1907, Herdersche Verlagshandlung. Price, net, $3.75.

With great pleasure we announce the appearance of Part II. of Dr. Pastor's fourth volume of his "History of the Popes." In this

volume he deals with the pontificates of Adrian VI. and Clement VII. As the book came to hand at the last moment, we have had time to read only the narrative of Adrian's reign; hence we shall reserve the second Medicean Pope for treatment in our next issue.

Although the story of the last non-Italian Pope is one of singular pathos, and though he was destined to fail in every one of his high aims, yet we can imagine the satisfaction it afforded the historian to come again upon a Pontiff of purely spiritual character, after being obliged to deal with the worldly-minded Popes of the Renaissance period. Previous writers, notably Hoefler and Lepitre, had already cleaned away the baseless charges with which the malignity of contemporary Italians had loaded the memory of one of the saintliest of the Popes; but Dr. Pastor, by a fresh ransacking of archives, was so lucky as to find a great deal of valuable materials, and he has written a history of Adrian worthy of the subject and of the writer.

Was Adrian's career, after all, the downright failure it is usual to pronounce it to have been? True, he cannot be said to have actually succeeded in achieving any one of the three great objects which he set before himself. These were: First, the conclusion of peace among Christian Princes for the purpose of a concerted defense of Christendom against the aggression of the Turks; second, the reform of the Roman court; third, the extinguishment of the religious conflagration in Germany. During his short reign Rhodes fell after a gallant defense; Lutheranism advanced with giant steps, while at Rome but little was accomplished in the way of extirpating inveterate abuses. For all that, and though Adrian, like his Divine Master, was fated to be "sorrowful even unto death," yet his untiring efforts and, yet more, his saintly character, were of immense advantage to the Catholic cause. He kept together and inspired with his own rugged courage the ever growing band of earnest Catholic reformers and blazed the path by which future successors in the Papacy achieved ultimate success. Demosthenes, with infinite scorn, derided those who make the success of the moment the standard of human merit. "The brave man," he says, "wraps himself round in his fortitude, as in a mantle, and leaves the issue of his efforts to the immortal gods." These words apply with peculiar force to the career of Adrian of Utrecht.

THE RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN FRANCE, 1900-1906. By *J. Napier Brodhead*, author of "Slav and Moslem." B. Herder, St. Louis, and Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., London. Price, net, $1.35.

The religious situation in France continues to engross the attention of the civilized world; and the more men consider, the more their

bewilderment grows at a condition of affairs which perplexes Catholics and non-Catholics alike. We have received more light on the subject from this little book of Brodhead's than from the immense number of communications which have filled the religious and secular journals. The writer is keen-sighted and wields a facile pen. He has enjoyed exceptional opportunities of studying the French problem, as he has resided over thirty years in that country. He began his appreciation of the struggle seven years ago, when the infidel government began its first insidious assaults upon Christianity; and he may be said to have prophesied the whole course of the combat till the end. No phase of it escapes his vigilant eye. His style is a model of terseness and strength. As instances, take the following short paragraphs, written in 1901:

"It is a notorious fact, well established by Taine, that the French Revolution, with all its saturnalia of carnage and nameless tyranny, was the work of a handful, some ten thousand in all, and even many of these were foreigners. They carried all before them, and I fear that history will repeat itself.

"France's great misfortune is, I repeat, that respectable people will not, as a rule, touch politics, or soon give them up in disgust, while denaturalized Frenchmen and naturalized foreigners do nothing else for a living."

No greater service could be rendered to the Catholic cause than the circulation of this valuable book among the American people.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

INSTITUTIONES PHILOSOPHICAE auctore *C. Willems, D. D., Ph. D.* Vol I., pp. 605, price 9 marks; Vol. II., pp. 680, price 10 marks. Treviris ex Officina ad Stm. Paulinum (Paulinus Duruckerei), 1906.

CURSUS BREVIS PHILOSOPHIAE auctore *Gustavo Pécsi, D. D., Ph. D.* Vol I. (Log. et Metaph.), pp. 327. Esztergour (Hungaria). Typis Gustavi Buzarovits, 1906.

DE SACRAMENTO EXTREMAE UNCTIONIS TRACTATUS DOGMATICUS auctore *Joseph Kern, S. J.* Ratisbonæ et Neo-Eboraci (New York): Pustet & Co., 1907. Pp. 412, price 4 marks.

ON GREGORIAN RHYTHM. I. The Old Manuscripts and the Two Gregorian Schools. By *Alexandre Fleury, S. J.* (Translation by Ludwig Bonvin, S. J.) II. Rhythm as Taught by the Gregorian Masters Up to the Twelfth Century and in Accordance With the Oriental Usage. By *Ludwig Bonvin, S. J.* New York: Reprint from *The Messenger.* Pp. 46. 8vo.

MEDITATIONS ON CHRISTIAN DOGMA. By *Right Rev. James Bellord, D. D.* With an introductory letter from the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. Third edition. Two vols., 12mo., pp. 369 and 363. Convent of Mercy, Callan, County Kilkenny.

THE MISSIONS OF CALIFORNIA AND THE OLD SOUTHWEST. By *Jesse S. Hildrup.* With thirty-five illustrations from photographs. Oblong octavo, pp. 100. Chicago: A. C. McClure & Co.

THE SPIRITUAL CONFERENCES. Translated from the Annecy Text of 1895, under the supervision of Abbot Gasquet and the late Canon Mackey, O. S. B. 12mo., pp. 406. Burns & Oates, London; Benziger Brothers, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago.

SHORT SERMONS. By *Rev. F. P. Hickey, O. S. B.* With introduction by the Right Rev. J. C. Hedley, O. S. B., Bishop of Newport. Benziger Brothers, New York, Cincinnati and Chicago.

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